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To better understand global pretrial detention patterns, this study explores economic, 
political, and social factors associated with two measures of pretrial detention: the number of 
pretrial detainees as a rate of the general population, and the number of pretrial detainees as a 
proportion of the overall prison population. Through simple correlation analysis, stepwise 
regression, and moderation analyses, the study identifies factors which are most strongly 
associated with the two pretrial detention measures. The literature does not report any large-scale 
cross-national studies on pretrial detention. This study addresses this gap, focusing exclusively 
on pretrial detention using a large cross-national sample of almost 200 countries. 
The economic, political, and social correlates of the two pretrial detention outcome 
measures are not the same as many of the correlates of general incarceration. This insight 
provides a useful pathway for constructing new theoretical approaches to understanding cross-
national pretrial detention patterns. 
Factors dealing with insecurity, development, and good governance are all significantly 
associated with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. Countries with high levels of 
insecurity, and lacking development and good governance, tend to have a high proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. This finding is important for national policy makers and 
international development assistance providers, especially in places where development 
intersects with modernization and democratic transitions – both of which are associated with 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is entrenched in international law, 
standards and norms. Yet, over a quarter of all prisoners, some three million people, are in 
pretrial detention worldwide. During the course of an average year, an estimated 15 million 
persons are remanded to pretrial detention (Schönteich, 2014). In many places pretrial detention 
rather than imprisonment after conviction is the norm. In South Asia, Central and West Africa, 
and parts of Latin America the majority of prisoners are pretrial detainees (Walmsley, 2017). 
Today’s cohort of pretrial detainees will collectively spend 640 million days in pretrial detention, 
often languishing for weeks, months and even years before their trials are finalized or charges 
dismissed. 
Many pretrial detainees are treated more harshly than convicted prisoners (UNICEF, 
1998; Rodley, 2000; Jones, 2003; Nowak, 2007). Pretrial detainees are regularly held in police 
cells, sometimes for extended periods of time, where conditions can be particularly crowded. 
Prison administrators regard their main mandate as the custody and rehabilitation of convicted 
prisoners and see pretrial detainees as a group whose imprisonment is temporary and somewhat 
incidental to their work. As a result, pretrial detainees are typically not provided with 
educational, vocational and related work opportunities. In poorer countries, health services are 
frequently particularly inadequate in remand facilities. There is a reluctance to provide treatment 
for infectious diseases that requires a sustained period of therapy for people in pretrial detention, 
whose custody is seen as temporary, even if “temporary” turns out to be of long duration. 
The generally poor conditions under which pretrial detainees are confined often serve an 





opportunity to cajole detained defendants to cooperate with the criminal investigation (Human 
Rights Watch, 2017). Pretrial detainees are particularly vulnerable to physical and psychological 
abuse during the first few days of detention as interrogators seek to extract confessions from 
defendants (Novak, 2009). Such abuses, and the generally deplorable conditions in pretrial 
detention induce defendants to plead guilty with the expectation of being transferred to a prison 
for convicted prisoners where conditions are generally better. Even in jurisdictions where 
physical abuse and torture is relatively rare, pretrial detainees face heightened risks of conviction 
compared to analogous defendants awaiting trial at liberty (Davies, 1971; Williams, 2003; 
Stevenson, 2017). Pretrial detention often serves as a de facto form of punishment (Vagg & 
Dünkel, 1994; Redpath, 2015), especially in countries where conviction rates are low because of 
under-resourced or dysfunctional criminal justice systems. This may be the case in the 50 or so 
countries where the majority of prisoners are pretrial detainees. The result is not solely too many 
people in pretrial detention, but also injustice and corrosion of the rule of law. 
Perhaps paradoxically, the wide-scale use of pretrial detention undermines public 
security. Globally, prisons are filled beyond their official capacity by some 1.5 million prisoners. 
The world’s prison crowding problem would, in principle, be solved by halving the number of 
pretrial detainees. Lower crowding, and more focused efforts at the rehabilitation of convicted 
prisoners should reduce recidivism. Moreover, in jurisdictions where pretrial detainees are not 
confined separately from convicts, such mixing heightens the risk of abuse and can have a 
criminogenic effect. There is also evidence to suggest that pretrial detention – especially of 
longer duration – is positively associated with the likelihood that pretrial detainees will 





Pretrial detention often unnecessarily burdens criminal justice systems and strains public 
finances. Many detainees are not convicted of the charges that led to their arrest and detention 
(Human Rights Watch, 2017); many others receive a non-custodial sentence because of the 
minimal risk they pose to public security even after their guilt has been proven (Karth, 2008; 
Human Rights Watch, 2010; Peillard, Ahumada, & Chahuán, 2011; UNODC, 2011). A 
significant chunk of state resources devoted to the confinement of pretrial detainees – $14 billion 
in the U.S. (Henrichson, Rinaldi, & Delaney, 2015; Ortiz, 2015) and around €20 billion by 
European governments (Aebi, Tiago, & Burkhardt, 2016) annually – is money which could have 
been spent on combating or preventing crime more effectively, such as hiring more police 
officers or increased funding for social welfare programs. 
In 2015 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development which seeks to, among other things, reduce the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention (United Nations, 2015). The inclusion of pretrial detention in the global development 
agenda is an important political recognition of the issue in the development context, and 
underscores the link between pretrial detention and economic development. Pretrial detainees 
often lose their jobs, are forced to abandon their education, and are evicted from their homes. 
Their families suffer from lost income and forfeited education opportunities, producing a multi-
generational effect in which the children of detainees experience reduced educational attainment 
and lower lifetime income (OSJI, 2011b; Baradaran Baughman, 2017; Muntingh & Redpath, 
2018). In fragile communities the impact of pretrial detention – lost earnings, broken homes, and 
the incarceration of adult caregivers – aggravate some of the underlying causes of crime. 
Pretrial detention and corruption can be mutually-reinforcing phenomena. A criminal 





marked by corruption will likely lead to the excessive use of pretrial detention. Corruption is 
disproportionately prevalent during the pretrial phase of the criminal justice process because it 
receives less scrutiny and is subject to more discretion than subsequent stages of the justice 
process, and often involves lower paid and mostly junior actors in the system (OSJI, 2010). The 
corrupt and arbitrary abuse of power disproportionately punishes the poor, destroys the justice 
system’s credibility, and undermines the rule of law. 
The manifold harms associated with the (over)use of pretrial detention are often 
interrelated and cumulative in their impact. For example, pretrial detention aggravates prison 
overcrowding, which has negative public health consequences and a criminogenic effect on 
detainees. Both undermine socio-economic development through higher incidences of illness and 
crime. Thwarted development and poverty, in turn, foster crime which engenders insecurity and 
increases public demands for draconian pretrial detention practices. 
Its widespread use and pernicious consequences should not suggest that pretrial detention 
is inherently excessive or unwarranted. Applied fairly and sparingly, pretrial detention can play 
an important role in a balanced criminal justice system. To do so, a rational and effective pretrial 
justice system needs to balance two potentially competing rights. Namely, the right of defendants 
to personal liberty and to be presumed innocent until convicted, and the right of the general 
public to live in safety and see defendants stand trial and, if the evidence so indicates, convicted 
and punished. To achieve this balance in compliance with internationally accepted norms and 
standards can be a challenge, especially for criminal justice systems burdened by high levels of 







International standards and norms 
Underlying the legal consideration of the applicability of pretrial detention are the right to 
liberty and the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence is universally 
recognized as a key principle in the administration of criminal justice (Stumer, 2010).1 This 
implies that the treatment of defendants throughout the criminal justice process should, in 
principle, be consistent with their innocence. Nevertheless, according to international law as 
reflected in numerous treaty provisions and authoritative jurisprudential interpretations thereof, 
pretrial detention is an acceptable constraint on defendants’ liberty provided a number of 
circumscribed preconditions are met. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that arrestees 
be brought promptly before a judicial officer and are entitled to a trial within a reasonable time 
or to release, and that it “shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained 
in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial” (ICCPR, 1966, Art. 9(3)). 
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures, enumerate the 
following guidelines in respect of pretrial detention (UN Standard Minimum Rules, 1990, Rule 
6): pretrial detention shall be used as a means of last resort in criminal proceedings, with due 
regard for the investigation of the alleged offense and for the protection of society and the 
victim; alternatives to pretrial detention shall be employed at as early a stage as possible; pretrial 
detention shall last no longer than necessary and shall be administered humanely and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of human beings; and the offender shall have the right to appeal 
                                                 
1 Article 11(1), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 1948); Article 14(2), International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (adopted 1966, entered into force 1976); Article 6(2), Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 1950, entered into force 1953); Article 7(b), African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 1981, entered into force 1986); Article 8(2), American Convention on 
Human Rights (adopted 1969, entered into force 1978); Article 6(2), European Convention on Human Rights 





to a judicial or other competent independent authority in cases where pretrial detention is 
employed. 
In 1990, the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment 
of Offenders established the principle that pretrial detention “may be ordered only if there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the persons concerned have been involved in the commission 
of the alleged offences and there is a danger of their absconding or committing further serious 
offences, or a danger that the course of justice will be seriously interfered with if they are let 
free” (United Nations, 1991, p. 158). In its jurisprudence the UN Human Rights Committee, the 
expert body responsible for interpreting the ICCPR, has emphasized that domestic authorities 
must interrogate whether less restrictive measures than pretrial detention can secure the 
attendance of defendants at trial. Moreover, a state cannot assume that a defendant will abscond, 
tamper with evidence, or obstruct the investigation of the case. Any risks associated with the 
pretrial release of a defendant must be investigated by the state (Ballard, 2011). 
Statement of the problem 
The purpose of this study is to better understand how economic, political, and social 
variables are associated with two national-level pretrial detention measures. While evidence of 
such relationships exists for incarceration generally, this is lacking in respect of pretrial 
detention. This is a curious gap in the research literature given that pretrial detention is a major 
driver of imprisonment. Over a quarter of all prisoners in the world are pretrial detainees. In 
many countries, pretrial detention is the norm with detainees outnumbering sentenced prisoners. 
Moreover, pretrial detention is a particular draconian aspect of the criminal justice process. Not 
convicted of a crime, and legally presumed to be innocent, pretrial detainees lose their freedom, 





This study uses a variety of economic, political, and social variables, primarily drawn 
from the comparative imprisonment literature, to quantify their relationship with two pretrial 
detention measures. Namely, the number of pretrial detainees expressed as (i) a rate per 100,000 
of the general population, and (ii) a proportion of the overall prison population. The objective is 
to identify and analyze the relationships between the aforementioned variables and the two 
pretrial detention measures in a comparative cross-national analysis. A variety of statistical 
techniques are used: (1) a simple correlation analysis and a one-way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) for the categorical variable of “legal system classification,” (2) a forward, stepwise 
regression to determine empirically which combination of independent variables best predict 
pretrial detention, and (3) moderator analyses using selected independent variables, which 
allowed for the testing of a number of hypotheses and theories around the use of pretrial 
detention, and identifying global patterns of pretrial detention and its economic, political and 
social correlates. 
Pretrial detention is a routine practice in the administration of criminal justice. Every 
contemporary criminal justice system makes use of some form of pretrial detention, confining 
suspected offenders awaiting trial or the finalization of their trial. This is the case in criminal 
justice systems based on common law, civil law, and Islamic law principles; democracies and 
authoritarian regimes; countries with free market and centrally planned economies; and 
developed and developing states. In short, pretrial detention is a universal practice wherever 
states and formal criminal justice institutions exist in some form. 
As is the case with overall imprisonment rates (Lappi-Seppӓlӓ, 2011), there is significant 
national variation in the size of pretrial detention populations worldwide. According to 





(248 pretrial detainees per 100,000 of the general population), Uruguay (202), and the United 
States (146). Countries with low rates of pretrial detention include Namibia (9), Nicaragua (19), 
and India (22). The global median pretrial detention rate is 33, with regional median rates 
varying from a high of 95 in the Americas to a low of 24 in Oceania. Countries with high 
numbers of pretrial detainees expressed as a proportion of the overall prison population include 
Paraguay (77.9%), Bangladesh (73.8%), and Nigeria (71.7%). Low proportions of pretrial 
detainees exist in Egypt (9.9%), Japan (11.0%), and Kazakhstan (14.5%). The global median 
proportion is 27%, with regional median proportions ranging from 15.2% in Oceania to 41.5% in 
Africa. 
It should be noted that the dataset from which the comparative pretrial detention 
populations are drawn does not include the People’s Republic of China because of the 
unavailability of up-to-date data (Walmsley, 2017). Walmsley (2016, p. 9) estimates that China’s 
pretrial detention population was “more than 650,000” in 2009. Others (van Kempen, 2012) 
provide a figure of 941,000 pretrial detainees for China in 2009. Walmsley’s figure suggests that 
some 28% of all prisoners in China are pretrial detainees, which is around the global median. 
Including an estimated 650,000 Chinese pretrial detainees in the global total increases the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention to a global mean of 33.8%. 
Numerous empirical studies have sought to explain the cross-national variation in penal 
policy and imprisonment, exploring relationships between incarceration rates and a variety of 
economic, political, and societal factors (e.g., Neapolitan, 2001; Ruddell & Urbina, 2004; 
Ruddell, 2005; De Koster et al., 2008; Lappi-Seppälä, 2011a). National-level explanations of 
pretrial detention practices and, by implication, the number of pretrial detainees, have been 





(Msiska, 2008; Venegas & Vial, 2008; Van Kalmthout, Knapen, & Morgenstern, 2009; Van 
Kempen, 2012; Charret-Del Bove & Mourlon, 2014), evaluation reports (Sandefur et al., 2011; 
Baba, 2012; Griggs, 2013), and academic studies (Doherty & East, 1985; Ryan, 1993; Klein, 
1997; Dhami, 2002; Sarre & Bamford, 2006; Baradaran, 2010; Fujimura-Fanselow & Wickeri, 
2013). By definition such national-level analyses focus on local peculiarities, limiting the 
transferability of insights and experiences to other jurisdictions. 
In comparison to quantitative cross-national imprisonment research, the literature on 
comparative quantitative research on pretrial detention is sparse. Only three large-scale cross-
national studies (Ruddell & Urbina, 2007; Lappi-Seppӓlӓ, 2011a; Albrecht, 2012) were found 
which deal tangentially with pretrial detention numbers and their correlates. Thus, while 
relationships between economic, political and social factors, and general incarceration rates have 
been explored, as have a variety of correlates of pretrial detention measures at the national level, 
no such relationships have been investigated cross-nationally using a large sample of both 
developed and developing countries. This constitutes an important gap in the literature as cross-
national comparative studies are particularly suitable for hypothesis testing, the inductive 
discovery of new hypotheses, and theory building (Collier, 1993). 
Conceptual framework 
The basic model tested in this study is presented in diagrammatic form in Figure 1 below. 
It essentially examines the relationships – and inter-relationships – between a variety of 
economic, political, and social factors as independent variables, and two measures of pretrial 
detention as dependent variables.2 
                                                 
2 The two dependent variables were chosen on the basis of their relevance to the study (i.e., that they measure or 
reflect the use and extent of pretrial detention) and data availability. The study’s ambition was to cover a broad 
range of developed and developing countries. Data for the two dependent variables are available for 216 prison 





The pretrial detention measures employed by this study reveal significant national 
variation across the globe and even within regions. Neighboring countries with similar legal 
traditions can exhibit starkly different measures of pretrial detention. For example, the rate of 
pretrial detention in the U.S. (146 per 100,000 of the general population) is almost four times 
that of Canada (40). On the other hand, the number of pretrial detainees expressed as a 
proportion of the overall prison population is some 65% higher in Canada (34.9%) compared to 
the U.S. (21.1%). Yet, countries which are continents apart and with different legal traditions can 
have similar measures of pretrial detention. For example, the rate and proportion of pretrial 
detainees in Costa Rica (61 per 100,000 / 17.2%) differs only moderately from that of the 
Russian Federation (75 per 100,000 / 16.9%). 
Given the aforementioned variation in pretrial detention measures, the presumption arises 
that the relationships between these measures and the selected independent variables are both 
complex and multi-dimensional. Some of the variation may be explained by highly 
contextualized local factors such as domestic pretrial detention laws, policies, and practices. For 
example, the number of statutory alternatives to pretrial detention, the proportion of crimes for 
which pretrial detention is mandatory, or the amount and quality of judicial training on pretrial 
justice issues, can all influence the use of pretrial detention. This study does not deal with such 
localized variables. Large-scale cross-national studies are not suitable for comparing laws and 
practices at the granular level. The amount of contextual information required for such an 
investigation renders it impractical. Instead, this study concerns itself with indicators or variables 
for which data are available across the majority of both developed and developing countries. 
 
                                                 
the mean or median duration of pretrial detention, or the pretrial detention admission or “flow” rate, would have 










































The two pretrial detention measures – the study’s dependent variables – reflect two 
potentially distinct phenomena. Indeed, international comparisons of these measures have a 
tendency to contradict one another (Foglesong & Stone, 2011). That is, countries which have a 
high proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention often have low rates of pretrial detainees, while 
countries with a low proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention tend to have high rates of 
pretrial detainees. For example, as indicated in Figure 2, the U.S. and Russia have low 
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proportions of prisoners held in pretrial detention but high rates of pretrial detainees. Conversely, 
Bangladesh, India, and Sierra Leone have high proportions of prisoners held in pretrial detention 
but low rates of pretrial detainees. 
Figure 2: Two measures of pretrial detention, selected countries 
  
 Proportion of 
prisoners in 
pretrial detention 
  Pretrial detention 
rate (per 100,000 
population) 
Bangladesh 73.8  USA 146 
Nigeria 71.7  Brazil 105 
Liberia 67.9  South Africa 81 
India 67.2  Russia 75 
Sierra Leone 54.3  Australia 50 
Brazil 36.3  Bangladesh 33 
Australia 31.2  Global median 33 
South Africa 27.9  Liberia 31 
Global median 27.0  Sierra Leone 30 
USA 21.1  Nigeria 25 
Russia 16.9  India 22 
Source: Walmsley (2017) 
 
The rate variable is an accurate indicator of the absolute number of pretrial detainees in 
relation to a jurisdiction’s overall population. It reflects the scale of pretrial detention and 
permits easy cross-jurisdictional comparisons. The number of defendants remanded to pretrial 
detention and the duration of their detention (and the size of the general population) determine 
the pretrial detention rate.3 The proportion variable is, unlike the pretrial detention rate, affected 
by the number of sentenced prisoners (Schönteich, 2015). For example, if the number (or rate) of 
pretrial detainees remains the same but the number of sentenced prisoners increases, then the 
number of pretrial detainees expressed as a proportion of the overall prison population will 
                                                 
3 Everything else remaining equal, a longer average or mean duration of pretrial detention results in a higher rate of 
pretrial detention. 200 persons in pretrial detention for an average of six months represent the same average rate of 
pretrial detainees (as measured per 100,000 of the general population) as 100 persons in pretrial detention for an 
average of twelve months. Thus, if the number of pretrial detainees remains the same, the rate of pretrial detention 
will increase if the average duration of detention rises (although this may be somewhat counterbalanced by an 





decline. Thus, changes in sentencing policy or the more efficient processing of trials (leading to 
more convictions and the imposition of custodial sentences) will affect the proportion measure. 
Low proportions of prisoners held in pretrial detention in countries such as the U.S. and Russia, 
for example, might be ascribed to sentencing policies or practices which result in long prison 
terms, thereby increasing the sentenced prisoner population. The proportion of pretrial detainees 
is also influenced by the inflow of pretrial detainees into the justice system and the duration of 
their detention. 
Research questions and hypotheses 
The purpose of this study is to better understand how economic, political, and social 
variables (the independent variables) are associated with both the number of pretrial detainees 
expressed as a rate per 100,000 of the general population, and the number of pretrial detainees 
expressed as a proportion of the overall prison population. The overall research question the 
study poses is the following: What relationships exist among economic, political, and social 
factors extraneous to the day-to-day operational and policy environments of criminal justice 
systems on the one hand, and national pretrial detention practices on the other hand? From this 
two subsidiary questions emerge: 
 Is there a relationship between the individual independent variables (taken separately) 
and each of the dependent variables and, if so, what is the extent thereof? 
 What combination of the independent variables (if any) demonstrates the most robust 
relationship between the independent variable(s) and each of the dependent variables? 
The below research hypotheses (Table 1), derived from the theoretical considerations and 





discussed in chapter 3 (the methodology chapter), seek to answer the overall and subsidiary 
research questions. 
 
Table 1: Variables and hypotheses 
Variable category Hypotheses 
Economic factors 
Unemployment  H1a: Unemployment levels are positively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
 H1b: Unemployment levels do not correlate significantly with 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Inequality  H2a: Economic inequality is positively correlated with pretrial 
detention rates. 
 H2b: Economic inequality does not correlate significantly with 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Social welfare  H3a: State welfare expenditure is negatively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
 H3b State welfare expenditure does not correlate significantly 
with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Modernization  H4a: A country’s level of modernization is positively correlated 
with pretrial detention rates. 
 H4b: A country’s level of modernization is negatively 
correlated with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Political factors 
Regime type  H5a: Stable democracy and civil liberties are negatively 
correlated with pretrial detention rates. 
 H5b: Stable democracy and civil liberties are negatively 
correlated with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Development  H6a: Countries’ levels of development are positively correlated 
with pretrial detention rates. 
 H6b: Countries’ levels of development are negatively correlated 
with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Social factors 
Corruption  H7a: Levels of official corruption are negatively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
 H7b: Levels of official corruption are positively correlated with 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Political legitimacy  H8a: Levels of state political legitimacy are negatively 
correlated with pretrial detention rates. 
 H8b: Levels of state political legitimacy do not correlate 
significantly with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention. 
Political trust  H9a: Levels of social trust are negatively correlated with 





 H9b: Levels of social trust are negatively correlated with the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Crime  H10a: Levels of recorded crime are positively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
 H10b: Levels of recorded crime are positively correlated with 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Perceptions of crime / 
safety 
 H11a: Perceptions of crime / safety are positively correlated 
with pretrial detention rates. 
 H11b: Perceptions of crime / safety are positively correlated 
with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Ethnic heterogeneity  H12a: Levels of ethnic diversity are positively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
 H12b: Levels of ethnic diversity are positively correlated with 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Foreign nationals  H13a: The proportion of foreign nationals in national 
populations are positively correlated with pretrial detention 
rates. 
 H13b: The proportion of foreign nationals in national 
populations are positively correlated with the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Public punitiveness  H14a: Levels of public punitiveness are positively correlated 
with pretrial detention rates. 
 H14b: Levels of public punitiveness are positively correlated 
with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Legal system  H15a: Compared to civil law countries, common law countries 
have lower pretrial detention rates. 
 H15b: Compared to civil law countries, common law countries 
have lower proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
 
Method 
An extensive review of the literature and past research informed the identification of the 
themes, constructs, and variables of the study. This, in turn, guided the elaboration of the study’s 
research questions and hypotheses (Table 1). Data for the dependent variables were drawn from 
an existing database maintained by the Institute for Criminal Policy Research at the University of 
London, the most comprehensive and up-to-date cross-national database for the study’s outcome 
measures. In respect of the independent variables used in this study, in addition to being guided 





organizations (e.g., Transparency International, UNDP, the World Bank) and those for which 
large cross-national datasets were available (typically covering in excess of 150 countries). A 
number of potential independent variables were discarded during the design phase of the study 
either because data were unavailable for a significant number of countries or the variables were 
similar to others under consideration so that their inclusion would have been unnecessarily 
duplicative.4 For some hypotheses only one variable was chosen where the variable matched, or 
closely matched, the construct to be investigated. In other cases, more than one variable was used 
to test the hypothesis in question. The objective was to obtain the most recent available data for 
each measure. While most datasets used are from 2015 and 2016, a few variables utilized older 
datasets. In some cases data from multiple years were collated to obtain larger sample sizes. 
The data were collected, collated, and cleaned for analysis. This included a descriptive 
and exploratory examination of the dependent and independent variables to provide a better 
illustration of the research variables in question, while probing for oddities and investigating 
variables that needed to be transformed. The objective was to identify variables that seemed 
highly skewed and lacked sufficient variability. These variables were log transformed to 
decrease the variability of the data and make the data conform more closely to the normal 
distribution to allow for accurate analyses. 
Three statistical techniques were used to answer the study’s research questions and test 
the associated hypotheses. First, a simple correlation analysis exploring the relationship between 
each of the 29 independent continuous variables and the two dependent pretrial detention-related 
variables, and a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for the categorical independent 
                                                 
4 Independent variables which were considered but ultimately discarded include: male unemployment; democracies 
versus autocracies database; index of civil liberties and political rights; confidence in judicial system; prosperity 





variable of “legal system classification” to explore its relationship with the two dependent 
variables. Second, a forward, stepwise regression to determine empirically which combination of 
independent variables best predict both pretrial detention-related dependent variables. Third, 
moderator analyses using selected independent variables to better understand how corruption 
moderates the relationship between state strength and pretrial detention; democratization and 
development moderate the relationship between crime and pretrial detention; and, 
democratization moderates the relationship between development and pretrial detention. 
Significance of the study 
Pretrial detention is an important component of imprisonment generally. In excess of a 
quarter of all prisoners in the world are in pretrial detention. In over 50 countries the majority of 
prisoners are pretrial detainees (Walmsley, 2017). Pretrial detention is a significant contributor to 
prison overcrowding and the negative consequences thereof. It prompted the UN General 
Assembly to emphasize the importance of measures to reduce overcrowding and pretrial 
detention in its 2016 resolution on human rights in the administration of justice (UNGA, 2016). 
International concern about the excessive use of pretrial detention is also reflected in the 
development of UN Principles and Guidelines on the right of anyone deprived of their liberty to 
challenge the lawfulness of detention (OHCHR, 2015). As stated earlier, pretrial detention harms 
individuals, families, and communities; wastes state resources; undercuts socio-economic 
development; and undermines the rule of law. In short, anyone interested in imprisonment needs 
to take account of pretrial detention. 
There is a burgeoning empirical literature exploring the cross-national correlates of 
imprisonment. This study complements and expands this literature by focusing on the cross-





detention (and general imprisonment) practices in a broader, global context. In particular, the 
study will tease out economic, political, and social correlates of pretrial detention to explain the 
factors which relate to two key pretrial detention measures. This should enhance understanding 
of the factors which correlate with pretrial detention numbers globally and allow for making 
general statements about global patterns of pretrial detention use. 
The study will permit the development of new empirically-grounded theories on 
variations in, and characteristics of, cross-national pretrial detention practices. For example, the 
study will allow for the development of models and theories that explain the relationship 
between levels of development or democratization and pretrial detention practices, or ethnic 
heterogeneity and pretrial detention. This should provide helpful empirically-based insights for, 
inter alia, development funders, democracy assistance providers, and national authorities to 
better understand how large economic, political, and social developments may relate to pretrial 
detention practices. This has not been done before using such a large sample of counties. 
Existing comparative studies which explore pretrial detention correlates focus on a relatively 
small sample of developed countries only. 
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan collectively hold almost a quarter of the world’s 
inhabitants but only 10% of its pretrial detainees. Africa contains 15% of the global population 
but only 9% of all pretrial detainees. By 2050, almost half the earth’s population will be in 
Africa and the aforementioned three South Asian countries. Also by 2050, Nigeria – a country 
with a particularly small pretrial detention population – is projected to be the third most populous 
country in the world with 440 million inhabitants. All of these countries are classified as lower-
middle income, as are many countries in Africa. If, for example, this study demonstrates a 





pretrial detention rate (and, as hypothesized, a negative correlation between economic 
development and the number of pretrial detainees as a proportion of all prisoners), then 
anticipated economic development in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia could result in 
significantly higher rates of pretrial detention, but lower proportions of pretrial detainees. Such 
an insight would be helpful to policy makers and governmental planners. Namely, to anticipate 
that economic development may go hand-in-hand with a higher pretrial detention rate (and the 
absolute number of pretrial detainees), but a lower number of pretrial detainees as a proportion of 
the overall prison population. In practical terms, there would be a need to develop and implement 
effective alternatives to pretrial detention, promulgate policies which limits police reliance on 
arrest (which often leads to pretrial detention), improve criminal justice efficiencies to reduce the 
average duration of pretrial detention, and, as a last resort, plan and budget for more prison 
infrastructure and staff while expecting a decline in the proportion of prison spaces needed for 
pretrial detainees. 
Organization of the study 
The study begins with a review of the relevant empirical and theoretical literature 
(Chapter 2). Next is a methodology section (Chapter 3) which outlines the research hypotheses 
derived from the theoretical considerations and extant empirical studies discussed in Chapter 2, 
and provides a description of the dependent and independent variables used to test these 
hypotheses. The sources and nature of the data for the dependent and independent variables are 
described. This is followed by an explanation of the procedures used to collect, clean, and 
prepare the data for analysis, and a detailed description of the statistical analyses and techniques 
used to answer the study’s research questions and test the associated hypotheses. Chapter 4 





exploring the results in terms of each of the three main statistical techniques used. Chapter 5 
(Discussion) contextualizes the study’s findings, and elaborates on the meaning and significance 
of the statistical results presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 also presents salient policy 







CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
Systematic comparative research on punishment is relatively new; comparative research 
on penal policy and imprisonment has been undertaken “only since the last decades of the 
twentieth century”, according to Brodeur (2007, p. 49). Since then “an increasingly international 
scholarly world [has developed] in which more people are motivated to look across national 
boundaries” (Tonry, 2007, p. 4) in a systematic manner, often comparing a large number of 
countries or jurisdictions. Today, a growing body of academic work engages with comparative 
methodologies for the study of crime and criminal justice to enhance our understanding of states’ 
responses to crime and public insecurity (Vagg, 1993; Garland, 2001; Bennett, 2004; Ruddell & 
Urbina, 2007). Comparative research on criminal justice issues is “burgeoning”, according to 
Tonry (2015, p. 505). 
Traditionally, empirical studies of imprisonment covering a large number of jurisdictions 
have primarily been descriptive in nature (Mauer, 1995; Newman, 1999; Walmsley, 2003; 
Carranza, 2014). While more intricate cross-national analyses of imprisonment are growing in 
number, most focus on a modest sample of countries, usually of developed or first-world 
countries (Sutton, 2000 & 2013; Jacobs & Kleban, 2003; Blumstein, Tonry, & Van Ness, 2005; 
Cavadino & Dignan, 2006; Downes & Hansen, 2006; Lappi-Seppälä, 2007 & 2011b; De Koster 
et al., 2008). 
Only a small number of studies exist which seek to empirically explore the correlates of 
imprisonment across a large sample of jurisdictions, usually in excess of 100 countries 





studies have explored the relationships between punishment / incarceration and inequality 
(Greenberg, 1999; Killias, 1986), minority threat (Ruddell, 2005; Ruddell & Urbina 2004), 
political arrangements or regimes (Killias, 1986; Neapolitan, 2001; Williams & Timberlake, 
1984), and the influence of legal systems (Ruddell, 2005). 
In comparison to quantitative cross-national imprisonment research, the literature on 
comparative quantitative research on pretrial detention practices is sparse. After an extensive 
literature search, only three large-scale cross-national studies (Ruddell & Urbina, 2007; Lappi-
Seppӓlӓ, 2011a; Albrecht, 2012) were found which deal tangentially with pretrial detention 
numbers and their correlates. 
There is a substantial body of academic and “grey literature”5 which, while comparative, 
explores a relatively small number of jurisdictions and is consequently more descriptive than 
analytical or quantitative (e.g., Van Kalmthout, Knapen, & Morgenstern, 2009; Fair Trials 
International, 2011; UNODC, 2011; Fair Trials, 2016), or such literature focuses on a single 
country or jurisdiction only (e.g., Barreto, 2007; Baradaran, 2010; Colbert, 2011; Kazemian, 
McCoy, & Sacks, 2012). 
This literature review first examines the more general and relatively substantial cross-
national imprisonment literature, followed by the literature exploring cross-national quantitative 
pretrial detention studies, and ends with a selective review of the more descriptive comparative 
or single-jurisdictional literature dealing with the causes, drivers, and correlates of pretrial 
detention use. 
 
                                                 
5 Grey literature are materials produced by organizations outside of the traditional commercial or academic 
publishing channels. Grey literature include materials produced by civil society or non-governmental organizations, 





General imprisonment literature 
Political economy 
First published in 1939, Rusche and Kirchheimer’s Punishment and Social Structure is a 
seminal Marxian analysis of punishment, especially mass imprisonment, as a social institution. 
Rusche and Kirchheimer (2003) held that the rationale of punishment was primarily economic; 
that severity of punishment in a society is influenced by the relative value of labor. Moreover, 
that the harshness of criminal penalties is inversely related to the value of labor. While their 
work has been criticized for the stereotypically Marxian tendency to reduce all variables to 
economic determinants (Lacey, 2008), it has been used by criminologists and sociologists to 
make sense of contemporary forms of mass imprisonment (Zimring & Hawkins, 1993). 
French sociologist, Loïc Wacquant, in Prisons of Poverty (2009a) and Punishing the 
Poor (2009b), adopts a neo-Marxian approach to develop a materialist explanation for trends in 
penalization and incarceration in developed countries. According to Wacquant, the routine use of 
imprisonment is a mechanism for managing social insecurity brought about by economic 
developments characterized by neo-liberal free markets of which the tightening of welfare 
expenditure is a prominent feature. A combination of declining welfare benefits, greater 
employment insecurity through, inter alia, flexible labor arrangements, and a dominant neo-
liberal discourse, result in “surplus labor” which is blamed for petty crimes of survival which are 
criminalized. Consequently, welfare state regimes are transformed into Darwinian penal states in 
which the economically and socially marginal are routinely imprisoned. 
Labor surplus 
In an early cross-national study of punishment and penal severity covering 47 countries, 





factors, including unemployment, inequality, and per capita income. The study found that 
unemployment and income concentration explained a substantial amount of variance in 
incarceration rates. High power concentration at the governmental level, unequal income 
distribution, and unemployment were associated with more severe punishment, including 
incarceration. In a wide-ranging review of the literature covering 44 empirical studies, Chiricos 
and DeLone (1992) concluded that independent of the effects of crime, labor surplus is 
consistently and significantly related to prison populations. 
Others, however, have failed to find significant associations between unemployment and 
incarceration in comparative studies. The evidence for such a link has been described as being 
“rather equivocal” (Young & Brown, 1993, p. 36). Sutton (2004) reviewed data from 15 affluent 
capitalist democracies over a three-decade period (1960-1990) using pooled regression 
techniques. He found no evidence of a causal relationship between business cycles (including 
unemployment) and imprisonment. To the extent that there is a relationship between the two, this 
is “an artefact of antecedent differences between neoliberal and corporatist societies” with the 
former producing higher imprisonment rates compared to the latter (Sutton, 2004, p. 170). Sutton 
does not rule out an association between unemployment and incarceration for specific high-risk 
populations such as poorly educated young men or immigrants. He proposes an institutional 
refinement to the structural approaches deriving from Rusche and Kirchheimer (2003) based on 
his findings that lower levels of incarceration are associated with union strength, low levels of 
political partisanship, employment growth, and corporatist labor market institutions. 
Using a sample of 148 countries to examine cross-national variation in the use of 
imprisonment, Neapolitan (2001) found no evidence for the position that incarceration rates are 





association between the unemployment rate and the imprisonment rate (counted as both 
sentenced prisoners and pretrial detainees) in a bivariate analysis of the 100 richest nations based 
on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This may, however, be because the richest 
countries are disproportionately likely to have relatively developed social welfare systems which 
might moderate the impacts of social stress, the latter factor being a driver of certain forms of 
crime, and hence, imprisonment (Piven & Cloward, 1993; Brisman, 2012). Ruddell (2004) also 
failed to find a significant association between unemployment and imprisonment in the U.S. in a 
longitudinal research design to examine the underlying political, cultural, and social factors 
contributing to the rise in incarceration between 1952 and 2000. 
Inequality 
In a comparative analysis of 70 countries, Williams and Timberlake (1984) sought to test 
the “threat hypothesis.” Namely, that crime control policies reflect the interests of economic 
elites. The more pronounced income inequality, the greater the resource capacity of such elites 
and the more intense the threat to their elite position which, in turn, results in greater use of 
legal-coercive sanctioning. While the authors found no evidence of an independent effect of 
income inequality on criminal sanctions or vice versa, they concede that their conclusion is 
tentative as their study may not have considered variables which could be suppressing the effect 
of income inequality on state-sanctioned punishment. 
A number of subsequent cross-national studies failed to find a significant relationship 
between economic inequality and imprisonment rates (Greenberg, 1999; Neapolitan, 2001; 
Ruddell, 2005). Wilkins and Pease (1987) explored the relationship between economic inequality 
and imprisonment in seven Western European democracies and found inconsistent results, as did 





multiple regression analysis to identify correlates of imprisonment rates in 30 countries in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. They found that the strongest correlation with countries’ 
incarceration rates was an index of unequal distribution of wealth, calculated as a ratio of the 
percentage of national income received by the wealthiest decile of households to that of the two 
lowest deciles of households. 
Welfare orientation 
In a review of data from 15 prosperous capitalist democracies between 1960 and 1990, 
Sutton (2004) concludes that imprisonment rates are sensitive to variation in the structure of 
labor markets. Namely, that the distribution of political power and the structures in place to 
govern the distribution of employment, social protection, and social status appears to influence 
incarceration rates, with corporatist-type democracies producing lower incarceration rates 
compared to political economies based on neoliberal values. 
In a cross-comparative study of 25 developed, mainly European countries, Lappi-Seppӓlӓ 
(2007) found “an evident connection between welfare orientation and penal culture” (p. 8). 
Namely, a significant positive correlation between income inequality and prisoner rates, and an 
inverse relationship between state commitment to welfare (expressed as a proportion of GDP 
devoted to welfare expenditure and the actual amount spent thereon) and the prisoner rate. 
Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2007) speculated that the relationship between state welfare payments and penal 
policy may be attributable to greater feelings of social solidarity, which are arguably more 
widespread in welfare-oriented states. This is partly based on Durkheimian tradition, and feelings 
of social solidarity found in “modern” and “industrial” societies and the dependence individuals 
have on each other in more advanced societies, and draws on the hypothesis that relative penal 





empathic identification and concern for the well-being of others… citizens in the more 
collectively oriented societies will also tend to identify with criminals, not just with their 
victims” (Greenberg, 1999, p. 297). Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2007) also surmised that established welfare 
states may be less punitive because of policy interventions such as promoting safeguards against 
social marginalization (thereby reducing the risk that socially and economically marginalized 
individuals engage in criminal conduct) and providing a relatively broad range of statutorily 
mandated alternatives to imprisonment. A number of other cross-national studies report that 
social welfare spending is negatively related to crime (Currie, 1985; Fiala & LaFree, 1988; 
Savage, Bennett, & Danner, 2008). In a later comparative study of 30 (mostly European) 
industrialized countries, Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2011b) explores a range of explanatory factors for 
national variations in imprisonment rates, and concludes that “moderate penal policies have their 
roots in a consensual and corporatist political culture, in high levels of social trust and political 
legitimacy, and in a strong welfare state” (p. 303). 
In a cross-sectional analysis of 18 Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries, Downes and Hansen (2006) found that countries which spend a 
higher proportion of their GDP on welfare tend to have lower imprisonment rates (with Japan 
being a marked exception). Their study is robust, using longitudinal data to show that declining 
welfare expenditures impact imprisonment in the West. Countries with a comprehensive welfare 
system protect their citizens from income loss, poverty, and low pay, thereby enhancing “social 
harmony,” while states with modest welfare systems are associated with “greater inequality 
among its citizens and the ensuring social problems that this brings” (Downes & Hansen, 2006, 
p. 10). The authors do, however, note that increases in welfare spending in the United Kingdom 





few welfare resources going to the delivery of social services for those in need as opposed to the 
management of these resources by expensive state bureaucracies. 
In an examination of imprisonment rates in 13 developed Western democracies from 
1970 to 1995, Jacobs and Kleban (2003) found that countries with higher welfare spending as a 
proportion of GDP tend to have lower incarceration rates. However, once the U.S. is excluded 
from the analysis, such a relationship falls away, suggesting that the explored relationship 
between state welfare expenditure and imprisonment rates is due to the particularly modest 
welfare expenditures coupled with exceptionally high incarceration rates in the U.S. 
The averment that social welfare spending has a mitigating effect on crime is disputed by 
some on ideological or philosophical grounds (Rector, 1992; Niskanen, 1996). Moreover, 
Cavadino and Dignan (2006) did not find support for the thesis that lower expenditure on welfare 
benefits leads to higher imprisonment rates when looking at 12 OECD countries. They used a 
typology of the political economy and culture for the selected countries, grouping them into four 
sub-groups: neo-liberal, conservative-corporatists, social democratic, and oriental-corporatist. 
They show significant similarities within typologies. Neo-liberal political economies have the 
highest imprisonment rates, followed by, in descending order, conservative-corporatist, social-
democratic, and oriental-corporatist. In a longitudinal cross-national analysis of 16 developed 
Western countries over a ten-year period (1992-2001), De Koster, van der Waal, Achterberg, and 
Houtman (2008) concluded that economic explanations for variations in imprisonment are 
unsustainable. In particular, that a range of indicators of economic neo-liberalization, including 
welfare expenditure, do not appear to affect imprisonment rates. Rather, they concluded that 





process driven not by economic insecurity but by cultural insecurity fueled by issues such as 
national identity, mass migration, and traditional moral values. 
Modernization 
Durkheim’s (1947) analysis of the transition from traditional agrarian societies to modern 
ones led to the development of a modernization perspective on crime (Clinard & Abbott, 1973; 
Neuman & Berger, 1988). Modernization theories contend that as traditional and agrarian-based 
economies with high levels of informal social control transform into industrialized and urban 
economies, crime and social disruption follow (Shelley, 1981; Neuman & Berger, 1988). It is the 
pace rather than the level of development which is crucial for understanding the patterns of 
crime. Rapid change accentuates conflict and pushes society into a transitory state of 
disequilibrium as values clash over appropriate norms resulting in increasing deviance and crime 
(Barak, 2001). In response, developing countries swap customary law for formal criminal justice 
institutions which emphasize sanctions such as imprisonment. Moreover, such social changes 
lead to increasing inequality and crime which, in turn, places upward pressure on incarceration 
rates. Modernization-related dislocations are, however, temporary in nature, and increases in 
crime are, over time, moderated by “new social forms that bind societies together more strongly 
and produce more effective forms of social control” (LaFree, Curtis, & McDowall, 2015, p. 484). 
A number of studies, broadly supportive of modernization theory in the context of 
imprisonment, have been reported in the literature. A cross-national study by Killias (1996) 
found that more affluent nations with the wherewithal to maintain extensive prison systems have 
higher incarceration rates. In a cross-national analysis of 13 Western democracies, Jacobs and 
Kleban (2003) also found that countries with higher per capita GDP had higher incarceration 





Urbina (2004) found that GDP growth had a clear and consistent association with the use of 
imprisonment. That is, wealthier nations had higher rates of imprisonment. Ruddell (2005), in a 
comparative study of the richest 100 countries in terms of per capita GDP, however, found that 
the top 50 richest countries had lower average rates of imprisonment compared to the bottom 50 
countries in his sample. 
Legitimacy 
While a Durkheimian approach links official punitiveness such as imprisonment with 
feelings of social solidarity, the Weberian tradition explains state punitiveness according to the 
concentration of power in a society and the need to protect political authority or legitimacy 
(Killias, 1986). In support of the latter, Garland (2001) argues that governments who perceive 
themselves to be vulnerable or lacking popular legitimacy will resort to expressive gestures and 
punitive responses. Conversely, regimes confident in their ability to retain power are less likely 
to rely on overly punitive sanctions. Duvall and Shamir (1980) speculate that repressive states 
with a structural propensity for coercion may not find it necessary to rely overly on overt 
coercive sanctions. Williams and Timberlake (1984) point out that “states organized to the 
formal exclusion of non-elites may impose coercive sanctions less frequently than those that are 
more ‘democratic’ in nature” (p. 419). Bollen (1980) reports evidence supporting this argument; 
that a growth in political liberties increases the risk of coercive state sanctioning. 
Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2007) sought to empirically test the relationship between social trust 
(Durkheim) and legitimacy (Weber) on the one hand and imprisonment rates on the other. In a 
cross-comparative study of 25 developed, mainly European, countries he found a strong inverse 
relationship between levels of imprisonment, legitimacy, and (social and institutional) trust. That 





and political trust (“vertical” trust in state institutions) tend to have low prisoner rates. In short, 
there is “strong support for the hypothesis that the degree of social and political trust and penal 
severity are closely interrelated, and that declining trust associates with increasing prisoner rates” 
(Lappi-Seppӓlӓ, 2007, p. 16). Societies with high levels of social trust can be expected to have 
relatively low levels of fear of crime which in turn should mitigate public pressure for tough 
penal sanctions. 
Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2007) posits that institutional trust and legitimacy are related; declining 
legitimacy and institutional trust can bring about tougher penal policies as governments seek to 
demonstrate their control over public security. Moreover, trust in institutions and legitimacy 
promotes norm-compliance and behavior (Tyler, 2003). Consequently, justice systems which 
maintain norm-compliance through trust and legitimacy, as compared to fear and deterrence, can 
maintain order with relatively low levels of sanctions including incarceration. Lappi-Seppӓlӓ 
(2007) concludes that trust may be a “key variable in explaining the shape and contents of penal 
policies” (p. 18). 
Crime 
The association between crime and imprisonment rates has been investigated both cross-
sectionally and longitudinally. Some analysts have found that imprisonment rates are largely 
unrelated to victimization rates or to trends in reported crime; a finding described as the “crime-
incarceration disconnect” (Lappi-Seppӓlӓ, 2011b, p. 308). In a study of 30 industrialized, 
primarily European, countries Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2011b) found an inverse correlation between total 
reported crime and imprisonment rates. Similarly, a review of 218 countries exploring the 





(Lappi-Seppӓlӓ, 2011a). That is, countries with higher total levels of reported crime tend to have 
lower levels of prison crowding. 
Tonry (2007) comes to a similar conclusion in a descriptive review of the literature 
dealing with causes of penal policies in Western countries, as does Kent (2010) in an analysis of 
the literature dealing with capital punishment. In a study of 20 developed countries, Greenberg 
(1999) found no significant relationship between crime rates and incarceration levels. Unlike 
most comparative studies on crime and imprisonment, Greenberg did not confine his analysis to 
homicide only. Modelling overall and demographic-specific homicide victimization trends from 
the late 1980s to the late 2000s covering 86 countries, Baumer and Wolff (2014) found no 
significant association between growth in imprisonment rates and homicide trends. 
Some studies have found a more ambiguous association between incarceration and crime 
rates. In a cross-comparative study of 25 developed countries, Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2007) found 
reported homicide rates to be positively associated with overall prisoner rates, although the 
results were disproportionately strengthened by two Baltic countries with particularly high 
homicide and imprisonment rates. Reported assault rates were negatively associated with 
prisoner rates. That is, countries with higher rates of reported assaults tended to have lower 
prisoner rates. Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2007) concluded that differences in cross-national prisoner rates 
cannot be explained by differences in crime. In an analysis of homicide rates in 235 countries 
Lappi-Seppӓlӓ and Lehti (2014) found a correlation of close to zero between imprisonment and 
homicide rates. The only regional exception was Europe, with a fairly strong positive correlation. 
However, as in Lappi-Seppӓlӓ’s 2007 analysis, this was almost exclusively attributable to the 
strong relationship between homicide and incarceration in countries of the former Soviet Union. 





bivariate analysis of the world’s richest 100 nations based on per capita GDP, Ruddell (2005) 
found that homicide rates were strongly associated with imprisonment rates (calculated as the 
sum of the sentenced prisoner and pretrial detainee rates). 
Group or racial threat 
A number of theories of prejudice emphasize group-level causes (King & Wheelock, 
2007) of imprisonment. Several theories falling under the general rubric of group threat theory 
explore threats to the dominant group by the subordinate group as a cause of the former’s 
prejudice. Group threat theory postulates that prejudice and inter-group hostility are largely 
reactions to real or perceived threats by subordinate groups. Dominant groups seek to preserve 
their advantaged social position and view encroachments on their privileges by minority groups 
as disrupting to the existing social order. One of the earliest versions of group-threat theory 
developed by Blumer (1958) posits that prejudice emerges as groups develop a sense of their 
social position relative to one another. Moreover, intergroup hostility does not emanate simply 
from material conditions. Feelings of competition and hostility emerge from historically and 
collectively developed judgments about the positions in the social order that in-group members 
believe they should rightfully occupy relative to members of an out-group. One element thought 
to be related to the degree of threat is the size of the subordinate group relative to the dominant 
group. A popular formulation of this principle is found in Blalock (1967) and is often classified 
as the “political threat hypothesis” or “power threat hypothesis”. 
Although originally envisaged as a theory of prejudice and discrimination, group threat 
theory and its derivatives informs a growing body of research on formal social control and 
criminal punishment. There is considerable empirical evidence from the U.S., demonstrating that 





example, incarceration rates are on average higher in states with larger African-American 
populations, independent of potential mediating factors such as crime and unemployment rates 
(Greenberg & West, 2001). Larger African-American populations are also associated with forms 
of state social control such as policing (Earl et al., 2003) and criminal justice expenditure (Jacobs 
& Heims, 1999). Moreover, community demographics influence public opinion about crime and 
punishment. Individuals residing in areas with a higher concentration of African-Americans are 
more likely to perceive higher crime rates (Quillian & Pager, 2001) and support capital 
punishment (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003). 
Minority threat hypotheses provide scholars with a theoretical framework for 
understanding cross-national patterns of punishment. National-level studies of Western 
democracies have found relationships between the size of minority populations and the use of 
formal social control or punishment (Wacquant, 1999; Beckett & Western, 2001; Greenberg & 
West, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001). Ruddell and Urbina (2004) examined the relationship 
between population heterogeneity and the use of punishment, measured in terms of 
imprisonment rates (and the abolition of capital punishment) in 140 countries. Controlling for 
political repression, violent crime, modernization, and economic stress, they found that religious 
diversity is positively associated with imprisonment (and that greater population homogeneity is 
associated with the abolition of capital punishment). The sample of 140 countries was selected 
on the basis of availability of information. As wealthier countries are likely to have greater 
resources to collect and disseminate statistical information, such countries were overrepresented 
in the sample. Using a panel design to examine the effect of minority presence on imprisonment 
rates in 13 liberal democracies from 1970 to 1995, Jacobs and Kleban (2003) found that the 





(2003) cross-national analysis suggests that “expansions in minority presence and the resulting 
threats to majority group dominance combine to produce increasingly punitive outcomes” (p. 
746). 
Empirical studies have shown that compared to majority groups, members of minority 
groups are, on average, subject to greater police scrutiny such as stop-and-search (OSJI, 2007; 
OSJI, 2009; Sharad, Rao, & Shroff, 2010; Ferrandino, 2015) and arrest (Kane, 2003; Kane, 
Gustafson, & Bruell, 2010); are more likely to be incarcerated (Tonry, 1997; Albrecht, 1997; 
Wacquant, 1999; Carmichael, 2005); and are subject to harsher punishment by criminal justice 
systems (Yates & Fording, 2005; Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 2003). 
Much of the work on the group threat hypothesis relies primarily on aggregate threat 
measures, such as “percent black,” which does not fully reflect important underlying threat 
processes. It is generally assumed that aggregate measures of group size tap into group power 
and associated levels of individual perceived threat. Yet, “relative numbers in a population do 
not necessarily reflect degrees of relative power of various groups nor do they necessarily reflect 
the amount of threat that might be perceived by an elite group” (Tittle & Curran, 1988, p. 33). 
Possibly because of this methodological simplification, research findings on minority threat have 
not always been consistent. For instance, Bridges and Crutchfield (1988) report an inverse 
relationship between black imprisonment rates and the size of the black population among states 
in the U.S. Such discrepant findings might reflect several limitations that are common in prior 
research on racial / ethnic group threat processes, including “a routine reliance on aggregate 
threat measures and a failure to investigate different specific group threat mechanisms” (Johnson 






Form of government and public opinion 
Herbert Packer (1968) distinguished between two extreme positions or models of how 
criminal justice systems function. Namely, a “crime control model” which seeks to protect the 
rights of law-abiding citizens through the efficient apprehension and punishment of offenders, 
placing a premium on security and order, and a “due process model” which emphasizes human 
rights and is designed to protect the rights of defendants. Authoritarian regimes tend to favor the 
former model, with its focus on deterring criminal conduct and identifying and containing 
offenders as efficiently as possible. Liberal democracies err on the side of the due process model 
with its legal restrictions on state excesses and emphasis on procedural justice. 
In an analysis of 111 countries, Sung (2006) found a strong relationship between 
democracy and increased criminal case attrition. That is, in liberal democracies relatively few 
arrests lead to convictions and custodial sentences compared to more authoritarian regimes, 
notwithstanding that “the size of both the police and prison staff turned out to be significantly 
larger in more democratic countries” (Sung, 2006, p. 326). However, in an analysis of 70 
developed and developing countries, Ruddell and Thomas (2009) found that police numbers 
(sworn officers expressed as a rate of the general population) were higher in countries with less 
durable or stable political regimes, with less democratic regimes generally deploying more 
police. However, contrary to their expectations Ruddell and Thomas (2009) found that punitive 
crime control strategies, such as incarceration rates, were not significantly associated with police 
strength. 
Democracy constrains executive power which may reduce imprisonment. However, in 
democracies public opinion and a free media shapes and informs policy priorities and outcomes. 





foster punitiveness and correlate with higher incarceration rates (Pratt, 2007). While a basic tenet 
of democracy “is the need for accountability – and, hence, ideally, responsiveness – of 
governments to the views and expressions of the electorate,” such values are in “potential 
conflict” with liberal and inclusive criminal justice policies (Lacey, 2008, p. 19). A number of 
influential criminologists have argued that over the last few decades numerous developed 
Western countries, especially Anglo-Saxon ones, have shifted towards a more punitive and crime 
control paradigm to address growing public insecurity. David Garland’s (2001) The Culture of 
Control, Jock Young’s (1999) The Exclusive Society, and Jonathan Simon’s (2007) Governing 
Through Crime review the loss of public faith in “penal modernism” and “penal welfarism” 
which dominated criminal justice policy making for the first few decades after WWII. 
After reviewing the U.S. incarceration literature, Enns (2014) finds the evidence “far 
from conclusive” (p. 2) that the U.S.’ rising imprisonment rate reflects a response to public 
punitiveness. Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) found a relationship between state political ideology 
and state-level incarceration rates. Nicholson-Crotty, Peterson, and Ramirez (2009) found a 
moderate relationship between public opinion and federal criminal justice policy. Other U.S. 
studies question the relationship between public opinion and punitive polices (Gottschalk, 2008; 
Brown, 2006; Zimring & Hawkins, 1991). Yet others proffer political explanations other than 
public opinion for punitive criminal justice policies in the U.S., including the political party in 
power and the influence of interest or pressure groups (Gottschalk, 2006; Weaver, 2007; Yates & 
Fording, 2005). 
In a 13-country cross-national analysis focusing on political institutions and 
imprisonment, Jacobs and Kleban (2003) found that national incarceration rates are positively 





governance arrangements. Corporatist political arrangements common to many advanced 
European democracies are, in contrast to federalist systems, more centrally managed societies 
where elites or unelected experts negotiate compromises on a range of societal issues. According 
to Jacobs and Kleban (2003), such “hierarchical arrangements” serve to establish a “solidaristic 
polity” (p. 729) and foster penal policies which Garland (2001) terms penal welfarism. In such 
corporatist arrangements the emphasis is on the reintegration of offenders through the 
intervention of professional experts. By contrast, in federalist systems the public can generally 
exert considerable influence at the sub-national level on government decisions, such as penal 
policy. In federal political systems citizens’ influence over policy is elevated, especially in 
respect of decisions made by local officials who are sensitive to public demands of a symbolic or 
moral nature such as penal polices. Jacobs and Kleban’s (2003) findings support theorists such as 
Garland (1990) who argue that incarceration rates are a product of political institutions that 
influence the extent of public control over penal policy. 
Legal system / tradition 
In a bivariate analysis of 100 countries, Ruddell (2005) found that countries with 
common law systems were significantly associated with the use of imprisonment, while 
countries with civil law systems had a non-significant relationship. D’Amico and Williamson 
(2015) investigated the relationship between incarceration rates and legal origins in a cross-
section of 113 countries. Using data from 2001 to 2011, they found that countries with civil legal 
origins had lower imprisonment rates compared to countries with common law origins. Their 
findings are robust even after controlling for intervening variables such as crime rates, criminal 
justice resources, economic factors, political institutions, and social factors. D’Amico and 





crime and punish offenders in common law countries. By contrast, in civil law countries 
bureaucratic infrastructures allow for relatively affordable alternatives to incarceration such as 
day-fines, community service, seizure of property, drug rehabilitation and probation. They write, 
“Given the greater prominence of bureaucratic institutions throughout civil law countries, 
alternative forms of punishment enforced through bureaucracies may substitute for 
imprisonment” (D’Amico & Williamson, 2015, p. 596). 
DeMichele (2014) developed composite measures of legal and criminal justice practices 
potentially related to incarceration rates. With a sample of 15 Western countries and looking at 
incarceration rates between 1960 and 2010, DeMichele (2014) groups countries into three 
punishment regime types rooted in different legal cultures. Namely, common law countries 
consisting of populist regime types (high incarceration rates), continental European countries 
with bureaucratic regime types (moderate incarceration rates), and collective regime types as 
found in Scandinavia (low incarceration rates). In an earlier comparative study of 17 OECD 
countries, DeMichele (2013) found that post-WWII incarceration trends cluster according to 
legal families with imprisonment rates highest in common law countries, followed by countries 
within the Roman law tradition, and Nordic law countries having the lowest incarceration rates. 
Cross-national quantitative pretrial detention literature 
Political repression and democracy 
Controlling for crime, population heterogeneity and development, Ruddell and Urbina 
(2007) examined the relationship between political repression and the use of punishment in 100 
of the world’s richest countries. They found that autocratic nations have higher overall 
imprisonment rates. Examining correlates of pretrial detention populations produced less 





to those related to imprisonment more generally. The authors did, however, find a statistically 
significant negative relationship between certain indicators of democracy – level of political 
repression, protection of civil liberties, and press freedom – and pretrial detention, with 
autocratic states showing higher numbers of pretrial detainees as a proportion of the overall 
prison population. The authors found a strong association between homicide and both pretrial 
detention and imprisonment, and a strong negative association between human development on 
the one hand, and sentenced prisoners and the number of persons in pretrial detention as a 
proportion of all prisoners on the other. Religious diversity was found to be strongly associated 
with incarceration but not with pretrial detention. Overall, Ruddell and Urbina (2007) concluded 
that while their “findings in regard to the plight of [pretrial] detention populations are modest, 
they underscore the importance of better understanding the conditions associated with detained 
populations” (p. 101). 
Prison overcrowding 
In a study of the causes of prison overcrowding in 218 countries, comparing national-
level data for the number of persons in pretrial detention as a proportion of all prisoners with the 
percentage by which national prison systems are overcrowded, Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2011a) found that 
pretrial detention was a major factor contributing to prison crowding, especially in developing 
regions in Africa, South and Central Asia, and South America. Largely confirming Lappi-
Seppӓlӓ’s (2011a) findings, an analysis of 200 countries to identify correlates of prison 
overcrowding by Albrecht (2012) identified “a strong and significant correlation” between 
pretrial detention (the number of pretrial detainees as a proportion of the overall prison 
population) and the extent of overcrowding (p. 30).6 The strength of the correlation varies 
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between countries and regions. The correlation is robust at the global level, and especially so in 
Asia and to a somewhat lesser extent in Africa; no significant correlation was found for Europe 
and South America. Using a cluster analysis, Albrecht (2012) identified three distinct prison 
overcrowding clusters: (i) Low crowding associated with high GDP per capita, low violence rate, 
low state fragility, a high Human Development Index (HDI) and democracy, and low perceived 
corruption. (ii) Medium crowding associated with lower GDP per capita, higher violence and 
more perceived corruption. (iii) High crowding associated with a low prisoner rate, high 
proportion of pretrial detainees, low per capita GDP, high violence, weak HDI and democracy, 
and weak government structures. 
Drawing on a variety of country-specific and multi-country studies, Albrecht (2012) 
articulates two explanations for the correlation between pretrial detention and prison crowding. 
First, governance-related issues around delays in the processing of pretrial cases through the 
criminal justice system caused by inefficient practices and procedural and legal problems. 
Second, statutory and bureaucratic pressures, including insufficient legal alternatives to pretrial 
detention, which result in the excessive use of pretrial detention by judicial officers. Albrecht 
(2012) did not find any correlation at the global level between prison crowding and the overall 
imprisonment rate (i.e., counting pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners together), but rather 
the opposite with crowding correlated with a low general imprisonment rate. This seemingly 
paradoxical finding is explained in the context of poor governance, with prison crowding 
correlated with a variety of weak governance and development indicators, such as high rates of 
violence, low per capita GDP, and low democracy and human development values. According to 
                                                 
that “overcrowding is correlated with the rate of pretrial detainees” (p. 12), while it is clear from the data he presents 






Albrecht (2012) overcrowding is associated with problems of “governance, a weak economy and 
obvious problems in the criminal justice systems,” including “deficits in case processing and 
procedural capacity” (p. 12). Drawing on a variety of country-specific analyses, Albrecht (2012) 
suggests that prison overcrowding is particularly acute in places undergoing significant social 
change or political transitions, and in post-conflict situations. 
Comparative descriptive or single-jurisdictional literature 
A number of studies, not all of them academic, but also undertaken by NGOs and 
regional or international organizations, compare a small number of jurisdictions to better 
understand pretrial detention practices. These are typically descriptive in nature with some 
rudimentary quantitative comparisons or analyses. Others focus on one jurisdiction only and are 
primarily descriptive in nature. 
Unemployment and labor surplus 
As discussed above, some research suggests a relationship between labor surplus and 
punishment (Rusche & Kirchheimer, 2003; first published in 1939). Namely, when labor is 
plentiful (and unemployment high), punishment is likely to be more severe and arbitrary. In an 
analysis of bail practices in respect of a sample of defendants charged with felonies in New 
Jersey, Kazemian, McCoy, and Sacks (2012) find little evidence to suggest that judicial officers’ 
bail decisions result in the disproportionate pretrial detention of those typically falling into the 
category of labor surplus. Their findings “do not illustrate any blatant attempts to exert greater 
control over the young, poor, predominantly minority males who comprise the ‘urban 
underclass’” (Kazemian, McCoy, & Sacks, 2012, p. 64). This is attributed, at least in part, to 
New Jersey’s legislative framework which prohibits preventive detention and the state’s 






Gaps exist between many states’ de jure and de facto compliance with international 
standards in the area of pretrial justice. Kelly (2001) found that many states which use pretrial 
detention excessively have enacted, and purport to apply, national legislation that closely mirrors 
international standards’ presumptions against the use of detention. This paradox is explained in 
part by the substantial vagueness of many of the relevant norms articulated by international 
institutions and conventions, which permit governments to demonstrate, at least on paper, 
fidelity with such norms without having to ensure specific outcomes. The international norms 
that apply at the pretrial stage are typically framed quite broadly, with “scope for legitimate 
disagreement as to precisely what is meant by expressions such as ‘promptly’, [and] ‘without 
undue delay’ vis-à-vis the need that an accused be expeditiously brought before a court for a bail 
hearing and subsequently stand trial” (Cape & Stapleton, 2012, p. 29). 
An area where legislation can be vague or varies significantly between jurisdictions is in 
setting maximum permissible lengths of pretrial detention. In an assessment of 15 European 
Union (EU) states, Fair Trials International (2011), an NGO, found that several countries have 
no maximum period of pretrial detention laid down in their legal systems (France, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Romania, and Spain), others allow extensions with no upper limit (Germany and 
Poland), while others have very generous maximum periods such as four years in both the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. The circumstances in which alternatives to pretrial detention can or 
should be imposed are also not always clearly set out in legislation or are left at the discretion of 
the judge. A review of pretrial detention laws and practice in 27 EU states found little evidence 
that the introduction of alternatives to pretrial detention resulted in a reduction in the number of 





even in countries where alternative measures are explicitly mentioned in law, in some cases, the 
law itself does not give an explicit objective of these alternatives… even the conditions under 
which they might be applied are lacking” (Van Kalmthout, Knapen, & Morgenstern, 2009, pp. 
95-96). 
Studies have found disparities in judicial officers’ pretrial detention decisions even on 
identical cases. That is, in laboratory studies the same judicial officer makes different decisions 
on identical cases, or different judicial officers differ in their decisions on identical cases 
(Dhami, 2005). In an analysis of the pattern of pretrial detention in five Brazilian cities, Barreto 
(2007) found the use of pretrial detention varied significantly in different parts of the country and 
is related to a number of subjective factors, such as the attitude of particular judges. Pretrial 
detention rates for persons arrested em flagrante (“caught-in-the-act”) for petty theft ranged 
significantly from around 30% to 90% in the different cities surveyed. 
Punitive public attitudes 
Examples abound of policymakers exploiting public fear of crime – or, conversely, being 
driven by it – to restrict the pretrial release of defendants awaiting trial. For example, rising 
levels of crime and fear of crime in South Africa in the mid-1990s led to a significant tightening 
of the country’s bail law (Schönteich, 1997). In a 1999 ruling, the South African Constitutional 
Court upheld the restrictive law on the basis that the limitation on the right of a defendant to be 
released on bail is reasonable and justifiable taking into account the high levels of serious violent 
crime in the country (Sarkin, Steyn, van Zyl Smit, & Pachke, 2000). During the 1990s many 
Latin America countries adopted extensive reforms of their criminal justice systems. In 
particular, these reforms sought to impose time limits on investigations, institute speedy trial 





increasing levels of fear of crime, and rising levels of violent crime, contributed to the 
“persistence of demands that the new systems focus more on public safety while producing civil 
and political movements to reform the new systems in order to make them ‘harder’ and increase 
their ability to provide solutions to the increase in criminal activity” (Duce, Fuentes, & Riego, 
2008, p. 55 [translated from the original]). Between 1999 and 2007, ten Latin American 
countries adopted counter-reforms which restricted the right to pretrial release, either through 
legislation or executive decree (Duce, Fuentes, & Riego, 2008). 
Limited state resources 
A criminal justice system’s lack of human or financial resources increases the risk of 
pretrial detention. Where the police and prosecution have limited investigative abilities due to a 
lack of forensic equipment or qualified investigators, they tend to rely disproportionately on 
confessions to bring matters to court. Often this implies that minor offenders who are “caught in 
the act” of, for example, theft or urinating in public, are arrested because they are easily 
identified, while those committing more serious crimes hidden from public view, such as serial 
killers or white-collar criminals, do not come to the attention of law enforcement agencies. A 
2009 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime study (UNODC, 2011) found that in most of 
the 30 African countries surveyed, the majority of pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners 
were incarcerated as a result of being charged with or convicted of minor offenses. For example, 
in Ghana, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia in excess of three-quarters of prisoners were 
incarcerated as a result of minor crimes. 
In countries where conviction rates are low because of a lack of criminal justice system 
capacity, there is a temptation to use pretrial detention not to “attain its primary goal of 





according to a report produced by the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum, an NGO 
(APCOF, 2011, p. 10). The lack of resources can also indirectly abet unnecessary pretrial 
detention or overly long detention periods. Many resource-poor jurisdiction do not have systems 
of personal or physical identification, rendering efforts to track persons released awaiting trial 
burdensome. For example, police in Malawi are known to “arrest relatives of suspects when a 
suspect herself cannot be found, apparently in order to ‘draw the wanted individual out of 
hiding’” (Baradaran, 2010, p. 129). A similar practice of “proxy detention” has been documented 
in South Sudan (Baradaran, 2010). 
A scarcity of police vehicles or fuel to run them can slow down the pretrial process and 
thereby increase both the duration of detention and the average number of detainees. In the 
immediate post-Yeltsin era, trials in Russia “often encountered long delays due to a shortage of 
police guards and vehicles to shuttle defendants from jail to court” (Smith, 1999, p. 115). Many 
jurisdictions in poorer countries lack an adequate court infrastructure so that courtrooms are 
often shared by more than one judicial officer. Some judges, for example, sit in court for only an 
hour or two a day to accommodate their colleagues who also need to use the facilities. In other 
places, there is a shortage of judicial personnel so that judges shuttle between courts resulting in 
adjournments and uncompleted trials (Olong, 2010). 
The unavailability of alternatives to pretrial detention increases the likelihood that courts 
will remand awaiting trial prisoners into pretrial detention. In many countries legislation 
provides for a wide range of alternatives, but funding is often lacking to make alternatives a 
realistic option. Within the U.S. federal system, for example, home electronic monitoring and the 
placement of detainees in halfway houses exist as alternatives to pretrial detention, but these 





Inadequate legal representation and assistance 
The availability of legal representation and assistance, especially at the early stages of the 
criminal justice process, can make a significant difference to arrestees’ likelihood of being 
remanded into pretrial detention and, in cases where they are detained, the duration thereof (Cape 
& Stapleton, 2012). For example, an initiative in four Nigerian states, whereby duty solicitors 
(lawyers) were stationed at police stations under a 24-hour duty schedule, reduced the number of 
pretrial detainees by almost 20% and the duration of pretrial detention by 72% over a one year 
period (Nwapa, 2008). In Malawi, the introduction of paralegals, who provide legal advice and 
assistance to arrestees and defendants at police stations, remand centers and courts, played a 
significant role in reducing both the number and proportion of pretrial detainees in that country 
(Msiska, 2008). The providers of legal assistance in the aforementioned Nigerian and Malawian 
examples were community-based organizations as state budget allocations for legal aid are 
minimal. A UNODC (2011) survey on legal aid in Africa found that while national laws – often 
entrenched as constitutional provisions – respect a right to legal aid, access to legal aid is not 
available at all stages of the criminal justice process, and is particularly rare at police stations. 
In 2008-2009, fewer than a dozen U.S. states (out of 50) ensured legal representation 
within the 48 hour initial bail hearing (Colbert, 2011). Until fairly recently, a number of U.S. 
states failed to provide lawyers at the bail stage of the criminal justice process (Colbert, 
Paternoster, & Bushway, 2002). A study involving nearly 4,000 lower-income defendants in the 
U.S. found that more than two-and-a-half times as many legally represented defendants were 
released on their own recognizance from pretrial custody compared to unrepresented defendants. 
Moreover, two-and-a-half times as many represented defendants had their bail reduced to an 





release determination was the “single most important reason for lengthy pretrial incarceration of 
people charged with nonviolent crimes” (Colbert, Paternoster, & Bushway, 2002, p. 1720). 
Police and prosecutorial influence 
In many jurisdictions, both the police and the prosecution instinctively favor pretrial 
detention over pretrial release. The police is typically convinced that a defendant is guilty and the 
prosecution service, working closely with the police, is likely to adopt the police’s position in 
most cases when it comes to requesting that a defendant be detained awaiting trial (Jones, 2003). 
Detained defendants, especially those without legal representation, are at the largely unfettered 
beck and call of detectives and prosecutors for repeated questioning, and are often more likely to 
cooperate with their interrogators. In the U.S., prosecutors have the authority to pursue a plea 
agreement and bargain with a defendant. In respect of most serious violent crimes and drug-
related offenses, federal prosecutors enjoy a discretion whether or not to pursue pretrial 
detention. As a result, prosecutors can use pretrial detention as a “bargaining chip” during plea 
negotiations. “This converts pretrial detention from a method of protecting society from crimes 
committed by criminals out on bail into a tool which helps prosecutors obtain information or 
convictions” (Klein, 1997, p. 290). 
Law enforcement’s preference for pretrial detention should be counterbalanced by the 
judiciary. This balancing effect is undermined where the judiciary adopts a deferential position in 
respect of prosecutors’ requests for pretrial detention. Judicial deference to the prosecution is 
especially marked in countries of the former Soviet Union. In Russia, since 2002, when the 
judiciary was given the power to decide upon pretrial detention (previously the responsibility of 
the prosecution), courts typically approve around 90% of all applications for pretrial detention 





Namoradze, 2012), over 90% of requests for pretrial detention by the prosecution are granted by 
the courts. A review of 10 European Union jurisdictions in 2015 revealed that judicial 
acquiescence to prosecutorial requests for pretrial detention in Central and Eastern Europe were 
equally high: 83% in Bulgaria, 90% in Hungary, and 92% in Poland (Fair Trials, 2016). Even in 
jurisdictions with a long tradition of judicial independence, prosecutors’ detention requests are 
usually adhered to by the courts. A study in England and Wales found that in 86% of cases 
judicial officers followed the prosecutions’ request to detain a defendant awaiting trial 
(Hucklesby, 1996). 
Corruption 
Police officers, prosecutors and judges are underpaid in many countries, and corruption 
can be a serious problem. Decisions made about arrest, investigation, charge, and pretrial 
detention can often be best understood in terms of the ways in which these may contribute to 
generating an income (OSJI, 2010). Corruption and excessive pretrial detention are mutually 
reinforcing. A criminal justice system that uses pretrial detention excessively is susceptible to 
corruption, and an environment marked by corruption will likely lead to over-reliance on pretrial 
detention (Heller & Henderson, forthcoming). 
In criminal justice systems where corruption is pervasive, defendants are likely to be 
released awaiting trial only if they are politically connected or have the means to bribe the 
arresting officer, prosecutor, or judicial officer dealing with their application for pretrial release. 
A review of arrest and detention practices of police in 21 African countries found that in many 
places the release of persons wrongfully arrested and the prompt handling of investigations 
depends on bribes rather than observance of legal procedure. “Corruption… exacerbates arbitrary 





police routinely round up the poor, women, homeless children, migrants, and refugees in mass 
arrests and subject them to extortion (APCOF, 2011). 
Widespread corruption may also entice criminal justice officials not to release defendants 
awaiting trial out of a concern that doing so would place them under suspicion of engaging in 
corrupt behavior. In Brazil, for example, the public holds the judiciary in low regard, blaming it 
for a combination of injustice and impunity. The view that “the police arrest criminals and the 
judges let them go” is a fairly widely held prejudice in sections of Brazilian society and the use 
of pretrial detention by some judges is reportedly partly a response to this belief (IBA, 2010, p. 
9). 
Conclusion 
The empirical cross-national imprisonment literature dealing with imprisonment 
generally reports an ambiguous relationship between unemployment and imprisonment, and 
typically no relationship between economic or income inequality and imprisonment. 
Imprisonment rates tend to be sensitive to variation in the structure of labor markets, at least in 
developed welfare state economies where prison rates are lower, although some studies focusing 
on a small number of countries fail to show a relationship between welfare expenditure and 
imprisonment. Modernization – when measured by GDP – is reportedly positively associated 
with imprisonment rates, with the exception of the most affluent countries. 
There is support for the contention that governments lacking popular legitimacy use 
punitive criminal justice policies, including incarceration, to maintain order and control – at least 
among developed, mainly European, countries. The literature generally reports no or an 





The literature is broadly supportive of group or racial threat theory – that dominant 
groups entrench their advantaged position through, inter alia, repressive social control and penal 
policies when they perceive their privileged position to be under threat. Countries with large 
minority populations often have higher imprisonment rates. 
The literature suggests that forms of government and legal tradition are associated with 
the use of imprisonment. Federal systems tend to be more punitive in respect of incarceration 
rates, while corporatist governance arrangements tend to be associated with lower incarceration 
rates. Incarceration rates are higher in common law compared to civil law countries. 
The cross-national quantitative pretrial detention literature reveals that while autocratic 
states have higher general imprisonment rates, this is not noticeably the case in respect of pretrial 
detention. There is, however, an association between political repression and higher proportions 
of prisoners in pretrial detention. Moreover, there is a strong correlation between prison 
crowding and pretrial detention, especially in developing regions of Africa and Asia. 
The comparative descriptive or single-jurisdictional literature deals with the relationship 
between pretrial detention practices and issues of unemployment and labor surplus, imprecise 
laws, punitive public attitudes, limited state resources, police and prosecutorial influence, and 
corrupt practices by criminal justice personnel. These studies are typically descriptive with some 








CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research hypotheses derived from the theoretical considerations 
and extant empirical studies discussed in Chapter 2. The hypotheses are followed by a 
description of the dependent and independent variables that will be used in a cross-national study 
to test them. The steps taken to prepare the data for manipulation and analysis are also described. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the importance and utility of large-scale cross-national 
quantitative studies, and some of the benefits and challenges associated with such a 
methodological approach. 
Purpose, benefits, and challenges of cross-national methodologies  
The comparative approach is not new to social science (Bennett, 2004; Howard, 
Newman, & Pridemore, 2000). Comparison can be used for hypothesis testing and contributes to 
the inductive discovery of new hypotheses and theory building, and plays an important role in 
concept-formation, bringing into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts among cases 
(Collier, 1993). 
Through the use of statistical analyses, and covering the majority of the world’s 
countries, this study seeks to investigate and quantify associations and relationships between a 
variety of factors or constructs and selected pretrial detention measures. Such an approach is not 
without general precedent; numerous cross-national studies have used a comparative approach to 
investigate correlates of prison overcrowding and general imprisonment rates. It has been found 
that such correlates and relationships can be “modelled along various economic, cultural and 





tested in comparative studies of general incarceration. However, no rigorous cross-national 
investigation has thus far been undertaken of the relationship between a variety of economic, 
political, and social factors, and pretrial detention measures. According to Ruddell and Urbina 
(2007), imprisonment research, while voluminous, typically neglects pretrial detainee 
populations. 
Three methodological approaches guide most comparative research in the criminal justice 
field (Ruddell & Thomas, 2009). Namely, (i) examining the relationships between economic, 
political, and social factors and criminal justice operations in larger cross-national samples; (ii) 
examining the criminal justice processes of a relatively small number of countries using a 
longitudinal approach; and (iii) comparing justice systems within small samples of countries. 
Lijphart (1971) draws similar typological divisions in comparative social science research, 
distinguishing between the statistical, comparative, and case study methods, with the statistical 
method implying quantitative comparative research using large amounts of data. A similar three-
pronged division – comparing many countries, comparing few countries, and single-country 
studies – is proposed by Landman (2008). 
This study adopts Ruddell and Thomas’ (2009) first approach. Namely, examining the 
relationships between economic, political, and social factors, and pretrial detention measures in a 
large cross-national sample. The focus is on identifying and analyzing relationships or 
correlations between a variety of factors (the independent variables) and two measures of pretrial 
detention (the dependent variables). “In more developed research areas it may be expected that 
researchers will be concerned with attempting to unpick causal explanations which underpin 
differences between cases, rather than attempting to merely identify patterns of outcomes of 





especially large-scale cross-national studies, remains too underexplored to easily “unpick” causal 
explanations regarding the drivers of pretrial detention. The objective of this study, therefore, is 
to identify statistical correlations between independent and dependent variables, but not causal 
relationships. 
In studies employing hundreds of cases or countries (as in this study), it is difficult to 
understand the details of each case / country, and the focus shifts to the analysis of variables and 
their relationships. The primary goal of variable-oriented research is the production of 
descriptive or explanatory variables. Descriptive inferences are produced by generalizing from 
patterns found within samples (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). With large sample sizes it is 
possible to generalize to a wider population. As Ragin and Robinson (2009) point out: 
All else being equal, the larger a sample is the greater the researcher’s 
confidence in generalizing to a wider population. Explanatory inferences are 
produced through hypothesis testing. Hypothesis testing requires a well-
specified theory of the relationships among variables, which may be confirmed 
or refuted by comparing the theory’s predictions against evidence. (p. 14) 
Past studies that collected data from a large number of countries and examined criminal 
justice-related issues, including incarceration policies and practices, have employed ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression models (Neapolitan, 2001; Ruddell, 2005) or logistic regression 
(Ruddell & Urbina, 2004). These ranged in size from a few dozen to over 100 countries. 
Comparative research to better understand similarities and differences between countries, using 
statistical techniques to undertake theory testing and search for correlates, is becoming more 






Comparative studies with large sample sizes from which the independent variables are 
extracted, have “methodological advantages such as reducing the possibility of multicollinearity, 
and enabling the investigators to include more variables in the statistical models,” and for 
“patterns to emerge from the analyses that might not be apparent when examining fewer nations” 
(Ruddell & Thomas, 2009, p. 656). It is a truism in quantitative comparative research that the 
greater the number of “variables that may exert a potential influence on the phenomenon under 
investigation, the more cases are needed to test all the possible combinations of several 
variables” (Lor, 2012, p. 12). 
Cross-national comparative studies incorporating a large number of countries are suitable 
for the formal testing of hypotheses. According to Bennett (2004), the testing of the 
generalizability of theories is a key benefit of cross-national comparative research: 
In almost all cases, theory is developed to explain an observed phenomenon. 
What is implicit in most theory generation is that the phenomenon is bound by 
time, space and culture, and the ensuing theoretical model is limited (if not 
idiosyncratic) to the social, political, and economic environment in which the 
phenomenon occurred. Theory development benefits from comparative research 
because a theory can be readily tested in varying environments and then 
modified or adapted to explain similar phenomena occurring globally, or a 
theory can be revealed as a limited ad hoc explanation of a culture-bound 
phenomenon. (p. 9) 
There are some disadvantages to selecting countries as the units of comparison (Lor, 
2012). One disadvantage is that within-country differences can be obscured. In some national 





greater than the differences when comparing countries with one another. For example, the 
difference in the pretrial detention rate between California and Maine may be greater than the 
difference in the rate between the U.S. and Canada or Mexico. Lijphart (1975) reviewed the issue 
of “whole-nation bias” and the challenges with focusing on countries as the unit of analysis. 
Conversely, Bennett (2004) argues that comparative research allows for the examination of 
variables that have limited range within a single country. For example, social welfare spending 
varies very little between the federal states of Germany. Due to such a restricted variance it is 
difficult to tease out the statistical relationship between, say, welfare spending and pretrial 
detention rates. Such a relationship is often weak, unstable, and even unreliable (Bennett, 2004). 
However, by using a large cross-national sample it is possible to better ascertain the correlation 
and the role of related variables. 
A challenge posed by large cross-national studies is that the necessary comparable data 
are incomplete (Norris, 2009) or become less valid as the sample size increases (Lor, 2012). This 
is especially the case when developing or post-conflict countries are included in the analysis. 
Such countries often lack the capacity to accurately collect up-to-date economic, political, and 
social statistics. 
This study sought to compensate for gaps in the available data for the independent 
variables by, in some cases, collating data from multiple years to obtain larger sample sizes. (See 
Appendix 7 for availability of data for independent variables by country.) While data drawn over 
multiple years had high year-on-year correlations so that slight inconsistencies in the years these 
variables were drawn from did not represent a significant limitation, this is nevertheless a less 





The two dependent variables, on which the veracity of this study largely relies, also have 
limitations. Even though the dependent variables were selected because of their wide coverage 
(216 national prison systems), no data were available for 10 countries, including the People’s 
Republic of China. The data for the dependent variables come primarily from national prison 
administrations (Walmsley, 2017), and are only as accurate as these government agencies are 
able to record and willing to report. Moreover, official prison data count only pretrial detainees 
who have been remanded to a prison or pretrial detention center (i.e., persons who are physically 
detained in a facility under the control of the prison administration). This undercounts the true 
number of pretrial detainees in places where detainees are also routinely confined at police 
stations. The data also reflect only the number of pretrial detainees on a particular date (i.e., 
“stock” as opposed to “flow” data) which may not be a good reflection of the average number of 
pretrial detainees for the year in question. For example, in countries with modest population sizes 
or small prison populations, the rate or proportion of pretrial detainees is sensitive to short-term 
and atypical events, such as a sudden increase in pretrial detainees because of a police operation 
which generates a high number of arrests. Finally, the dependent variable data are not counted 
the same in all jurisdictions. For example, in civil law systems, detainees convicted but not yet 
sentenced or awaiting final sentence after an appeal are classified as pretrial detainees, while in 
common law systems they are not. This poses a challenge for comparative analyses which 
include – as this study does – countries from jurisdictions which count the phenomenon under 
investigation in different ways. 
Statistically-oriented cross-national studies incorporating a large number of countries also 
face problems related to the validity and reliability of measures used in comparisons. For 





rates do not reveal the “dark figure” of crimes which are not reported or recorded by the police. 
Moreover, dichotomous variables may be too blunt to take into account nuanced differences. For 
example, by characterizing legal systems as either “common” or “civil” law, no cognizance is 
taken of legal systems which contain elements of both legal traditions. Large-scale cross-national 
studies are variable-oriented but such variables are often conceptualized and measured at a 
somewhat superficial level. 
While the independent variables were carefully selected and, where possible, based on 
the literature and prior studies, this had to be tempered by the availability of data across a large 
sample of both developed and developing countries and the constructs which this study sought to 
explore. While some constructs make for easy measurement (e.g., unemployment), others had to 
be represented by measurements only obliquely representing the construct in question. For 
example, past studies have used urbanization as a measure of modernization (Bennett, 1991), yet 
a closer inspection of urbanization rates suggest this may be an imperfect measure for the 
modernization construct as employed in this study. With an official urbanization rate of 66%, 
Austria might be considered to have a lower modernization level than Libya with an urbanization 
rate of 79%, Venezuela (89%), or Uruguay (95%). 
The larger the number of countries compared the less intensely each one will be studied. 
That is, the more countries included in a comparative study the higher the level of abstraction 
(Landman, 2008), with abstraction referring to the concepts used. Thus, in variable-oriented 
studies where many countries are used, the “focus is on a limited number of variables, which are 
abstracted and removed from the concrete reality and context of the countries that are studied by 
means of simplifying assumptions” (Lor, 2012, p. 10). Moreover, according to Howard, 





theoretical constructs” (p. 167) at a high level of abstraction, especially where – as is the case in 
this study in respect of the dependent variables – the researcher depends on secondary data 
collected by governments for administrative purposes. 
Lor (2012) summarizes the challenges with many-country comparisons as follows: 
Ontological assumptions underlying many-country comparisons are that  
countries can be seen as units, that the features being compared can be 
measured, that these features are sufficiently similar, and that variations in 
features in one country are largely independent of variations of the same features 
in other countries. The latter assumption is referred to as ‘unit independence’. 
Vast differences between countries call into question the assumption that their 
features are comparable. (p. 12) 
A related obstacle to cross-national research in criminal justice is the lack of uniformity 
in definitions and statistics (Lynch, 1988). Definitional, reporting, and recording differences 
among countries compromise the quality and comparability of cross-national data. This study 
faces the challenge of using a measure – pretrial detention – which is counted differently in 
different jurisdictions. 
As a result of a lack of comprehensive time-series data for the dependent variables, it was 
not possible to use statistical techniques to show causation between the independent and 
dependent variables. Thus, while this study is able to demonstrate how these two categories of 
variables relate to one another, it is not possible to say whether any of the independent variables 
caused either of the dependent variables (e.g., that high homicide rates cause or contribute to a 





A further methodological limitation is that some of the independent variables are 
comprised of indices which are, in turn, an amalgamation of a variety of measurements or data 
points. For example, the Democracy Index is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in 
five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; 
political participation; and political culture. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the 
overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five category indices (Keki, 2007). The 
data for each indicator come from public opinion surveys, expert assessments, and official 
statistics. Given the complexity of such indices – often comprised of sub-indices and numerous 
indicators or data points – it is a challenge to construe what they concretely represent. For 
example, this study ascertains that there is a modest negative correlation between the Democracy 
Index and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. That is, “more” democracy predicts a 
lower proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. Such a finding does not, however, permit a 
more nuanced analysis about what aspects or components of democracy correlate with the 
dependent variable. Based on the composition of the Democracy Index, it could be an aspect of, 
inter alia, countries’ electoral processes, respect for civil liberties, political culture, or a 
combination of these and other themes. 
Many of the independent variables used in this study are comprised of perception data, 
typically reflecting the perceptions or opinions of country experts, the general population (i.e., 
general opinion surveys), or specific groups (e.g., business owners). For example, the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are based on subjective or perceptions-based 
measures of governance, taken from surveys of households and firms, and expert assessments. 
There is a risk of potential systematic bias in perceptions data. Different types of respondents 





“experts” may not perceive the quality of governance in the same manner as the average citizen 
if experts are largely comprised of middle-to-upper class persons who disproportionately use 
private alternatives to government services, such as private education, healthcare, and security. 
Another form of bias in perceptions data is the possibility that subjective assessments of the 
construct being measured (e.g., governance) are driven by factors other than the construct itself. 
For example, the recent economic performance of a country may influence public perceptions on 
development, so that respondents may rate a country’s development as positive simply because 
the economy is doing well. Finally, a potential source of bias in perceptions data is that providers 
of such data, such as the World Bank or the Economist Intelligence Unit, rely on each other’s 
assessments, and consequently risk making correlated perception errors (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2010). 
A further challenge with comparative research is that the process of comparing through 
the application of particular units of analyses and variables is likely influenced by the researcher 
undertaking the analysis. “No comparison is completely neutral… the way in which the question 
is asked implies part of the response”, according to Green (1994, p. 6). Choices of units, levels of 
analysis, and variables in cross-national comparisons may be influenced by, inter alia, the 
researcher’s cultural background, linguistic knowledge, and resources. That is, researchers may 
“seek to analyze practices in different cultural settings through their own (inappropriate) 
conceptual lens. Inevitably, researchers have their own culturally and linguistically determined 
assumptions and their own mindsets” (Hantrais, 1999, p. 103). While such implicit or explicit 
researcher’s bias will influence research findings irrespective of the methodology employed, the 
risk is greater in large-scale cross-national studies where most of the units of analysis (i.e., 





In the context of a discussion on the strengths and limitations of large-scale cross-
national comparative studies it is important to note that national contexts and peculiarities play 
an important role in shaping pretrial detention practices. While aspects of penal practices, 
including pretrial detention, can be explained by general economic, political, and cultural factors, 
their impact is “difficult to condense in terms of a simple statistical model” (Lappi-Seppӓlӓ, 
2007, p.298). Many relationships are context-related and the aforementioned factors are likely to 
occur in different combinations in different jurisdictions and at different points in time. The 
methodological approach and units of analysis for this study focus on country-level relationships 
and patterns. Aggregation to such high levels masks the considerable variation in pretrial 
detention measures and their economic, political, and social correlates present in many countries. 
To overcome this limitation, some researchers favor country-specific research capable of 
analyzing such correlates or relationships at subnational level (LaFree & Kick, 1986; Neapolitan, 
1997). 
Writing in the context of growing levels of popular punitiveness and incarceration (at 
least in a number of developed countries), and the desire to understand starkly different cross-
national levels of imprisonment, Nelken (2011) calls for an exploration of the differences in 
national political cultures and institutions. Nelken (2013) contends there may be some general or 
universal economic, political, and cultural factors which drive levels of punitiveness, such as 
populist rhetoric by political elites, greater socio-economic and political polarization, and an 
overall decrease of trust in governments and criminal justice experts. He warns, however, that 
other drivers of punitiveness are highly context specific such as, for example, in the United 
States the impact of racial divisions on the public’s fear of crime and consequent punitive 





context-specific impediments or “shields” against punitiveness such as the role and influence of 
strong centralized state bureaucracies in some European countries which are not easily swayed 
by popular opinion or the whims of politicians. In short, national-level peculiarities influence 
pretrial detention practices. These are not a focus of this study, however. 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, the methodological approach of this study has a 
number of strengths and benefits. Cross-country comparison is useful for hypothesis testing and 
the inductive discovery of new hypotheses and theory construction. Comparisons can be used to 
better understand the relationships behind observed similarities and differences (Azarian, 2011). 
The use of large sample sizes reduces the risk of multicollinearity and permits the inclusion of a 
wide variety of variables to test a multitude of hypotheses. Comparative research also allows for 
the investigation of variables which have limited range within a country but considerable 
variation across countries. 
Hantrais and Mangen (1998) discuss other advantages of cross-national comparative 
research. Namely, a deeper understanding of critical issues of concern in different countries; 
development of new directions and useful avenues for future research about which scholars may 
not previously have been aware; a more informed focus of analysis of the subject being 
investigated by suggesting new perspectives; and the identification of gaps in the existing 
knowledge base. Moreover, a “variable-oriented” approach, assessing the relationship between 
variables across a large sample of observations can serve to identify patterns that hold for the 
overall sample, thereby enabling predictions or inferences to be drawn (Ragin, 1987). 
While data reliability remains a challenge, both the quantity and quality of data needed 
for international comparisons in a variety of fields, including the themes covered by this study, 





organizations have engaged in ongoing efforts to address gaps in data availability and to ensure 
datasets capture different country contexts (Cacace, Ettelt, Mays, & Nolte, 2013; Kriegler & 
Shaw, 2016). 
Study themes and hypotheses 
This section is organized around the economic, political, and social factors that relate to 
pretrial detention. Each factor is comprised of a number of themes or constructs identified in the 
literature as germane to punishment / incarceration and/or pretrial detention practices. For each 
of the constructs two hypotheses are proposed – one for each of the independent variables. 
Economic factors 
Unemployment 
Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939/2003) hypothesized that punishment, especially mass 
imprisonment, is driven primarily by economic considerations. Cross-national studies seeking to 
test Rusche and Kirchheimer’s theory focus disproportionately on developed and rich countries 
and none explicitly investigate the relationship between unemployment and pretrial detention. 
There is consequently scope for testing the labor surplus hypothesis using a large sample of 
developed and developing countries with a focus on pretrial detention. Pretrial detention can be 
construed as a mechanism of social control and punishment so that it is reasonable to assume that 
Rusche and Kirchheimer’s labor surplus dynamics apply to pretrial detention rates as well. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1a: Unemployment levels are positively correlated with pretrial detention rates. 
If labor surplus affects all forms of criminal incarceration (i.e., both in respect of 
sentenced prisoners and pretrial detainees), then the relationship between the two incarcerated 





unemployment results in higher numbers of both pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners, then 
the number of pretrial detainees expressed as a proportion of all prisoners is unlikely to change 
significantly. This produces the following hypothesis: 
H1b: Unemployment levels do not correlate significantly with the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Inequality 
Inequality, a consequence of unemployment, may also be related to penal policies and 
practices, including incarceration. Williams and Timberlake (1984) speculate that in situations of 
high economic inequality, governments tend to focus more attention and resources on crime 
control activities. Wacquant (2000) argues that imprisonment serves as a mechanism for 
controlling offenders and maintaining the legitimacy of the capitalist state during periods of 
rising and sustained economic inequality. Others (Merton, 1938; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Hirschi, 
1969; Agnew, 2006; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2006) speculate that the poor and unemployed have a 
greater propensity to engage in criminal conduct and risk being arrested and imprisoned 
compared to better-off members of society; a phenomenon which is exacerbated by inequality 
and social stratification. Notwithstanding the theoretical work, the cross-national empirical 
literature is largely inconclusive on the issue with numerous studies finding no significant 
relationship between economic inequality and imprisonment (Greenberg, 1999; Neapolitan, 
2001; Ruddell, 2005). As the literature has not explicitly explored the relationship between 
inequality and pretrial detention, it is germane to test for this relationship based on the theoretical 
literature. This leads to the following hypothesis: 





As with labor surplus, more effective and better resourced crime control policies and/or 
increases in criminal conduct can be expected to increase both pretrial detainee and sentenced 
prisoner numbers, thereby not significantly affecting the relationship between the two. This 
suggests the following hypothesis: 
H2b: Economic inequality does not correlate significantly with the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Social welfare 
Both strain (Merton, 1938) and subculture theories (Cohen, 1955) link crime and criminal 
conduct with poverty. It follows that policies designed to reduce or mitigate the impact of 
poverty, such as increases in government spending on social welfare programs, should reduce 
both poverty and economic inequality and thereby decrease crime. 
Empirical studies on the relationship between social welfare spending and changes in the 
crime rate have found significant negative correlations (Savage, Bennett, & Danner, 2008). 
Numerous cross-national studies found a negative correlation between welfare spending and 
imprisonment rates (Jacobs & Kleban, 2003; Downes & Hansen, 2006; Lappi-Seppälä, 2007). 
These have, however, focused on developed countries and used relatively small sample sizes 
(around two-dozen countries or less). A smaller subgroup of empirical studies fail to support the 
aforementioned findings and found that welfare expenditure does not affect incarceration rates 
(e.g., De Koster, van der Waal, Achterberg, & Houtman, 2008). Given these inconsistent 
findings and the fact that no studies explicitly explored the relationship between welfare 
expenditure and pretrial detention, the following hypothesis arises: 





Based on the theoretical literature, social welfare expenditure reduces criminal conduct 
which should lower both pretrial detainee and sentenced prisoner numbers and not significantly 
affect the relationship between the two, suggesting the following hypothesis: 
H3b State welfare expenditure does not correlate significantly with the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Modernization 
A number of empirical cross-national studies found support for the modernization 
perspective in the context of imprisonment (e.g., Jacobs & Kleban, 2003; Ruddell & Urbina, 
2004). These findings have, however, been questioned by Ruddell (2005) who, in an analysis of 
the world’s 100 richest countries, found that the top 50 richest countries had lower average rates 
of imprisonment compared to the next set of 50 countries. The basic premise of Durkheim’s 
analysis should also apply to pretrial detention: as countries modernize, so their formal criminal 
justice institutions develop and grow. This, in turn, should bring about a higher number of arrests 
and the processing of arrestees through pretrial justice systems. The following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H4a: A country’s level of modernization is positively correlated with pretrial detention 
rates. 
Because modernization increases the salience of formal criminal justice institutions it is 
reasonable to assume that modernization will exert upwards pressures on both the use of pretrial 
detention and imprisonment, but more so on the latter as formal justice systems enhance their 
human and technical capacities to convict offenders. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4b: A country’s level of modernization is negatively correlated with the proportion of 







Autocratic regimes tend to have higher incarceration rates compared to liberal 
democracies (Ruddell & Urbina, 2007). Governments which perceive themselves to be 
vulnerable or lacking popular legitimacy will resort to punitive policies to maintain their 
positions of authority and power (Garland, 2001). The autocracy – democracy pattern does, 
however, not appear to hold for pretrial detention rates, suggesting that some of the factors which 
contribute to pretrial detention may be different to those that lead to imprisonment more 
generally (Ruddell & Urbina, 2007). Ruddell and Urbina’s study covered the world’s 100 richest 
countries, and it would be insightful to assess their findings using a larger sample of countries 
which also cover developing and low-income countries. If it is assumed that autocratic states 
generally employ the “crime control model” as compared to the “due process model” (Packer, 
1968), then autocratic regimes with relatively high incarceration rates should have high pretrial 
detention rates too. This makes for the following hypotheses: 
H5a: Stable democracy and civil liberties are negatively correlated with pretrial detention 
rates. 
H5b: Stable democracy and civil liberties are negatively correlated with the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Development 
Countries with high levels of prison crowding tend to have a high proportion of prisoners 
in pretrial detention, especially in developing regions. This may be because of poor governance 






A large cross-national analysis covering 200 countries found that prison crowding is 
associated with low general imprisonment rates (Albrecht, 2012). This finding can be explained 
in the context of poor governance. That is, badly governed and/or developing countries tend to 
have limited prison space producing overcrowding even when the overall imprisonment rate is 
low. Such countries have overall low imprisonment rates because they tend to lack the criminal 
justice capacity and resources to ensure a high proportion of arrestees are prosecuted and 
convicted. That is, a relatively high proportion of prisoners are pretrial detainees. 
A criminal justice system’s lack of human or capital resources, which is more acute in 
developing countries, increases the risk of pretrial detention. Where the police and prosecution 
have limited investigative abilities they tend to rely disproportionately on confessions to bring 
matters to court. Such confessions are most easily extracted from persons in custody, often in 
pretrial detention. Moreover, in countries where conviction rates are low because of a lack of 
criminal justice capacity, there may be a temptation on the side of criminal justice system 
operators to use pretrial detention as a form of de facto punishment (Schönteich, 2014). 
A lack of resources can also indirectly influence the criminal justice system to 
unnecessarily detain defendants awaiting trial, or detain them for inordinately lengthy periods of 
time. Many resource-poor jurisdiction do not have systems of personal or physical identification, 
rendering efforts to track persons released awaiting trial burdensome. Pretrial release is 
consequently an unappealing option for law enforcement officials. Moreover, the unavailability 
of effective alternatives to pretrial detention in resource-poor settings increases the likelihood 
that courts will remand defendants into pretrial detention. Such development / governance 





H6a: Countries’ levels of development are positively correlated with pretrial detention 
rates. 
H6b: Countries’ levels of development are negatively correlated with the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Social factors 
Corruption 
In criminal justice systems where corruption is pervasive, detained defendants are likely 
to be released awaiting trial only if they have the means to bribe the arresting officer, prosecutor, 
or judicial officer dealing with their application for pretrial release. In such jurisdictions arrests 
by the police are likely to be high as every arrest potentially leads to an income-generating  
bribe. The average duration of pretrial detention may be of relatively short duration as arrestees 
or defendants bribe themselves out of custody before the beginning of the trial process. It is thus 
plausible that in corrupt criminal justice systems relatively few defendants stand trial to be 
prosecuted and face the risk of conviction. This implies that corrupt systems will have relatively 
modest numbers (or rates) of pretrial detainees given the relatively short average duration of 
pretrial detention. Moreover, because of the rarity of trials, sentenced prisoner numbers should 
be particularly low. This allows for the following hypotheses: 
H7a: Levels of official corruption are negatively correlated with pretrial detention rates. 
H7b: Levels of official corruption are positively correlated with the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Political legitimacy 
In a cross-comparative study of 25 developed, mainly European, countries Lappi-Seppӓlӓ 





legitimacy and (social and institutional) trust on the other. Societies with high levels of social 
trust can be expected to have relatively low levels of fear of crime which in turn should mitigate 
public pressure for tough penal sanctions. It is reasonable to presume that similar dynamics apply 
to pretrial detention policies and practices: jurisdictions with high levels of political trust and 
legitimacy can be expected to have relatively low rates of pretrial detention. As high-trust 
societies are likely to have low rates of general imprisonment (i.e., both in respect of pretrial 
detainees and sentenced prisoners) it is not to be expected that the relative proportion of pretrial 
detainees to sentenced prisoners is affected significantly by varying levels of political trust or 
legitimacy. This allows for the following hypotheses: 
H8a: Levels of state political legitimacy are negatively correlated with pretrial detention 
rates. 
H8b: Levels of state political legitimacy do not correlate significantly with the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Political trust 
High levels of political trust can also be expected to correlate with low rates of pretrial 
detention. Pretrial detention may be particularly sensitive to varying levels of political trust; 
arguably even more so than sentenced prisoner numbers. In jurisdictions with high levels of 
political trust, judicial officers should feel more comfortable releasing defendants awaiting trial 
on the assurance that the latter will not abscond or interfere with the criminal investigation and 
will, in due course, stand trial. This suggests the following hypotheses: 
H9a: Levels of political trust are negatively correlated with pretrial detention rates. 







The association between crime and incarceration rates has been extensively explored. It is 
reasonable to assume that the relationship between crime and pretrial detention is less elastic 
compared to the relationship between crime and sentenced prisoner numbers. There are a number 
of intervening bureaucratic and procedural factors in the criminal justice process – between the 
pretrial detention stage and the point at which defendants are convicted and given a custodial 
sentence – which disrupt the “pipeline” between arrest and the imposition of a custodial 
sentence. The criminal justice system is akin to a funnel with many people coming into contact 
with the system at its large “open” end (Smit & Harrendorf, 2010). This is when persons are 
stopped and questioned by the police, or charged with a crime and remanded to pretrial 
detention. However, many of those arrested or remanded are not prosecuted because, inter alia, 
the incriminating evidence is not compelling enough, or state witnesses disappear or lose 
interest. Of those prosecuted, some will not be convicted. And, of those convicted, many will not 
receive a custodial sentence. It is probable, therefore, that high levels of crime will affect pretrial 
detention numbers more than the number of sentenced prisoners, at least in jurisdictions where 
case attrition rates are high. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H10a: Levels of recorded crime are positively correlated with pretrial detention rates. 
H10b: Levels of recorded crime are positively correlated with the proportion of prisoners 
in pretrial detention. 
Perceptions of crime / safety 
Actual levels of crime, or even of recorded crime, are not necessarily the same as 
subjective perceptions of crime / safety. Public perceptions of high crime levels may, through 





(Garland, 2000). For reasons set out above under the “crime” variable, perceptions of high crime 
levels may, on balance, not only increase the rate of pretrial detention but also the number of 
pretrial detainees as a proportion of all prisoners. This suggests the following hypotheses: 
H11a: Perceptions of crime / safety are positively correlated with pretrial detention rates. 
H11b: Perceptions of crime / safety are positively correlated with the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Ethnic heterogeneity 
Group threat theory and its derivatives inform research on formal social control and 
criminal punishment. Minority threat hypotheses provide a theoretical framework for 
understanding cross-national patterns of punishment. Cross-national studies have also shown a 
relationship between population heterogeneity and punishment, with evidence that religious 
diversity is positively associated with imprisonment rates (Ruddell & Urbina, 2004).There is no 
compelling reason to assume that the group threat / population heterogeneity dynamic should not 
apply to pretrial detention practices as well. Indeed, there is empirical evidence to suggest that 
members of minority groups are, on average, at greater risk of arrest compared to majority 
groups (Bruell, 2010). Given the tendency of criminal justice systems to jettison cases during the 
course of the criminal justice process (see “case attrition” discussion above), it is possible that 
discriminatory practices against minority groups, or the targeting of minority groups by police, 
disproportionately affect pretrial detention numbers in relation to the number of sentenced 
prisoners. This suggests the following hypotheses: 
H12a: Levels of ethnic diversity are positively correlated with pretrial detention rates. 
H12b: Levels of ethnic diversity are positively associated with the proportion of prisoners 






Most European Union countries disaggregate data on prison inmates to distinguish 
between citizens and foreign nationals. In the majority of EU countries foreign nationals are 
significantly overrepresented in national prison systems in comparison to their prevalence in the 
general national population. The same pattern holds for pretrial detention populations. In 2015, 
24 out of 28 EU countries provided disaggregated data for their pretrial detention populations, 
differentiating between citizens and foreign nationals. In half of these countries, 30% or more of 
pretrial detention populations were comprised of foreign nationals. In a third, or eight countries, 
foreigners constituted in excess of 40% of all pretrial detainees (Aebi, Tiago, & Burkhardt, 
2016). Others have reported that foreign nationals are overrepresented in arrest rates in many 
countries (Preston & Perez, 2006). 
A variety of reasons can be proffered why foreign nationals might be overrepresented 
among pretrial detention populations. Non-nationals may, on balance, pose a greater flight risk 
being in possession of a foreign passport and having fewer local community ties compared to 
citizens. Some argue that foreign nationals have a greater tendency to engage in criminal acts 
compared to citizens (Albrecht, 1997; Yaeger, 1997). This tendency may be especially 
pronounced where foreign nationals are disproportionately comprised of young males, a 
demographic group which is universally relatively crime prone. Finally, and related to the above 
discussed group threat theories, there is the possibility of disparate and discriminatory treatment 
against foreign national by law enforcement agencies (Junger Tas, 1997; Wacquant, 1999). 
These considerations suggest the following hypotheses: 
H13a: The proportion of foreign nationals in national populations are positively 





H13b: The proportion of foreign nationals in national populations are positively 
correlated with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Public punitiveness 
It stands to reason that public punitiveness exerts some influence on penal policies and 
their application, especially in democracies with accountable and responsive policy makers. 
Policy makers have strategic incentives to reflect changes in punitive attitudes of citizens in their 
policy decisions (Jennings et al., 2015). Studies have shown feedback processes between public 
preferences and policy (Soroka & Wlezien, 2010) consistent with the ideas behind penal 
populism. 
It is reasonable to assume that countries with high levels of public punitiveness will, 
everything else remaining equal, experience higher rates of pretrial detention. Less clear is the 
impact of public punitiveness on the numerical relationship between pretrial detainees and 
sentenced prisoners. Policy makers have limited influence over sentencing practices. Judicial 
independence and judicial sentencing discretion common to many jurisdictions act as a barrier to 
executive or political interference in sentencing practices. On the other hand, arrest and charging 
practices, and prosecutorial pretrial detention policies, are typically within the authority of the 
political executive and criminal justice policy makers. Pretrial detention practices are 
consequently more likely to be responsive to public punitiveness compared to sentencing 
practices. This suggests the following hypotheses: 
H14a: Levels of public punitiveness are positively correlated with pretrial detention rates. 
H14b: Levels of public punitiveness are positively correlated with the proportion of 







According to the cross-national empirical literature, countries with common law systems 
have higher overall incarceration rates compared to countries with civil law systems (e.g., 
DeMichele, 2014; D’Amico & Williamson, 2015). Common law trials are typically of relatively 
short duration, with emphasis on the oral testimony of witnesses. By contrast, in civil law 
systems a series of court hearings may be held over an extended period with documents and 
documentary evidence playing a more important role than witness testimony. Moreover, in civil 
law regimes appeals may be taken both on the facts and the law, and the appeal courts can open 
the record to receive new evidence (Messitte, 1999). During such appeal processes defendants 
continue to be classified as remandees or pretrial detainees, often described as “prisoners without 
a final sentence” by the statistical agencies of civil law countries (Morgenstern, 2009). Delays 
between the commission of an offense and trial are attributed to “the inherent complexity of the 
[civil law] system at the pre-trial stage, which is formal and in which duplication of tasks often 
occurs” (van Caenegem, 1999, p. 86). These insights suggest the following hypotheses: 
H15a: Compared to civil law countries, common law countries have lower pretrial 
detention rates. 
H15b: Compared to civil law countries, common law countries have lower proportions of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Dependent variables and dataset 
This study uses two dependent variables: the number of pretrial detainees expressed as a 
rate per 100,000 of the general population; and the number of pretrial detainees expressed as a 
proportion of the overall prison population. The source for both dependent variables is the 





Institute for Criminal Policy Research (ICPR) at the University of London. In almost all cases 
the original source for the data included in the List is the national prison administration of the 
country concerned, or the executive ministry responsible for the prison administration 
(Walmsley, 2017). The List contains the latest available data as of the end of November 2016 on 
pretrial detainees held in penal institutions in 216 prison systems in independent countries and 
dependent territories worldwide.7 The latest available year for which these data are provided vary 
somewhat, although most are from between 2014 and 2016. The data contained in the List reflect 
the number of pretrial detainees on a particular date (i.e., “stock” as opposed to “flow” data, 
whereby the latter would reflect the number of individual pretrial detention admissions over a 
certain period). No data are available for 10 countries, including the People’s Republic of 
China.8 
In providing information about prisoners held in pretrial detention, the List refers to 
persons who, in connection with an alleged offense(s), are “deprived of liberty following a 
judicial or other legal process but have not been definitively sentenced by a court for the 
offence(s)” (Walmsley, 2017, p. 1). That is, data provided by the List include persons who have 
been formally remanded to pretrial detention by a court but have not been definitively sentenced 
by a court for the offence(s) with which they were charged. Pretrial detainees captured by the 
data in the List include persons who are in one of five stages of the criminal justice process. 
Namely, (i) the “investigation” stage, when defendants are being interrogated and the allegations 
against them investigated to ascertain if there is justification for instituting a prosecution against 
                                                 
7 Dependent territories include places such as Aruba (Netherlands), Bermuda (UK), Hong Kong (China), Puerto 
Rico (USA), and Réunion (France). 
8 The third edition of the ‘World Pre-trial / Remand Imprisonment List’ (Walmsley, 2017) does not contain data for: 






them; (ii) the “awaiting trial” stage, after the investigation has ended and a decision has been 
taken to initiate a prosecution; (iii) the “trial” stage, while the trial is actually taking place; (iv) 
the “convicted unsentenced” stage, when detainees have been convicted by the court but not yet 
sentenced; and (v) the “awaiting final sentence’” stage, when detainees have been provisionally 
sentenced by the court of first instance but are awaiting the result of an appeal process which 
occurs before the definitive sentence is confirmed. 
Some legal systems, common law systems in particular, do not count the aforementioned 
fourth and fifth stages (respectively, the “convicted unsentenced” and “awaiting final sentence” 
stages) as pretrial detention, and individuals in these stages are consequently not reflected in the 
List’s data for such jurisdictions. Civil law systems typically include persons in the 
aforementioned fourth and fifth stages in their pretrial detention or remand data (for such 
jurisdictions the term “pretrial detention” is too narrow and the term “remand detention” is more 
accurate). This poses a challenge for comparative analyses which include – as this study does – 
countries from jurisdictions which count the phenomenon under investigation in different ways. 
A few jurisdictions, especially countries belonging to the Council of Europe, provide 
disaggregated data according to the aforementioned stages of the criminal justice process (Aebi 
& Delgrande, 2014). This provides some insight into the impact of including “convicted 
unsentenced” and “awaiting final sentence” defendants in the overall count of pretrial detainees / 
remandees. Reviews by Morgenstern (2009) and Pease (1994) found that some civil law 
countries have higher numbers of pretrial detainees as a result of their expanded definition of 
remand detention. This, however, varies from one jurisdiction to the next, and it appears that the 





appeals procedure and/or a large proportion of pretrial detainees / remandees who appeal against 
their conviction or sentence in the court of first instance. 
As mentioned above, in almost all cases the original source for the pretrial detention data 
contained in the List is the national prison administration of the country concerned or the 
executive agency responsible for the prison administration. Such official prison administration / 
ministry data generally reflects only the number of pretrial detainees who have been remanded to 
a prison or pretrial detention center. This may undercount the true number of pretrial detainees in 
some places where detainees are also routinely confined at police stations. In jurisdictions where 
the state lacks the wherewithal to properly undertake criminal investigations, keeping pretrial 
detainees at police stations allows for easier and more robust interrogation of suspects to elicit 
confessions. Very few jurisdiction maintains centralized records of the number of pretrial 
detainees confined in police cells. It is therefore an unknown quantity which could, potentially, 
affect the analyses for countries where the number of pretrial detainees in police stations is 
significant. 
Independent variables 
A variety of variables were selected to test for the hypotheses enumerated above. Where 
appropriate, the variables were derived from the literature which investigated cross-national 
correlates of imprisonment and pretrial detention. Variables for which large cross-national 
datasets were available (typically in excess of 150 countries) were given preference over those 
which had data for a relatively small number of countries only. For some hypotheses only one 
variable was chosen where the variable matched, or closely matched, the construct to be 
investigated such as, for example, the national unemployment rate for the “unemployment” 





was used to test the hypothesis in question. For example, for the “modernization” construct, the 
Human Development Index (HDI) and urbanization levels were used as variables. See Table 2 
for a list of the variables used, the constructs they represent, and the number of countries (“N”) 
for which data were available for each variable. Appendix 1 provides a summary table of the 
hypotheses and the related constructs, variables, and data sources. Appendix 2 provides 
hyperlinks to the databases from which the data for the dependent and independent variables 
were drawn. 
The most recent publically available data for each measure was sought. While most 
datasets used are from 2015 and 2016, some variables utilized older datasets. See the “years 
used” column in Table 2 for the years for which the data were obtained. In some cases data from 
multiple years were collated to obtain larger sample sizes. For example, Gini index data were 
obtained from 2007 to 2015. Data drawn over multiple years had high year-on-year correlations 
so that slight inconsistencies in the years these variables were being drawn from should not 















Table 2: Variable metadata 
CONSTRUCTS VARIABLE 
 YEARS     
USED       N 
“BETTER” 
SCALE 
END9 NOTES  
     
 
 
Proportion prisoners in PTD ~2016 209  
 
 
Pretrial detention rate ~2016 208  
 
UNEMPLOYMENT      
 Unemployment 2016 176 -  
INEQUALITY      




     
 
Social Assistance Expenditure 2009-2015 59 + Average across 
years used 
 Education Expenditure 2015 140 +   
Public Health Expenditure 2015 183 + 
 
MODERNIZATION 




Human Development Index 2015 180 + 
 
 
Urbanization  2016 202    
REGIME TYPE 
   
 
 
  Democracy Index 2016 160 +  
 Political Stability & Absence of 
Violence 
2016 199 + Projected 
estimates10  
DEVELOPMENT       
Government Effectiveness 2016 197 + Projected 
estimates  
GDP per Capita 2016 175  Ln transformed  
Prison Occupancy Rate ~2016 193  
 
 Fragile States Index 2017 170 -   
Public Services Indicator 2017 170 + 
 
 
Police Per Capita 2007-2016 128  Range11 
CORRUPTION 




Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 169 + 
 
 




   
 
 
 Rule of Law 2016 197 + Projected 
estimates 
 Judicial Independence ~2015 135 +  
                                                 
9 The “better” scale end is a shorthand way of expressing the politically or socially desirable end of an ordinal 
variable. For example, less unemployment is preferable to more unemployment, so that the lower end of the 
unemployment scale is “better” of preferred. In respect of the Gini Index, which measures inequality, with 1 
expressing maximal inequality and 0 minimal inequality, the “better” scale end is on the lower side representing less 
inequality. Or, in respect of “social assistance expenditure” more is generally preferable to less, so that the “better” 
scale end is on the higher side representing more social assistance expenditure. 
10 Projected estimates indicate that these data are not explicitly measured per se, but rather, are predicted (estimated) 
based on weights assigned to other pre-existing data. This allows for generating a single number to represent a 
broader, sometimes difficult to observe construct. See Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2011) for more information 
on how estimates are calculated. 






 YEARS     







   
 
 
 Trust in National Government 2015 135 +  
CRIME       
Homicide Rate 2010-2014 184  Ln transformed 
Range 
PERCEPTIONS OF 
CRIME / SAFETY 
     
 
Level of Peace / Insecurity 2017 155 - 
 
 Law & Order Index 2016 133 +   
Safety and Security Index 2016 149 + 
 
 Percent Feeling Safe 2014 140 +  
ETHNIC 
HETEROGENEITY 












Stock of Immigrants 2015 186  
 
LEGAL SYSTEM       
Legal System Classification  ~2016 212  Recoded to 3 
levels, N = 203 
PUBLIC 
PUNITIVENESS 
     
 
Voice and Accountability Index 2016 197 + 
 
 Press Freedom Index 2015 169 -  
      
 
Unemployment 
Economic stress variables such as unemployment are standard control variables in studies 
of imprisonment (Killias, 1986; Chiricos & DeLone, 1992; Neapolitan, 2001; Ruddell, 2005; 
Ruddell & Urbina, 2007). Data were obtained from the International Labor Organization’s 
ILOSTAT database through the World Bank’s “DataBank” web-portal which contains data on a 
variety of development topics. The unemployment rate is measured as the number of 
unemployed persons as a proportion of the total number of persons in the labor force. The labor 
force is the sum of the number of persons employed and unemployed. The unemployed comprise 
all persons of working age who are without work, (i.e., not in paid employment or self-






Inequality was operationalized using the Gini coefficient expressed as a normalized Gini 
index. The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or wealth among 
individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. It is a 
common measurement of inequality (Ceriani & Verme, 2012), including in cross-national 
criminological research (Neapolitan, 2001; Ruddell, 2005; Baumer & Wolff, 2014). A Gini index 
of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. Data were 
obtained from the World Bank. Some of the Gini statistics were from different years, with the 
data derived from 2007 to 2015. This is not a serious limitation, as patterns of inequality tend to 
be stable over time. For example, the correlation between 2014 and 2010 Gini is .97; the 
correlation between 2014 and 2000 Gini is .92. Missing data for the Gini index were mean-
replaced. That is, in cases where no Gini data for a given country existed for a given year, the 
average Gini scores were used for that country across all years to fill in the missing data. 
Social welfare 
Social welfare was operationalized through three variables: social assistance expenditure, 
education expenditure, and public health expenditure. 
Social assistance expenditure reflects public spending on social assistance programs as a 
proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). That is, total expenditures including spending on 
benefits (e.g., the amount of money a given government spends on social safety net programs 
such as social pensions, school feeding schemes, public works programs, and other social 
assistance) and on administrative costs (i.e., costs associated with the management and dispersal 





program budgets (i.e., operating and investment budgets). Data were obtained from the World 
Bank. 
Education expenditure was operationalized as government expenditure on education, 
including current, capital and transfer spending on education, expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Data were obtained from the 2016 United Nations Development Report (UNDP, 2016, pp. 231-
233). 
Public health expenditure reflects current and capital spending on health from 
government (central and local) budgets, external borrowing and grants (including donations from 
international agencies and non-governmental organizations) and social (or compulsory) health 
insurance funds (for example, funds for Medicare and Medicaid in the U.S.). Taken together, the 
factors function as a public health expenditure indicator, which is defined in turn as a percentage 
of GDP. Data were obtained from the 2016 United Nations Development Report (UNDP, 2016, 
pp. 226-229). 
Modernization 
Modernization was operationalized through the Human Development Index (HDI) and 
urbanization levels. The HDI is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic 
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life (life expectancy in years), knowledge 
(expected years and mean years of schooling), and a decent standard of living (gross national 
income per capita). Consistent with Neapolitan (2001), Pratt and Godsey (2002), and Ruddell 
and Urbina (2007), the HDI is used as a proxy indicator of development. Data were obtained 
from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2016). 
Urbanization is used to capture a facet of development (Bennett, 1991). It is defined as 





operationalized using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations 
World Urbanization Prospects. Percentages urban are the number of persons residing in an area 
defined as “urban” per 100 total population. They are calculated by the Statistics Division of the 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Data were obtained from the World 
Bank. 
Regime type 
Regime type was operationalized through two variables: the Democracy Index, and the 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index. 
The Democracy Index is made up of a weighted average of: (i) civil liberties (which 
reflect, inter alia, the degree of free speech protection afforded to citizens and media outlets, and 
the degree of protection granted to rights widely construed to be fundamental among democratic 
countries); (ii) the electoral process and pluralism (which reflect the degree to which 
mechanisms for a fair electoral process are consistently put to use, as well as the degree to which 
multiple political parties can run against each other for votes in public elections); (iii) the 
functioning of government (which reflects the degree to which governments can efficiently pass 
and enforce effective legislation on behalf of citizens, and whether government actions such as 
redistricting and catering to narrow voter blocs result in electoral and policy outcomes that are 
unrepresentative of the wishes of the public); (iv) political participation (which reflects voter 
turnout, the proportion of individuals in a given country who are members of political parties, 
and overall engagement in political debate and advocacy); and (v) the political culture (which 
reflects the belief among a given citizenry of the efficacy of democratic government). Data were 
obtained from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The EIU is a UK-based for-profit entity 





business and world affairs information) providing forecasting and advisory services through 
research and analysis. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence measures perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and / or politically-motivated violence. Variables used to construct this 
measure include the incidence of armed conflict, violent demonstrations, and social unrest; the 
intensity of internal conflicts; the degree of ethnic tensions; the intensity and impact of protests 
and riots; the risk of damage to property, injury or death from terrorism and organized crime; and 
the risk of intra-state conflict. 
Data were obtained from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). 
The WGI report on six broad dimensions of governance for some 200 countries and territories. 
Namely, (i) Voice and Accountability; (ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence; (iii) 
Government Effectiveness; (iv) Regulatory Quality; (v) Rule of Law; and (vi) Control of 
Corruption. The WGI are composite governance indicators based on 33 underlying data 
sources.  These data sources are rescaled and combined to create the six aggregate indicators. 
The WGI are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by 
enterprise, citizen, and expert survey respondents gathered from survey institutes, think tanks, 
non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006). The WGI are among the most widely used indicators of 
governance by policymakers and academics (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007). By 
averaging information from different data sources the WGI smooth out some of the peculiarities 
of individual measures of governance and are consequently more informative about the broad 







Development was operationalized using six variables: the World Bank’s index of 
Government Effectiveness; per capita GDP; prison occupancy rates; the Fund for Peace’s Fragile 
States Index and Public Services Indicator; and police per capita. 
Government effectiveness data were obtained from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). See above for a description of the WGI and how the different 
aggregate indicators, including government effectiveness, are comprised. The index of 
Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services (e.g., public 
schools, transportation infrastructure, drinking water and sanitation quality); and the quality of 
the civil service (e.g., institutional effectiveness of state bureaucracies) and its degree of 
independence from political pressures. The index also captures the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of governments’ commitment to such policies. 
The index is a subjective measure of governments’ performance by drawing on data 
sources that reflect the perceptions of a diverse group of survey respondents with first-hand 
knowledge of the governance situation in the country (Soo-Young & Whitford, 2009). Data 
incorporated into the index include surveys of experts, which reflect country ratings produced by 
commercial risk rating agencies, and cross-country surveys of residents carried out by 
international and non-governmental organizations (Kaufman, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999). 
Surveys of experts capture the perceptions of country analysts at multilateral development 
agencies such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the African and Asian 
Development Banks, and the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007). Surveys of 
residents are surveys of individuals or domestic firms with knowledge of the governance 





procedure rescales the individual indicators from each underlying variable’s source to make them 
comparable across data sources and then constructs a weighted average of each of these rescaled 
data sources to produce an aggregate indicator of government effectiveness (Soo-Young & 
Whitford, 2009). 
Gross Domestic Product per capita is divided by mid-year population. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in an economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. Data are in U.S. dollars and were obtained 
from the World Bank. 
Prison occupancy rate is calculated as the number of inmates in custody as a percentage 
of a country’s official prison capacity. These data are specific to adults and consequently do not 
include data from juvenile systems. The data are collated and published by the Institute for 
Criminal Policy Research’s World Prison Brief. In almost all cases the original source of the data 
are the national prison administration of the country concerned (Walmsley, 2017). The definition 
of overcrowding depends on a mix of normative, factual, and even cultural elements. Normative 
links are provided by international and regional human rights instruments which prohibit cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment and guarantee human dignity. Sometimes 
national constitutions explicitly mention prisoners’ right to “adequate accommodation”, while in 
a few cases national law defines the minimum permitted space per prisoner. Definitions of 
overcrowding differ between countries and are dependent on, inter alia, the adoption of single 
cell accommodation as a standard practice versus the use of communal cells, the general prison 
designs, the economic resources available to prison administrators, and the degree of flexibility 
which is demanded from prison administrations by politicians, law makers, and the judiciary 





The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of some 170 countries based on the 
different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. Three primary sources of data – 
quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation – are triangulated and reviewed to obtain final 
scores for the FSI. FSI scores must be interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, 
the better. Thus, a reduced score indicates an improvement and greater relative stability, while a 
higher score indicates greater instability or fragility. Data were obtained from the Fund for 
Peace, an independent, non-profit research and educational organization that seeks to prevent 
violent conflict and promote sustainable security. 
The FSI is a weighted index across 12 variables that assess a state’s vulnerability to 
conflict or collapse (Marshall & Cole, 2011). The Index is informed by the following indicators: 
the Security Apparatus indicator, which takes into account security threats and crime; the 
Fractionalized Elites indicator, which takes into account within-country divisions along ethnic, 
class and religious lines, as well as political gridlock; the Group Grievance indicator, which takes 
into account societal divisions, the frequency of extra-judicial between-group retributions, and 
the presence of reconciliation mechanisms; the Economic Decline indicator, which takes into 
account an array of measures that indicate economic decline; the Uneven Economic 
Development indicator, which reflects within-country income inequality; the Human Flight and 
Brain Drain indicator, which charts the departure of political figures as well as skilled workers 
from countries; the State Legitimacy indicator, which takes into account the level of confidence 
that citizens place in their respective governments, the presence of peaceful political 
demonstrations, measures on the transparency of governmental institutions, and political 
violence; the Public Services indicator (discussed in the paragraph below); the Human Rights 





presence of fair judicial systems, illegal detention rates, and the degree to which political actors 
are able and willing to share power; the Demographic Pressures indicator, which considers 
population growth rates, public health / nutrition quality, environmental stability and resource 
management; the Refugees and Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs) indicator, which considers 
the number of refugees and IDPs within a given country; and the External Intervention indicator, 
which measures the presence of external actors who support coalitions which oppose reigning 
governments, the presence of foreign troops, police training, and the presence of economic aid. 
The Public Services Indicator is an index that aggregates the presence of basic state 
functions that serve the public. This includes the provision of essential services, such as health, 
education, water and sanitation, transport infrastructure, electricity and power, and internet 
connectivity. It includes the state’s ability to protect its citizens from violence through perceived 
effective policing. The Indicator also considers how equally basic state functions and services are 
provided, and the extent to which the absence of general infrastructure negatively affects a 
country’s development. The Public Services Indicator is one of twelve indicators that 
collectively comprise the Fragile States Index (see above). Data were obtained from the Fund for 
Peace. 
Police per capita are the number of police personnel per 100,000 of the general 
population. Data were obtained through links specific to each country provided by Wikipedia 
that were independently verified (Harrendorf, Heiskanen, & Malby, 2010). Police personnel are 
police in public agencies whose principal functions are the prevention, detection, and 
investigation of crime and the apprehension of suspected offenders. Police support staff such as 







To operationalize corruption, two variables were used: Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index, and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption index. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a composite indicator (i.e., an index that 
groups multiple measures together in a standardized manner) to measure perceptions of 
corruption in the public sector in different countries around the world. The CPI aggregates data 
from a number of sources that provide perceptions by business people and country experts of the 
level of corruption in the public sector. The 2016 CPI was calculated using 13 data sources 
which capture the assessment of experts and business executives on a number of corrupt 
behaviors in the public sector, including bribery, diversion of public funds, use of public office 
for private gain, nepotism in the civil service, and state capture. The data sources come from 12 
institutions (e.g., African Development Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, 
World Bank, and World Justice Project) that capture perceptions of corruption within the 
previous two years. The data are standardized to a scale of 0-100, where 0 equals the highest 
level of perceived corruption and 100 equals the lowest level of perceived corruption. For a 
country to be included in the CPI, a minimum of three sources must assess that country. A 
country’s CPI score is then calculated as the average of all standardized scores available for that 
country. The CPI scores are closely correlated across years and with other global corruption 
indices (including polls by Gallup International, Business International, and the World Bank), 
making it a measure widely used by researchers (Treisman, 2000; Kääriäinen, 2007). Data were 






Control of Corruption is an index combining up to 23 different assessments and surveys, 
depending on availability, each of which receives a different weight in relation to its estimated 
precision and country coverage. The Control of Corruption indicator draws on data from, inter 
alia, the World Bank, the African and Asian Development Banks, the Afrobarometer and 
Latinobarometer Surveys, Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the World 
Justice Project. The index captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the 
state by elites and private interests. Countries are evaluated on factors such as the prevalence of 
grand corruption and petty corruption at all levels of government; nepotism, cronyism, and 
patronage in the civil service; the perceived involvement of elected officials and judicial officers 
in corruption; and public trust in the financial honesty of politicians. Data were obtained from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). 
Political legitimacy 
Two variables were used to operationalize political legitimacy: the World Bank’s Rule of 
Law index, and a judicial independence index maintained by Harvard University. 
The Rule of Law index measures the extent to which individuals and companies have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. Countries are evaluated on factors which include 
public confidence in the police and judicial system; popular observance of the law; a tradition of 
law and order; strength and impartiality of the legal system; prevalence of petty crime, violent 
crime, and organized crime; the extent to which a well-functioning and accountable police force 
protects citizens and their property from crime and violence; the extent to which serious crime is 
reported to the police and investigated; independence, effectiveness, predictability, and integrity 





actions; willingness of citizens to accept legal adjudication over physical and illegal measures; 
government compliance with judicial decisions; the independence of prosecutors from political 
direction and control; the existence of effective and democratic civilian state control of the police 
through the judicial, legislative, and executive branches; the police respect human rights and are 
held accountable for abuses of power; impartiality and non-discrimination in the administration 
of justice; citizens are given a fair, public, and timely hearing by a competent, independent, and 
impartial tribunal; citizens have the right to independent counsel, and those charged with serious 
crimes are given access to independent counsel when it is beyond their means; protection of 
judges from interference by the executive and legislative branches; judges are appropriately 
trained to carry out justice in a fair and unbiased manner; law enforcement agencies are protected 
from political interference and have sufficient budgets to carry out their mandates; appointments 
to law enforcement agencies are made according to professional criteria; and law enforcement 
officials are not immune from criminal proceedings (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). 
Data were obtained from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). 
The judicial independence index is a composite of direct and indirect indicators of 
judicial independence collected by Feld and Voigt (2003), Howard and Carey (2004), Marshall 
and Jaggers (2010), Keith (2012), and Johnson, Souva, and Smith (2013). The direct indicators 
of judicial independence measure the degree to which governmental and non-governmental 
actions directly encroach on and undermine judicial autonomy (e.g., legislation which curbs the 
autonomy of the courts). The indirect indicators of judicial independence assess phenomena that 
correspond with judicial independence such as the ability of courts to constrain the decision-





Harvard Dataverse Network, at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science (IQSS) at Harvard 
University. 
Political trust 
The data originated from the results of a Gallup World Poll (GWP) survey where 
respondents were asked, “In this country, do you have confidence in the national government?” 
The GWP is a cross-country household survey, interviewing more than 100,000 households in 
over 160 countries (Clausen, Kraay, & Nyiri, 2011). The GWP is fielded annually or biennially 
representing 95% of the world’s adult population. The surveys are designed to be nationally 
representative of people who are 15 years old or older. Efforts are made to interview households 
in rural areas, as well as politically unstable and unsafe areas. The surveys are face-to-face 
interviews in all countries except the most developed countries where a shorter version of the 
survey is fielded by telephone (Tortora, Srinivasan, & Esipova, 2010). The data were obtained 
from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2016, pp. 250-252). 
Crime 
Crime was operationalized using national homicide rates. That is, the number of recorded 
intentional homicides (i.e., unlawful death purposefully inflicted upon a person by another) per 
100,000 of the general population in a country. Data were obtained from the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In most cases, UNODC derived the data from national 
data repositories generated by either the criminal justice or the public health system. In the 
former, data are produced by law enforcement authorities in the process of recording and 
investigating a criminal case. In the latter, statistical information is produced by health 
authorities certifying the cause of death of individuals (UNODC, 2014). National authorities 





external causes. “Consequently, either (or both) of these sources are the best possible options 
available to produce statistical information on homicide” (UNODC, 2014, p. 99). In respect of 
some 70 countries, where neither of these sources is available, homicide data were derived from 
estimates produced by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2014) based on a statistical model 
used to produce data on all causes of death, and “which provide the only available and 
comparable figure on intentional homicides” (UNODC, 2014, p. 99). The UNODC dataset has 
been criticized for its significant omissions (Altbeker, 2005) but it has improved considerably, to 
the point where it now covers all United Nations member states. UNODC also seeks to 
standardize and validate definitions and methods wherever possible, and conducts consultations 
with UN member states to this end (UNODC, 2014). 
Homicide is an appropriate measure of crime in cross-national research because 
homicides tend to be relatively consistently and accurately reported, and there is a shared 
consensus about the seriousness of the crime (Archer & Gartner, 1984; Messner & Rosenfeld, 
1997; Neapolitan, 1998, 2001; LaFree & Drass, 2002; Sutton, 2004). Although it is rare 
compared to most other crimes, homicide engenders a disproportionate amount of public and 
media attention and is often considered a strong indicator of crime and violence more generally 
(UNODC, 2014). As Kriegler and Shaw (2016) point out: “Places and times with more murders 
tend to be places and times with more other criminal rule-breaking… Therefore, the majority of 
research that seeks to compare different countries or track crime levels over a long period does 








Perceptions of crime / safety 
Four variables were used to operationalize perceptions of crime / safety: the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Global Peace Index, Gallup’s Law and Order Index, the Legatum Institute’s 
Safety and Security Index, and an index covering perceptions of safety. 
The Global Peace Index (GPI), measures a country’s level of “negative peace” using 
three domains of peacefulness. The first domain, ongoing domestic and international conflict, 
explores the extent to which countries are involved in internal and external conflicts, as well as 
their role and duration of involvement in conflicts. The second domain evaluates the level of 
harmony or discord within a country. Ten indicators broadly assess societal safety and security. 
The assertion is that low crime rates, minimal terrorist activity and violent demonstrations, 
harmonious relations with neighboring countries, and a stable political environment can be 
equated with peacefulness. Finally, seven indicators relate to a country’s militarization, reflecting 
the link between a country’s level of military build-up and access to weapons and its level of 
peacefulness, both domestically and internationally (GPI, 2017). Data were obtained from the 
Institute for Economics and Peace, a global think tank which develops metrics to analyze peace 
and to quantify its economic benefits. The GPI is collated in collaboration with the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). 
The Law and Order Index measures public perceptions of safety and its experiences with 
crime and police. It is a composite index created from a combination of four questions: (i) In the 
city or area where you live, do you have confidence in the local police force?; (ii) Do you feel 
safe walking alone at night in the city or area where you live?; (iii) Within the last 12 months, 
have you had money or property stolen from you or another household member?; and (iv) Within 





Global Law and Order Report (Gallup, 2017) which collates people’s answers to the 
aforementioned questions. Results are based on telephone and face-to-face interviews with 
approximately 1,000 adults per country, aged 15 and older, conducted throughout 2016 in 135 
countries. 
The Safety and Security Index measures countries’ performance in the areas of national 
security and personal safety drawing on 11 data sources, including homicide rates, property-
related crime victimization, perceptions of personal safety, state-sponsored political violence, 
and the incidence of lethal terrorism-related violence. The index combines objective measures of 
security and subjective measures of personal safety. Approximately two-thirds of the variables 
are objective, and are either survey-based (e.g., how many people had their property stolen over 
the last year) or assessments based on expert research. The remaining variables measure 
respondents’ self-reported assessments (e.g., perceptions of personal safety). The index is part of 
the Legatum Prosperity Index, a framework that assesses countries on the promotion of their 
residents’ wellbeing and wealth across nine pillars. Data for the Prosperity Index are drawn from 
a wide range of sources including inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations, 
World Bank, and World Health Organization; independent research and non-governmental 
organizations such as Freedom House and Transparency International; and databases compiled 
by academics (Legatum Institute, 2016). The producers of the Prosperity Index, the Legatum 
Institute, is an international think-tank and educational charity. 
Percent feeling safe: Personal perceptions of safety was operationalized as the proportion 
of respondents answering “yes” to a survey question, “Do you feel safe walking alone at night in 
the city or area where you live?” The data were drawn from the 2016 UNDP Human 





Gallup World Poll (GWP), a cross-country survey of some 100,000 individuals in 160 countries 
(Clausen, Kraay, & Nyiri, 2011). 
Ethnic heterogeneity 
Population heterogeneity was operationalized through a measure of ethnic 
fractionalization. Ethnic fractionalization measures are intended to assess the degree of ethnic 
heterogeneity in a country. While there are multiple means to measure fractionalization, data 
from Alesina et al. (2003) were used. The fractionalization dataset compiled by Alesina et al. 
(2003) uses an index to reflect the probability that a randomly selected pair of individuals in a 
country belong to different ethnic groups. Where a country is inhabited by just one ethnic group, 
the index is zero. Sources of the data include the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook (2000), and national censuses. Alesina et al.’s data have 
been used by, and received considerable attention from, several researchers (e.g., Fearon 2003; 
Posner 2004; Bjørnskof 2008). 
Foreign nationals 
Foreign nationals was operationalized by the stock of the immigrant population or 
percent of the population that are immigrants. This is calculated as a ratio of the number of 
immigrants in a country, expressed as a percentage of the country’s population. The definition of 
immigrant varies across countries but generally includes the stock of foreign-born people, the 
stock of foreign people (according to citizenship) or a combination of the two (UNDP, 2016). 
Data were obtained from the 2016 UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP, 2016, pp. 246-
248). The original data source is the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(UNDESA, 2015). Most of the data UNDESA used to estimate the international migrant stock by 





representative surveys also provided information on migrant numbers. In estimating the 
international migrant stock for countries, UNDESA equated migrants with the available foreign-
born population data. “In most countries lacking data on place of birth, information on the 
country of citizenship of those enumerated was available, and was used as the basis for the 
identification of international migrants, thus effectively equating, in these cases, international 
migrants with foreign citizens” (UNDESA, 2015, p. 7). 
Public punitiveness 
Public punitiveness was operationalized through the World Bank’s Voice and 
Accountability Index, and Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index. 
Voice and Accountability Index data were obtained from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). The index measures the extent to which a country’s residents can 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. The index is an aggregate of 20 different governmental, non-
governmental, and commercial business information providers, and household surveys 
component data sources. Each component data source is combined, leading to the Voice and 
Accountability Index, using a statistical method called the unobserved components model. This 
model requires each component data source to be rescaled and normalized to create the overall 
index (Kocka & Gaskina, 2014). 
Press Freedom Index data were obtained from Reporters Without Borders (RWB), an 
international non-governmental organization that promotes freedom of information and freedom 
of the press, with consultant status at the United Nations. RWB compiles and publishes the Press 
Freedom Index (PFI), an annual ranking of some 180 countries. The concept of press freedom is 





institutions permit and promote media freedom and the ability of journalists to collect and 
disseminate information unimpeded by physical, psychological or legal attacks and harassment” 
(Becker, Vlad, & Nusser, 2007, p. 11). 
Data for the index are collected through the responses of experts, including media 
professionals and lawyers, to a questionnaire devised by RWB. This qualitative analysis is 
combined with quantitative data on abuses and acts of violence against journalists during the 
period evaluated. The issues covered in the questionnaire are pluralism (the degree to which 
varied opinions are represented in the media), media independence, media environment and self-
censorship, legal framework, transparency, and the quality of the infrastructure that supports the 
production of news and information. Moreover, a team of specialists assigned to different 
geographical regions maintain a record of abuses and violence against journalists and media 
outlets. This quantitative indicator is used to weight the qualitative analysis of the situation in the 
country based on the replies to the aforementioned questionnaires. Scores are calculated on the 
basis of the responses of the experts combined with the data on abuses and violence against 
journalists. Countries are given scores ranging from 0 to 100, with 0 being the best possible score 
and 100 the worst. The PFI is used by organizations such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 
the World Bank, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation in determining the allocation of 
development aid. A comparison of media freedom indices – the PFI, Freedom House’s Freedom 
of the Press Index, and the International Research and Exchanges Board’s Media Sustainability 
Index found their ratings to be empirically quite similar (Becker, Vlad, & Nusser, 2007). 
Legal system 
Legal system data were drawn from “JuriGlobe”, a research group of academics from the 





relating to the different legal systems in the world. In JuriGlobe’s database, legal system is a 
categorical variable represented as Civil, Common, Customary, Mixed (referring not to a single 
system but to a combination of systems ), and Muslim. Due to the low sample size associated 
with Customary and Muslim law countries (only six countries were labelled as having 
exclusively either a Muslim or Customary law system), these categories were dropped, leaving 
Civil, Common, and Mixed categories.  
Data analysis 
A descriptive and exploratory examination of the dependent and independent variables 
was conducted to provide a better illustration of the research variables in question, while probing 
for oddities and investigating variables that needed to be transformed. The primary aim was to 
identify variables that seemed highly skewed and lack sufficient variability. These variables were 
log transformed to decrease the variability of data and make data conform more closely to the 
normal distribution to allow for accurate analyses. The benefits of log transforming variables in 
this fashion are two-fold: the residuals will tend to better align with linear regression 
assumptions, and it will be less likely that variables will have outliers that are highly influential 
for the analysis. Nevertheless, log transformations add an additional consideration to output 
interpretation, as the coefficients in the regression analysis no longer indicate a linear 
relationship, but rather a linear relationship based on a log transformation. 
The distribution of the values for the dependent variables – the proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention, and the number of pretrial detainees per 100,000 of the general population – 
were not very skewed and would not pose a problem for correlations and regression analyses. 







Table 3: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
 N Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
Proportion prisoners in pretrial detention 209 .000 .900 .33292 .205005 
Number pretrial detainees per 100,000 
general population 
210 0 272 51.38 48.111 
Valid N 208     
 
The distribution of the seven economic independent variables were not very skewed with 
the possible exception of “social assistance expenditure”. However, because there are only 59 
cases for that variable, log transformation made it only a slightly better predictor for one of the 
outcome measures, so rather than transforming, social assistance expenditure was not changed. 
See Table 4 for descriptive statistics, and Appendix 3, Figure 2, for histograms and distribution 
curves. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for economic independent variables 
 N Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
Unemployment 176 .23 31.43 8.87 6.35 
Gini index 133 24.72 63.20 39.12 8.60 
Social assistance expenditure 59 .25 10.43 1.64 1.63 
Education expenditure 140 .80 10.00 4.62 1.69 
Public health expenditure 183 .80 16.40 4.16 2.51 
Human Development Index 180 .35 .95 .70 .16 
Urbanization 202 8.35 100.00 59.99 24.43 
 
The distribution of the eight political independent variables were about normally 
distributed, with the exception of Gross Domestic Product per capita. See Table 5 for descriptive 
statistics, and Appendix 3, Figure 3 for histograms and distribution curves. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for political independent variables 
 N Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
Democracy Index 160 1.43 9.93 5.64 2.15 
Political Stability & Absence of 
Violence 
199 -2.91 1.96 .01 .99 
Government Effectiveness 197 -2.260 2.209 .02877 .979579 
Gross Domestic Product per capita 175 285.73 102831.3 13080.32 18185.89 
Prison occupancy rate 193 14.00 454.40 126.04 64.45 





Public Services Indicator 170 1.00 10.00 5.42 2.69 
Police per capita 128 38.00 1442.00 374.23 242.20 
 
The distribution of the fourteen social independent variables were about normally 
distributed, with the exception of “homicide rate” and “stock of immigrant population”. See 
Table 6 for descriptive statistics, and Appendix 3, Figure 4, for histograms and distribution 
curves. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for social independent variables 
 N Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
Corruption Perceptions Index 169 11.00 90.00 43.52 19.23 
Control of corruption 197 -1.67 2.30 0.02 0.99 
Rule of law 197 -2.18 2.04 0.03 0.98 
Judicial independence 135 4.00 86.00 48.74 17.83 
Trust in national government 135 8.00 91.00 47.35 18.30 
Homicide rate 184 0.00 74.60 7.58 10.89 
Level of peace / insecurity 155 1.11 3.81 2.08 0.51 
Law and Order Index 133 42.00 97.00 76.09 10.23 
Safety and Security Index 149 33.08 86.62 66.11 11.57 
Percent feeling safe 140 22.00 92.00 61.63 15.38 
Ethnic fractionalization 147 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.26 
Stock of immigrant population 186 0.10 88.40 9.68 14.78 
Voice and Accountability Index 193 -2.13 1.58 0.05 0.96 
Press Freedom Index 169 7.59 84.19 33.39 15.34 
 
On the basis of the above results, three of the independent variables were log 
transformed: GDP per capita, homicide rate, and stock of immigrant population. A natural log 
transformation was appropriate for reducing the skewness of these variables. Natural log 
transformations are typical for data with a right-skewing tail, and has been utilized in past 
research (Ruddell, 2005) investigating social and political factors, particularly GDP (Kent, 










Table 7: Descriptive statistics for log transformed independent variables 
 N Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
Gross Domestic Product (LN) 175 5.66 11.54 8.5684 1.44344 
Homicide rate (LN) 182 -2.30 4.31 1.3063 1.27950 
Stock of immigrant population (LN) 186 -2.30 4.48 1.2920 1.53066 
 
The final independent variable – legal system – is a categorical variable. Data obtained 
from the JuriGlobe research group at the University of Ottawa disaggregated legal systems into 
five categories: Civil, Common, Customary, Mixed, and Muslim. Due to low sample sizes 
associated with exclusively Customary and Muslim legal systems, these categories were dropped 
leaving Civil, Common, and Mixed categories. See Table 8 for recoding of the legal system 
descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 8: Recoding of legal system categories 
 Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative 
percent 
(Blank) 4 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Civil 85 40.1 40.1 42.0 
Common 33 15.6 15.6 57.5 
Customary 3 1.4 1.4 59.0 
Mixed 85 40.1 40.1 99.1 
Muslim 2 .9 .9 100.0 





 Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative 
percent 
Common 33 15.6 16.3 16.3 
Mixed 85 40.1 41.9 58.1 
Civil 85 40.1 41.9 100.0 
Total 203 95.6 100.0  
Missing 9 4.2   
Total 212 100.0   
 
The overarching research question this study poses is: What relationships exist between 





environments of criminal justice systems on the one hand, and national pretrial detention 
practices on the other hand? From this two subsidiary questions emerge: 
 Is there a relationship between the individual independent variables (taken separately) 
and each of the dependent variables and, if so, what is the extent thereof? 
 What combination of the independent variables (if any) demonstrates the most robust 
relationship between the independent variable(s) and each of the dependent variables? 
To address the first bullet point, all independent variables, with the exception of “legal 
system”, were individually correlated with the two pretrial detention outcome measures. 
Correlation analysis estimates a sample correlation coefficient, more specifically the Pearson 
Product-Moment correlation coefficient (Rodgers & Nicewander, 1988). It is an analysis suited 
for establishing if there are possible connections between variables, and the strength of such 
relationships. The sample correlation coefficient, denoted r (or R, or Pearson's r), ranges between 
-1 and +1 and quantifies the direction and strength of the linear association between the two 
variables under investigation. The correlation between two variables can be positive, denoting 
that higher levels of one variable are associated with higher levels of the other, or negative, 
denoting that higher levels of one variable are associated with lower levels of the other. That is, 
the magnitude of the correlation coefficient indicates the strength of the association, while the 
sign of the correlation coefficient indicates the direction of the association. -1.0 indicates a 
perfectly negative correlation, -0.8 a strongly negative correlation, and -0.5 a moderately 
negative correlation. The same applies, vice versa, for positive correlations, with +1.0 indicating 
a perfectly positive correlation, etc. (Zou, Tuncali, & Silverman, 2003). It bears emphasizing that 
even if two variables are highly correlated, this is not sufficient proof of causation. It is not 





play. To show causation, “the causal variables must precede the variable it causes, and several 
conditions must be met (e.g., reversibility, strength, and exposure response)” (Zou, Tuncali, & 
Silverman, 2003, p. 618).  
In addition to the simple correlations, a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was 
used to assess whether there were differences in the pretrial detention outcome measures based 
on legal system classification. A one-way ANOVA allows for testing whether differences in 
categorical membership (in this case, country legal system classification) correspond with 
differences in pretrial detention. That is, ANOVAs are used to assess whether there are 
differences in a continuous outcome measure based on a categorical independent variable with 
two or more “groups” (Wonnacott & Wonnacott, 1990). 
To explore the second sub-question above – what combination of the independent 
variables (if any) demonstrates the most robust relationship between the independent variable(s) 
and each of the dependent variables – a stepwise selection technique was used to determine 
which independent variables best predict the two pretrial detention outcome variables, to thereby 
build cumulative prediction models based on the inputted predictors. 
The objective was to determine empirically which combination of independent variables 
best predicted pretrial detention using a forward, stepwise regression. Forward regression means 
that during the model-building procedure, variables are inserted one at a time based on how the 
addition of each variable changes the model (Henderson & Denison, 1989). This contrasts with 
other methods (such as a typical regression, where all variables are simultaneously entered and 
assessed at once). This was done instead of a traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) method, 
where all variables are entered simultaneously, for two reasons: (i) to avoid having non-





predicts the outcome, and (ii) because highly correlated predictors entered simultaneously would 
likely wipe out any observable effects because of multicollinearity. 
In line with past recommendations (Downey & King, 1998) mean replacement was used 
to allow for stepwise regression analyses. This is because automatic model-building procedures 
often require list-wise completion for all independent variables in order to be considered for the 
next procedural step. Because only 32 countries had complete data on all independent variables 
to be used, this would have resulted in a dramatically reduced sample size. (See Appendix 7 for 
the availability of data for the independent variables used in this study.) During mean 
replacement, countries that are missing data on a particular independent variable (e.g., HDI), 
have their missing data filled in with the mean HDI across countries. All the independent 
variables were included as selection options. To appropriately model the effects of legal system 
type (which is a categorical variable), two dummy-coded variables were included that 
represented (i) civil law legally systems, and (ii) mixed legal systems. Dummy coding is a 
typical way in which categorical variables are assessed in regression interactions by specifically 
testing for the differences between individual levels of the outcome (Aiken, West, & Reno, 
1991). 
Finally, to further interrogate the overall research question on relationships which may 
exist between economic, political, and social factors extraneous to the day-to-day operational and 
policy environments of criminal justice systems, and national pretrial detention practices, a 
number of moderator analyses were undertaken. 
In statistics, moderation occurs when the relationship between two variables depends on a 
third variable. The third variable is referred to as the moderator variable or simply the 





characterized as an “interaction”. That is, a quantitative or categorical variable that affects the 
direction and / or strength of the relation between dependent and independent variables. Within a 
correlational analysis framework, a moderator is a third variable that affects the zero-order 
correlation between two other variables, or the value of the slope of the dependent variable on 
the independent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
With a moderator analysis, the starting point is a linear relationship in which variable X is 
presumed to relate to variable Y (e.g., government effectiveness relates to pretrial detention). A 
moderator variable M is a variable that alters the strength of the aforementioned relationship. For 
example, government effectiveness may reduce pretrial detention (more and quicker trials) more 
in less corrupt than in more corrupt jurisdictions. Consequently, corruption moderates (M) the 
effect of government effectiveness (X) on pretrial detention (Y). Moderator analysis measures 
the causal relationship between X and Y by using a regression coefficient (Hayes, 2013). 
The following moderating (or altering) effects that selected variables have on the 
relationship between the economic, political, and social variables, and pretrial detention were 
explored: 
 Whether corruption moderates the relationship between state strength and pretrial 
detention. 
 Whether democratization and development moderate the relationship between crime 
and pretrial detention. 
 Whether democratization moderates the relationship between development and 
pretrial detention. 
In line with recommendations for examining moderation in regression analysis, both the 





collinearity and facilitate ease of interpretation (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991). The beginning 
point of the moderator analyses was an assessment whether there was a statistically significant 
interaction between the hypothesized independent variable and moderator. Where this interaction 
was statistically significant, the interaction was decomposed by reporting the slopes for scores at 
the low (-1SD) and high (+1SD) end of the moderator. Full model statistics for each moderated 
regression analysis as well as a graphical representation of all tested moderated hypotheses are 







CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
Introduction 
Three statistical techniques were used to answer the study’s research questions and test 
the associated hypotheses. First, a simple correlation analysis exploring the relationship between 
each of the 29 independent continuous variables and the two pretrial detention-related dependent 
variables. For the categorical independent variable of “legal system classification” a one-way 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to explore its relationship with the two dependent 
variables. Second, a forward, stepwise regression to determine empirically which combination of 
independent variables best predict both pretrial detention-related dependent variables. Third, 
moderator analyses using selected independent variables to better understand how corruption 
moderates the relationship between state strength and pretrial detention; democratization and 
development moderate the relationship between crime and pretrial detention; and, 
democratization moderates the relationship between development and pretrial detention. 
Analysis 1: Simple correlations 
In the simple correlation analyses, the “correlation” is the “Pearson Correlation” (r), 
which indicates the size of the effect, while the p-value indicates the certainty the trend is not due 
to random chance. The Pearson Correlation is a value ranging from -1 to +1, where -1 indicates a 
perfect negative correlation, and +1 indicates a perfect positive correlation. Pearson correlation 
technically answers the following question: For every 1 standard deviation change in X, how 
many standard deviations does Y change? Interpretations of the effect size in the social sciences 
occur through a reliance on rules of thumb: .1-.2 is a small effect; .3-.4 is a medium-sized effect; 





correspond, there are instances where there is a high certainty of the effect (the p-value is very 
low), but the effect size is small. It is consequently important to consider both the correlation and 
p-value separately. In line with scientific standards, the criteria employed for “significance” is 
determined by whether or not the p-value is less than .05 (Cramer & Howitt, 2004). 
Results of the simple correlations between all independent variables (except for legal 
system classification, a categorical variable) and the pretrial detention outcome variables follow 
below. For each variable, a finding is made whether the study’s hypotheses are supported in 
respect of both outcome measures (pretrial detention rate, and the proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention), and on what basis this finding is made, providing both the numerical value of 
the correlation and the effect size. A summary of the findings are presented in Table 9. 
Unemployment 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with 
unemployment was not supported. There is virtually no correlation between the pretrial detention 
rate and unemployment r(172) = .01, p = .932. The Pearson correlation between the pretrial 
detention rate and unemployment is .01, based on a sample size of 172 countries. With such a 
small correlation coefficient, and rather large sample size, this result seems fairly certain. The 
hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would not correlate with 
unemployment was supported. There is a negative correlation between the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention and unemployment r(173) = -.12, p = .126, but this failed to reach 
statistical significance, indicating that while there may be some small trend, it does not satisfy 
the threshold of certainty to be considered more than a random occurrence. 
Inequality 





inequality was supported. A moderately sized positive correlation, r(129) = .40, p < .001 was 
found, suggesting that the higher the level of economic inequality in a country, the higher the 
pretrial detention rate. The hypothesis that inequality would not correlate with the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention was not supported. A modest positive association r(130) = .26, p < 
.01 was found, suggesting that the higher the level of economic inequality in a country, the 
higher the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Social welfare 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would negatively correlate with social 
welfare was broadly not supported. There are numerically negative correlations observed in the 
variables of social assistance expenditure, r(58) = -.19, p = .153, education expenditure, r(137) = 
-.06, p = .497, and public health expenditure r(179) = -.12, p = .100. However, none of these 
correlations reach statistical significance. By consequence, it is not possible to say whether the 
correlations represent meaningful trends or merely random error. The hypothesis that the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would not correlate with social welfare was 
unsupported. All the social welfare variables utilized indicate a negative correlation. This is the 
case for social assistance expenditure, r(59) = -.29, p < .05, education expenditure, r(138) = -.27, 
p < .01,  and public health expenditure r(180) = -.34, p < .001. The consistency of these findings 
provides relative certainty there is a small to medium negative association between social 
welfare and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Modernization 
The hypothesis that modernization would positively correlate with the pretrial detention 
rate was generally supported. Small statistically significant correlations were observed for both 





suggesting that countries that exhibit characteristics of modernization tend to have slightly higher 
rates of pretrial detention. There is moderate support for the hypothesis that modernization is 
negatively correlated with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. Specifically, the 
Human Development Index is negatively correlated with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention, r(177) = -.36, p < .001, but there is no significant correlation with urbanization, r(199) 
= -.10, p = .174. 
Regime type 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would negatively correlate with stable 
democracy and civil liberties of political regimes was not supported. The analysis yielded non-
significant correlations for the Democracy Index, r(156) = .08, p = .305, and political stability / 
absence of violence, r(195) = .11, p = .126. The hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention would negatively correlate with stable democracy and civil liberties of political 
regimes was supported. This is the case for both the Democracy Index, r(157) = -.20, p < .01, 
and for the measure of political stability / absence of violence, r(196) = -.33, p < .001. 
Development 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with 
development received modest and mixed support. There is a positive correlations for GDP per 
capita (ln), r(171) = .18, p < .05, prison occupancy rate, r(193) = .23, p < .01, and police per 
capita, r(126) = .22, p <.05. However, there is no significant correlation between the pretrial 
detention rate and government effectiveness, r(193) = .07, p > .05, the Fragile States Index, 
r(166) = -.08, p > .05, and the Public Services Indicator, r(166) = -.07, p > .05. The hypothesis 
that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would negatively correlate with development 





proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention and GDP per capita (ln), r(172) = -.31, p < .001, and 
government effectiveness, r(194) = -.31, p < .001. Higher proportions of prisoners in pretrial 
detention correlated positively with the Fragile States Index r(167) = .37, p < .001. Due to the 
manner in which the Fragile States Index is designed, larger or higher values on the Index 
correspond to less development, so that a positive r actually reflects a negative relationship 
between the outcome measure and development as measured by the Index. Positive correlations 
are present for two measures of development: prison occupancy rate r(191) = .39, p < .001, and 
the Public Services Indicator, r(167) = .44, p < .001. In respect of police per capita no significant 
correlation was found, r(126) = -.15, p = .097. 
Corruption 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would negatively correlate with corruption 
was not supported – neither by the Corruption Perceptions Index r(165) = .01, p = .908, nor by 
the measure of the control of corruption, r(193) = .06, p = .376. Both of these correlations are not 
only small in size, but also far from being close to statistical significance. The hypothesis that the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would positively correlate with corruption was 
supported by the Corruption Perceptions Index, r(166) = -.35, p < .001, and the control of 
corruption measure, r(194) = -.30, p < .001. Both the Corruption Perceptions Index and the 
control of corruption variables are oriented such that larger values indicate less corruption (one 
can loosely think of each of these as being measures of the “control” of corruption). As such, 
higher proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention correspond with lower “control” of 
corruption (i.e., more corruption). 
Political legitimacy 





political legitimacy found mixed results. Thus, while this is not the case for rule of law, r(193) = 
.02, p = .841, it is the case in respect of judicial independence, r(133) = -.29, p < .001. The latter 
finding provides considerable certainty that there is a medium size, negative association between 
the pretrial detention rate and judicial independence. The hypothesis that the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention would not correlate with political legitimacy also found mixed 
results. The correlation between the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention and judicial 
independence, while negative r(134) = -.09, p = .279, is not statistically significant. However, 
there is a highly significant medium, negative correlation between rule of law and the proportion 
of prisoners in pretrial detention, r(194) = -.35, p < .001. 
Political trust 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would negatively correlate with political 
trust found no support. While trust in the national government was negatively correlated with the 
pretrial detention rate, r(133) = -.151, p > .05, this correlation was not statistically significant. 
The hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would negatively correlate 
with political trust also found no support, r(134) = .04, p > .05. 
Crime 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with crime was 
supported, r(178) = .42, p < .001. The hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention would positively correlate with crime was also supported, r(179) = .31, p < .001. 
Perceptions of crime / safety 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with perceptions 
of crime / safety was supported. Higher rates of pretrial detention correspond with lower scores 





the percentage of the population feeling safe, r(137) = -.38, p < .001. Higher rates of pretrial 
detention correspond with lower scores (higher perceptions of crime / safety) on the Safety and 
Security Index, r(145) = -.15, p = .071, but this failed to reach statistical significance. In respect 
of the level of peace / insecurity variable, the correlation was only very moderately positive and 
not statistically significant, r(151) = .10, p = .243. The hypothesis that the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention would positively correlate with perceptions of crime / safety was 
supported. Higher proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention correspond with lower scores 
(higher perceptions of crime / safety) on the Law and Order Index, r(131) = -.52, p < .001, 
Safety and Security Index, r(146) = -.44, p < .001, and the percentage of the population feeling 
safe, r(137) = -.34, p < .001. In respect of the level of peace / insecurity variable, the correlation 
was also positive, r(152) = .34, p < .001. 
Ethnic heterogeneity 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with ethnic 
diversity was not supported, r(143) = .03, p > .05. The hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners 
in pretrial detention would positively correlate with ethnic diversity found some support. There is 
a significant, small-to-medium correlation between the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention and ethnic diversity, r(144) = .26, p < .001. 
Foreign nationals 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with the 
proportion of foreign nationals in a country was not supported, r(182) =.07, p > .05. Moreover, 
the hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would positively correlate 







The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with public 
punitiveness was not supported in terms of either the Voice and Accountability Index, r(189) = 
.08, p > .05, or the Press Freedom Index, r(165) = -.01, p = .891. The hypothesis that the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would positively correlate with public punitiveness 
was supported only very modestly. There is a small but significant correlation between the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention and the Voice and Accountability Index, r(190) = -
.16, p < .05. There is no correlation between the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention and 
the Press Freedom Index, r(166) = .09, p = .242. 
 
Table 9: Simple correlations between independent variables and pretrial detention (PTD) 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
Hypothesis/Variable r n Prediction r    n Prediction 
Unemployment   ↑   -- 
Unemployment .01 172 ↑ -.12 173 -- 
Inequality   ↑   -- 
Gini Index .40
*** 129 ↑    .26** 130 -- 
Social Welfare   ↓   -- 
Social Assistance Expenditure -.19 58 ↓   -.29
* 59 -- 
Education Expenditure -.06 137 ↓ -.27
** 138 -- 
Public Health Expenditure -.12 179 ↓ -.34
*** 180 -- 
Modernization   ↑   ↓ 
Human Development Index .16
* 176 ↑ -.36*** 177 ↓ 
Urbanization .16
* 198 ↑     -.10 199 ↓ 
Regime Type   ↓   ↓ 
Democracy Index .08 156 ↓ -.20
** 157 ↓ 
Political Stability & Absence of Violence .11 195 ↓ -.33
*** 196 ↓ 
Development   ↑   ↓ 
GDP per Capita (ln) .18
* 171 ↑ -.31*** 172 ↓ 
Government Effectiveness .07 193 ↑ -.31
*** 194 ↓ 
Prison Occupancy Rate .23
** 191 ↑ .39*** 191 ↓ 
Fragile States Index -.08 166 ↓• .37
*** 167 ↑• 
Public Services Indicator -.07 166 ↑ .44
*** 167 ↓ 
Police per Capita .22
* 126 ↑     -.15 126 ↓ 
Corruption   ↓   ↑ 
Corruption Perceptions Index .01 165 ↑• -.33





Control of Corruption .06 193 ↑• -.30
*** 194 ↓• 
Political Legitimacy   ↓   -- 
Rule of Law        .02 193 ↓ -.35
*** 194 -- 
Judicial Independence       -.29
*** 133 ↓     -.09 134 -- 
Political Trust    ↓   ↓ 
Trust in National Government -.151 133 ↓       .04 134 ↓ 
Crime   ↑   ↑ 
Homicide Rate (ln) .42
*** 178 ↑ .31*** 179 ↑ 
Perceptions of Crime / Safety    ↑   ↑ 
Level of Peace / Insecurity .10 151 ↑ .34
*** 152 ↑ 
Law and Order Index -.34
*** 130 ↓• -.52*** 131 ↓• 
Safety and Security Index -.15 145 ↓• -.44
*** 146 ↓• 
Percent Feeling Safe -.38
*** 137 ↓• -.34*** 137 ↓• 
Ethnic Heterogeneity   ↑   ↑ 
Fractionalization - Ethnic Diversity -.03 143 ↑ .26
*** 144 ↑ 
Foreign Nationals    ↑   ↑ 
Stock of Immigrants (ln) .07 182 ↑      -.10 183 ↑ 
Public Punitiveness   ↑   ↑ 
Voice and Accountability Index .08 189 ↑ -.16* 190 ↑ 
Press Freedom Index -.01 165 ↑       .09 166 ↑ 
Correlations between the outcome measures and independent variables: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Note. Predictions for the overall constructs (e.g., Regime Type) as well as the specific scales (e.g., the Democracy 
Index, or the Political Stability and Absence of Violence indicator) by which the construct of Regime Type can be 
measured are given with arrows (↑ and ↓). Prediction arrows for individual scales within each hypothesis may have a 
different direction than the arrow corresponding to the overall hypothesis itself. This is because scales may be 
oriented in either a positive or negative direction, depending on each unique scale’s construction. For example, a 
negative (↓) association between the pretrial detention rate and the Fragile States Index was predicted, because 
larger values on the Fragile States Index correspond to less development. Similarly, a positive association between 
perceptions of crime / safety and pretrial detention was predicted, but because lower values of Percent Feeling Safe 
correspond with higher perceptions of crime / safety, the theoretical prediction was that the Percent Feeling Safe 
measure would negatively correlate with pretrial detention. Scales oriented in opposite directions of the construct are 
highlighted with (•). 
 
Legal system 
In addition to the simple correlations, a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was 
used to assess whether there were differences in pretrial detention based on countries’ legal 
system classification. The hypothesis that, compared to civil law countries, common law 
countries have lower pretrial detention rates was not supported by the analysis. An ANOVA 
revealed significant differences in the pretrial detention rate, F(2,196) = 10.77, p < .001, R2 = 
.099. Post hoc analyses revealed that common law countries (M = 83.84, SD = 70.28) had 





< .001 and civil law countries (M = 51.90, SD = 44.59), p = .003, the latter two of which were 
not significantly different from each other, p = .185.12 The hypothesis that, compared to civil law 
countries, common law countries have lower proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention was 
supported by the analysis. An ANOVA revealed significant differences in the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention, F(2,197) = 4.34, p = .014, R2 = .042. Post hoc analyses revealed 
that mixed legal systems (M = .38, SD = .22) had marginally higher proportions of prisoners in 
pretrial detention than civil law systems (M = .31, SD = .20), p = .090, and significantly higher 
proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention than common law countries (M = .26, SD = .16), p 
= .021, the latter two of which were not significantly different from each other, p = .495. 
Analysis 2: Automatic predictive model building 
The purpose of the automatic predictive model building is to determine which variables 
allow for the greatest prediction of pretrial detention. The analysis seeks to determine empirically 
which combination of independent variables best predict the two pretrial detention-related 
dependent variables. This was done using a forward, stepwise regression whereby variables are 
inserted one at a time based on how the addition of each variable changes the model. 
Analysis 2a: Predicting the rate of pretrial detention 
Model-building was used to determined which variables best predict pretrial detention 
rates. A total of five variables were selected for the final model, which was highly significant 
overall, F(5,206) = 19.748, p < .001 (Table 10). The adjusted R2 (.308), indicates that the 
                                                 
12 M, or mean, refers to the average scores for a given variable. SD, or standard deviation, refers to the average 
“spread” around the mean. R2 indicates the proportion of variance in the outcome that is accounted for by the 
variance in the independent variable. For example, an R2 of .12 indicates that 12% of the variance of the outcome 
measure is accounted for (or explained) by the independent variable. The F value is a test statistic to generate a p 
value, but has little interpretative use. SE, or standard error, represents the standard deviation divided by the square 
root of the sample size. By (crude) rule of thumb, a confidence interval for an estimate exists at around +/- 2 SE 
units. For example, if M = 100, and SE = 10, a roughly 95% confidence interval around the estimate would be 





combination of these five variables account for 30.8% of the variance in the scores for pretrial 
detention rates. The homicide rate is the first variable entered into the model, and was highly 
significant, b = 19.000, SE = 2.625, β = .471, p < .001.13 The second most predictive variable is 
Human Development Index, b = 162.638, SE = 24.514, β = .487, p < .001. The third most 
predictive variable is prison occupancy rate, b = .198, SE = .050, β = .255, p < .001, followed by 
public health expenditure, b = -2.958, SE = 1.335, β = -.144, and police per capita, b = .032, SE = 
.015, β = .126 (with the latter two predictive variables having p < .05). 
A closer inspection of the variables reveals an intriguing observation. Many of the item 
relationships in the model are similar (but typically weaker) in direction as was found in the 
individual correlations section above. For example, police per capita correlates with the pretrial 
detention rate at β = .126, but in the simple correlation analysis (Table 9), the Pearson correlation 
is .22. Nevertheless, there are also cases where variables selected by the final model are stronger 
than in the simple correlations analysis. For example, the standardized correlation for the Human 
Development Index is β = .487, which is greater than the original r = .16 found in the simple 
correlation analysis. This is not uncommon in multiple regression analyses, where controlling for 
particular independent variables has the potential to alter or change the relationship between 
other variables in the model. In cases when controlling for one variable increases the apparent 
relationship between another independent variable, this relationship is sometimes called a 
“negative confounder” (Mehio-Sibai, Feinleib, Sibai, & Armenian, 2005). 
 
 
                                                 
13 The lowercase “b” is interpreted literally as “for every 1 unit increase in X, how does Y change?” Note, however, 
that this value is specifically in the context of the scale used, which makes comparisons across scales difficult. For 
example, b coefficients will naturally be much smaller for a 1-10 scale than for a 1-100 scale. However, this does 
not necessarily indicate that the smaller b value is less “important”. When comparing across different scales, it is 
often better to consider the standardized β statistic, which can be interpreted as “for every 1 standard deviation 
increase in X, how many standard deviations does Y change?” The standardized regression coefficient (β) is 





Table 10: Determining the best predictive model of the rate of pretrial detention 
 
b SE β 
DV = Rate of PTD    
(Constant) -112.082*** 20.542  
Homicide Rate (ln) 19.000*** 2.625 .471 
Human Development Index (HDI) 162.638*** 24.514 .487 
Prison Occupancy Rate .198*** .050 .255 
Public Health Expenditure -2.958* 1.335 -.144 
Police per Capita .032* .015 .126 
    
Adjusted R2  .308 
 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
Analysis 2b: Predicting the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention 
Model-building was used to determine which variables best predict the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. A total of three variables were inputted, generating a highly 
significant overall statistical model, F(3,211) = 22.209, p < .001 (Table 11). The adjusted R2 
(.232), indicates that the combination of these variables accounts for 23.2% of the variance in the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention.  
 
Table 11: Determining the best predictive model for proportion prisoners in pretrial detention 
 
b SE β 
DV = Proportion Prisoners in PTD    
(Constant) .840*** .138  
Law & Order Index -.007*** .002 -.275 
Prison Occupancy Rate .001** .000 .203 
Public Health Expenditure -.016** .006 -.178 
    
Adjusted R2  .232 
 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
For the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention analysis, the Law and Order Index is 





occupancy rate b = -.001, SE = .000, β = -.203, p < .01, and public health expenditure b = -.016, 
SE = .006, β = -.178, p < .01. Many of the item relationships in the model were similar (but 
typically weaker) in direction as was found in the individual correlations section (Table 9). Thus, 
the standardized correlation for the Law and Order Index is β = -.275, which is smaller than the 
original r = -.52 found during the simple correlation analysis, but is still statistically significant 
and in the negative direction. The standardized correlation for prison occupancy rate is β = .203, 
compared to the original r = -.39, while the standardized correlation for public health 
expenditure is β = -.178, compared to the original r = -.34. 
Analysis 3: Moderating effects 
This section reports on three moderator analyses.14 In particular, whether: 
 corruption moderates the relationship between state strength and pretrial detention; 
 democratization and development moderate the relationship between crime and 
pretrial detention; and 
 democratization moderates the relationship between development and pretrial 
detention. 
In total, 18 moderator analyses were undertaken. In respect of the rate of pretrial 
detention dependent variable, all 18 analyses produced a statistically significant result. In respect 
of the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention dependent variable, five of the analyses were 
statistically significant. 
The effect of state strength and “government effectiveness” on the rate of pretrial 
detention is moderated by corruption in interesting ways. In places where states are relatively 
                                                 
14 In statistics, moderation occurs when the relationship between two independent variables depends on a third 
variable. The third variable is called the “moderator variable” or “moderator”. The effect of a moderating variable is 
called an “interaction”, which is a variable (categorical or quantitative) that affects the direction and/or the strength 





effective or strong, high levels of corruption predict high rates of pretrial detention, while low 
rates of corruption predict lower rates of pretrial detention. Conversely, in places where 
governments or states are relatively weak, high levels of corruption predict low rates of pretrial 
detention, while low rates of corruption predict higher rates of pretrial detention. 
The effect of insecurity on the rate of pretrial detention is moderated by levels of 
democracy and human development. In places with high levels of insecurity, more “democracy” 
predicts high rates of pretrial detention. By contrast, in places with less “democracy”, high levels 
of insecurity predict no, or only a modest positive, relationship with the pretrial detention rate. In 
countries scoring high on human development, high levels of recorded homicide predict high 
rates of pretrial detention, while in countries scoring low on human development, high recorded 
homicide rates also predict high (but more modest) pretrial detention rates. 
The effect of government effectiveness and state strength on the rate of pretrial detention 
is moderated by democratization. In countries which are less democratic, high levels of 
development predict high rates of pretrial detention. In countries which are more democratic, 
high levels of development predict low rates of pretrial detention. While development tends to be 
positively but modestly correlated with the pretrial detention rate, this relationship is affected by 
the degree of democracy and tends to apply more in respect of countries which are less 
democratic. Countries which are doing well economically and are relatively developed but which 
are not overly democratic experience high rates of pretrial detention. Conversely, economically 
successful and developed countries with higher levels of democratization experience lower rates 
of pretrial detention. 
In places where states are relatively strong, high levels of corruption tend to predict a 





respect of countries where corruption is low. In places where governments are relatively 
effective, high levels of corruption predict a lower proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention, 
while in countries where corruption is relatively low, government effectiveness does not predict 
any effect on the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
In countries scoring high on “democratization”, more government effectiveness predicts a 
modestly lower proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention, while in countries scoring low on 
democratization, more government effectiveness predicts a lower proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention. 
Full model statistics for each moderated regression analysis as well as a graphical 
representation of all tested moderation hypotheses can be found in appendices 4 and 5. These 
should be used in tandem with the below narrative when interpreting the results. 
Analysis 3a: Corruption, state strength and pretrial detention 
This analysis assessed whether corruption (as measured by the Corruption Perceptions 
Index, and “control of corruption”) moderates the relationship between state strength (as 
measured by government effectiveness, Fragile States Index, and Public Services Indicator) and 
pretrial detention. 
Pretrial detention rate 
The relationship between government effectiveness as an indicator of state strength and 
the rate of pretrial detention is significantly moderated by the Corruption Perceptions Index, b = -
10.276, SE = 3.316, β = -.271, p < .01 (Table 12).15 The interaction was then decomposed into 
the simple slopes of those that scored low on the Corruption Perceptions Index moderator (Low 
M) and those that scored high on the Corruption Perceptions Index moderator (High M). This 
                                                 
15 In general, “significance” is assessed in statistical moderation just like any other analysis. A p value of less than or 





revealed that for countries at the low end of the moderator (countries scoring low in the 
Corruption Perceptions Index, which are perceived as more corrupt), the relationship between 
government effectiveness and the pretrial detention rate is relatively positive (b = 6.28, SE = 
9.01) compared to countries that were at the high end of the moderator (countries scoring high in 
the Corruption Perceptions Index, which are perceived as less corrupt), which tend to have a 
relatively negative slope (b = -14.26, SE = 10.33). Put another way, as countries become more 
corrupt (lower Corruption Perceptions Index), the relationship between government effectiveness 
and the pretrial detention rate becomes more positive. When countries are corrupt, more 
government effectiveness results in higher rates of pretrial detention. When countries are 
relatively uncorrupt, more government effectiveness predicts lower rates of pretrial detention. 
See Figure 3 for a graphic representation of this relationship. 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between government effectives and the rate of pretrial detention, 
moderated by the Corruption Perceptions Index 
 
Note: These simple slopes (those at +1 and -1 SD) are not statistically different than zero, so caution is called for 
about making claims about countries that are “high” or “low” in the Corruption Perceptions Index independently, 
rather than simply making the observation that “high” and “low” countries may differ from each other. It is not 
unusual to find significant moderation (i.e., an interaction), but non-significant slopes within that interaction. This 
may be the case because the slopes are estimated at +1 and -1 SD, and these points may not be extreme enough away 





changes or alters the relationship between X and Y. The +1 and -1 SD points are conventional but arbitrary points to 
assess change, and it may be possible, for example, that for +1.5 SD and -1.5 SD the slopes are significantly 
different than zero, because these points are more extremely oriented on the dimension of a moderator that does in 
fact change the relationship between X and Y. Additionally, moderation tests whether slopes are significantly 
different than each other, not whether they are different than zero. Thus, while two slopes can be quite different 
from each other (e.g., if one is -5, the other +4, which is -5 vs. 4, or different by a value of 9), the raw difference 
between each decomposed slope and zero (e.g., 5 vs. 0 and 4 vs. 0) will typically each be smaller values, which may 
not be “significantly” different than zero. 
 
The relationship between state fragility as an indicator of state strength (as measured by 
the Fragile States Index) and the rate of pretrial detention is also significantly moderated by the 
Corruption Perceptions Index, b = 9.674, SE = 3.320, β = .265, p < .01 (Table 12). For countries 
that are relatively corrupt (low Corruption Perceptions Index), there is a relatively stronger 
negative relationship between state fragility and the rate of pretrial detention (b = -21.45, p <.05), 
compared to states that are relatively uncorrupt (b = -2.10, p > .05). In countries with a high 
perception of corruption the rate of pretrial detention is significantly lower in fragile states. As 
countries become more corrupt (lower Corruption Perceptions Index), the relationship between 
state fragility and the pretrial detention rate becomes more negative. That is, when countries are 
corrupt, more state fragility predicts significantly lower rates of pretrial detention. When 
countries are relatively uncorrupt, more state fragility predicts only very slightly lower rates of 
pretrial detention. 
The relationship between public services as an indicator of state strength (as measured by 
the Public Services Indicator) and the rate of pretrial detention is also moderated by the 
Corruption Perceptions Index, b = 11.511, SE = 3.918, β = .272, p < .01 (Table 12). For 
countries that are relatively corrupt (low Corruption Perceptions Index), there is a negative 
relationship between the Public Services Indicator and the rate of pretrial detention (b = -13.75, p 
<.05), compared to countries that are relatively uncorrupt (b = 9.28). When countries are corrupt, 
better public services predicts lower rates of pretrial detention. When countries are relatively 





The control of corruption measure complements the Corruption Perceptions Index 
because it measures, inter alia, how much a state fights or curbs corruption. As with the 
Corruption Perceptions Index, higher values (for control of corruption) represent less corruption. 
The relationship between government effectiveness and the rate of pretrial detention is 
significantly moderated by control of corruption, b = -10.372, SE = 3.319, β = -.241, p < .01 
(Table 12). For countries at the low end of the moderator (countries low in the control of 
corruption, which are likely more corrupt), the relationship between government effectiveness 
and the pretrial detention rate is positive (b = 12.05, SE = 8.50) compared to countries that are at 
the high end of the moderator (countries scoring high on control of corruption, which are likely 
less corrupt), which have a relatively negative slope (b = -8.69, SE = 9.11). That is, when 
countries are corrupt (scoring low on the control of corruption), more government effectiveness 
predicts higher rates of pretrial detention. When countries are relatively uncorrupt, more 
government effectiveness predicts lower rates of pretrial detention. 
The relationship between state fragility (as measured by the Fragile States Index) and the 
rate of pretrial detention is significantly moderated by the control of corruption, b = 10.033, SE = 
3.209, β = .265, p < .01 (Table 12). For countries that are relatively corrupt (low control of 
corruption score), there is a significant negative relationship between state fragility and the rate 
of pretrial detention (b = -21.69, p <.05), with greater state fragility resulting in lower rates of 
pretrial detention. By contrast, in countries that are relatively uncorrupt (high control of 
corruption), there is only an extremely modest negative relationship between state fragility and 
the rate of pretrial detention (b = -1.63). 
The relationship between public services as an indicator of state strength (as measured by 





Public Services Indicator, b = 10.818, SE = 3.835, β = .249, p < .01 (Table 12). For countries that 
are relatively corrupt (low control of corruption score), there is a negative relationship between 
the Public Services Indicator and the rate of pretrial detention (b = -13.64, p <.05), compared to 
countries that are relatively uncorrupt (b = 7.99). When countries are corrupt, better public 
services predicts lower rates of pretrial detention. When countries are relatively uncorrupt, better 
public services result in higher rates of pretrial detention. 
Proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention 
The relationship between state fragility (as measured by the Fragile States Index) and the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention is moderated by the Corruption Perceptions Index, b 
= -.029, SE = .015, β = .265, p < .05 (Table 12). For countries that are more corrupt (low 
Corruption Perceptions Index), there is a relatively stronger positive relationship between state 
fragility and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention (b = .108, p <.01), compared to 
states that are relatively uncorrupt (b = .051). That is, when countries are corrupt, more state 
fragility predicts a somewhat higher proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. When countries 
are relatively uncorrupt, more state fragility predicts hardly perceptible increases in the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
The relationship between government effectiveness and the proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention is moderated by control of corruption, b = .044, SE = .013, β = .242, p < .001 
(Table 12). For countries at the low end of the moderator (countries low in the control of 
corruption, which are likely more corrupt), the relationship between government effectiveness 
and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention is somewhat negative (b = -.083, SE = .034) 
compared to countries at the high end of the moderator (countries scoring high on control of 





.036). That is, when countries are corrupt (scoring low on the control of corruption), more 
government effectiveness predicts a lower proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. When 
countries are relatively uncorrupt, more government effectiveness predicts virtually no change in 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
The relationship between state fragility (as measured by the Fragile States Index) and the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention is moderated by the control of corruption, b = -.037, 
SE = .014, β = -.213, p < .01 (Table 12). For countries that are relatively corrupt (low control of 
corruption score), there is a somewhat positive relationship between state fragility and the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention (b = .095, p <.01), with greater state fragility 
resulting in a higher proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. By contrast, in countries that 
are relatively uncorrupt (high control of corruption), there is only a very modest positive 
relationship between state fragility and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention (b = 
.022). 
The relationship between public services as an indicator of state strength (as measured by 
the Public Services Indicator) and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention is significantly 
moderated by the Public Services Indicator, b = 10.818, SE = 3.835, β = .249, p < .01 (Table 12). 
For countries that are relatively corrupt (low control of corruption score), there is a positive 
relationship between the Public Services Indicator and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention (b = .119, p <.001), compared to countries that are relatively uncorrupt (b = .033). 
When countries are corrupt, better public services predict a higher proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention. When countries are relatively uncorrupt, better public services predict only a 







Table 12: Moderation results for analysis 3a 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
B    SE β B      SE β 
Moderator = Corruption Perceptions Index        
Government Effectiveness  -10.276** 3.316 -.271 .022 .014 .127 
Low M  6.28 9.01     
High M -14.26 10.33     
Fragile States Index  9.674** 3.320 .265 -.029* .015 -.171 
Low M  -21.45* 7.85  .108** .033  
High M -2.10 8.83  .051 .039  
Public Services Indicator  11.511** 3.918 .272 -.031 .016 -.157 
Low M  -13.75* 6.05     
High M 9.28 8.13     
Moderator = Control of Corruption       
Government Effectiveness  -10.372** 3.319 -.241 .044*** .013 .242 
Low M  12.05 8.50  -.083* .034  
High M -8.69 9.11  .003 .036  
Fragile States Index  10.033** 3.209 .265 -.037** .014 -.213 
Low M  -21.69* 7.67  .095** .032  
High M -1.63 8.40  .022 .036  
Public Services Indicator  10.819** 3.835 .249 -.043** .016 -.217 
Low M  -13.64* 5.97  .119*** .024  
High M 7.99 8.15  .033 .033  
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Highlighting indicates simple slope effects where there is a significant 
interaction. Slopes are presented for scores that are at the low (-1 SD, “Low M”) and high (+1 SD, “High M”) end of 
the moderator. 
 
Analysis 3b: Democratization and development, insecurity and pretrial detention 
This analysis assessed whether democratization and development moderate the 
relationship between crime / the fear of crime and pretrial detention. The variables of the 
Democracy Index and the Human Development Index (HDI) were used to assess 
democratization and development, respectively. Homicide rate and fear of crime were used to 





evidence that democratization and development levels moderate the relationship between crime 
and the pretrial detention rate, but not between crime and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention. 
Pretrial detention rate 
The relationship between the homicide rate and the rate of pretrial detention is moderated 
by democracy (as measured by the Democracy Index), b = 14.300, SE = 3.583, β = .317, p < .001 
(Table 13). For countries that are relatively democratic (scoring high on the Democracy Index), 
there is a strong positive relationship between the homicide rate and the rate of pretrial detention 
(b = 28.27, p <.001). There is an almost imperceptible negative relationship between the 
homicide rate and the rate of pretrial detention in countries which are relatively undemocratic (b 
= -.33). As countries become more democratic, the relationship between the homicide rate and 
the rate of pretrial detention becomes markedly more positive. That is, when countries are 
democratic, higher homicide rates predict higher rates of pretrial detention. 
The relationship between feelings of safety and the rate of pretrial detention is moderated 
by democracy (as measured by the Democracy Index), b = -10.256, SE = 3.245, β = -.255, p < 
.01 (Table 13). For countries that are relatively democratic (scoring high on the Democracy 
Index), there is a strong negative relationship between feelings of safety and the rate of pretrial 
detention (b = -27.17, p <.001). This tendency holds for relatively undemocratic countries, but 
the negative relationship between feelings of safety and the rate of pretrial detention is more 
modest (b = -6.66). As countries become more democratic, the relationship between feelings of 
safety and the rate of pretrial detention becomes more negative. That is, when countries are 





The relationship between the homicide rate and the rate of pretrial detention is moderated 
by development (as measured by the Human Development Index), b = 14.289, SE = 3.456, β = 
.268, p < .001 (Table 13). For countries that are relatively developed (scoring high on the HDI), 
there is a strong positive relationship between the homicide rate and the rate of pretrial detention 
(b = 38.59, p <.001). There is a more modest positive relationship between the homicide rate and 
the rate of pretrial detention in less developed countries (b = 10.01). As countries become more 
developed, the relationship between the homicide rate and the rate of pretrial detention becomes 
markedly more positive. That is, when countries are developed, higher homicide rates predict 
higher rates of pretrial detention. 
The relationship between feelings of safety and the rate of pretrial detention is moderated 
by development (as measured by the HDI), b = -8.399, SE = 3.740, β = -.174, p < .01 (Table 13). 
For countries that are relatively developed (scoring high on the HDI), there is a strong negative 
relationship between feelings of safety and the rate of pretrial detention (b = -29.29, p <.001). 
This tendency also holds for less developed countries, but the negative relationship between 
feelings of safety and the rate of pretrial detention is more modest (b = -12.49, p <.05). As 
countries become more developed, the relationship between feelings of safety and the rate of 
pretrial detention becomes more negative. That is, in relatively developed countries, higher 















Table 13: Moderation results for analysis 3b 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
B    SE β B      SE β 
Moderator = Democracy Index        
Homicide Rate  14.300*** 3.583 .317 -.023 .019 -.103 
Low M  -.33 5.75     
High M 28.27*** 3.76     
Feeling safe -10.256** 3.245 -.255 .022 .016 .115 
Low M  -6.66 4.63     
High M -27.17*** 4.59     
Moderator = HDI       
Homicide Rate 14.289*** 3.456 .268 .001 .018 .002 
Low M  10.01 5.41     
High M 38.59*** 3.93     
Feeling safe -8.399** 3.740 -.174 .017 .018 .076 
Low M  -12.49* 6.67     
High M -29.29*** 4.85     
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Highlighting indicates simple slope effects where there is a significant 
interaction. Slopes are presented for scores that are at the low (-1 SD, “Low M”) and high (+1 SD, “High M”) end of 
the moderator. 
 
Analysis 3c: Democratization, development and pretrial detention 
This analysis assessed whether democratization (as measured by the Democracy Index, 
and the Voice and Accountability Index) moderates the relationship between development (as 
measured by the Human Development Index, GDP per capita, government effectiveness, and the 
Public Services Indicator) and pretrial detention. There is compelling evidence that 
democratization moderates the relationship between development and pretrial detention. 
Development predicts higher rates of pretrial detention, particularly in countries that are 
relatively autocratic. Much like analysis 3b (above), the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention showed relatively little support for the contention that democratization moderates the 





Pretrial detention rate 
The relationship between the Human Development Index and the rate of pretrial 
detention is moderated by democracy (as measured by the Democracy Index), b = -11.276, SE = 
3.377, β = -.269, p < .001 (Table 14). For countries that are relatively democratic (scoring high 
on the Democracy Index), there is a negative relationship between HDI and the rate of pretrial 
detention (b = -8.82). For relatively undemocratic countries, there is a positive relationship 
between HDI and the rate of pretrial detention (b = 13.73, p < .01). As countries become more 
democratic, the relationship between development (HDI) and the rate of pretrial detention 
becomes negative. That is, when countries are democratic, more development predicts lower 
rates of pretrial detention. When countries are relatively undemocratic, more development 
suggests higher rates of pretrial detention. 
The relationship between GDP per capita and the rate of pretrial detention is moderated 
by democracy (as measured by the Democracy Index), b = -12.123, SE = 3.327, β = -.299, p < 
.001 (Table 14). For countries that are relatively democratic (scoring high on the Democracy 
Index), there is a negative relationship between GDP per capita and the rate of pretrial detention 
(b = -7.81). For relatively undemocratic countries, there is a positive relationship between GDP 
per capita and the rate of pretrial detention (b = 16.44, p < .01). As countries become more 
democratic, the relationship between development (GDP per capita) and the rate of pretrial 
detention becomes negative. That is, when countries are democratic, more development predicts 
lower rates of pretrial detention. When countries are relatively undemocratic, more development 
suggests higher rates of pretrial detention. 
The relationship between government effectiveness and the rate of pretrial detention is 





.243, p < .01 (Table 14). For countries that are relatively democratic (scoring high on the 
Democracy Index), there is a negative relationship between government effectiveness and the 
rate of pretrial detention (b = -14.76, p <.01). For relatively undemocratic countries, there is a 
modest positive relationship between government effectiveness and the rate of pretrial detention 
(b = 4.57). As countries become more democratic, the relationship between government 
effectiveness and the rate of pretrial detention becomes negative. That is, when countries are 
democratic, more government effectiveness predicts lower rates of pretrial detention. When 
countries are relatively undemocratic, more government effectiveness suggests modestly higher 
rates of pretrial detention. 
The relationship between public services (as measured by the Public Services Indicator) 
and the rate of pretrial detention is moderated by democracy (as measured by the Democracy 
Index), b = 11.324, SE = 3.223, β = .282, p < .001 (Table 14). For countries that are relatively 
democratic (scoring high on the Democracy Index), there is a positive relationship between good 
public services and the rate of pretrial detention (b = 13.06, p <.05). For relatively undemocratic 
countries, there is a negative relationship between good public services (i.e., scoring high on the 
Public Services Indicator) and the rate of pretrial detention (b = -9.59). That is, when countries 
are democratic, good public services predict higher rates of pretrial detention. When countries 
are relatively undemocratic, public services suggests lower rates of pretrial detention. 
The relationship between the Human Development Index and the rate of pretrial 
detention is moderated by democracy (as measured by the Voice and Accountability Index), b = -
9.85, SE = 3.66, β = -.20, p < .01 (Table 14). For countries that are relatively democratic (scoring 
high on the Voice and Accountability Index), there is a negative relationship between 





relatively undemocratic countries, there is a positive relationship between development and the 
rate of pretrial detention (b = 14.41, p <.01). That is, when countries are democratic, 
development results in lower rates of pretrial detention. When countries are relatively 
undemocratic, development suggests higher rates of pretrial detention. 
The relationship between Gross Domestic Product per capita and the rate of pretrial 
detention is moderated by democracy (as measured by the Voice and Accountability Index), b = -
9.29, SE = 3.92, β = -.18, p < .01 (Table 14). For countries that are relatively democratic (scoring 
high on the Voice and Accountability Index), there is an almost imperceptible negative 
relationship between development (as measured by GDP per capita) and the rate of pretrial 
detention (b = -1.05). For relatively undemocratic countries, there is a positive relationship 
between development and the rate of pretrial detention (b = 16.85, p <.01). That is, when 
countries are democratic, development predicts basically no change to the rate of pretrial 
detention. When countries are relatively undemocratic, development suggests higher rates of 
pretrial detention. 
The relationship between government effectiveness and the rate of pretrial detention is 
moderated by democracy (as measured by the Voice and Accountability Index), b = -7.01, SE = 
3.25, β = -.16, p < .05 (Table 14). For countries that are relatively democratic (scoring high on 
the Voice and Accountability Index), there is a modest negative relationship between 
development (as measured by government effectiveness) and the rate of pretrial detention (b = -
6.83). For relatively undemocratic countries, there is a modest positive relationship between 
development and the rate of pretrial detention (b = 7.18). That is, when countries are democratic, 
development results in modestly lower rates of pretrial detention. When countries are relatively 





The relationship between public services (as measured by the Public Services Indicator) 
and the rate of pretrial detention is moderated by democracy (as measured by the Voice and 
Accountability Index), b = 10.00, SE = 3.61, β = .22, p < .01 (Table 14). For countries that are 
relatively democratic, there is a positive relationship between development (as measured by 
public services) and the rate of pretrial detention (b = 10.31). For relatively undemocratic 
countries, there is a negative relationship between development and the rate of pretrial detention 
(b = -9.69). That is, when countries are democratic, development predicts higher rates of pretrial 
detention. When countries are relatively undemocratic, development suggests lower rates of 
pretrial detention. 
Proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention 
The relationship between government effectiveness and the proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention is moderated by democracy (as measured by the Voice and Accountability 
Index), b = .034, SE = .014, β = .169, p < .05 (Table 14). For countries that are relatively 
democratic (scoring high on the Voice and Accountability Index), there is a very modest 
negative relationship between development (as measured by government effectiveness) and the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention (b = -.043, p <.05). For relatively undemocratic 
countries, there is also a modest negative relationship between development and the proportion 
of prisoners in pretrial detention (b = -.111, p <.001). That is, for both relatively democratic and 
undemocratic countries, development predicts very slight lower proportions of prisoners in 
pretrial detention, with relatively undemocratic countries reflecting somewhat lower proportions 









Table 14: Moderation results for analysis 3c 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
B    SE β B      SE β 
Moderator = Democracy Index        
HDI  -11.276*** 3.377 -.269 .007 .015 .036 
Low M  13.73** 4.81     
High M -8.82 5.67     
GDP per capita (ln) -12.123*** 3.327 -.299 .007 .015 .035 
Low M  16.44** 5.30     
High M -7.81 5.31     
Government Effectiveness  -9.664** 3.186 -.243 .023 .014 .115 
Low M  4.57 6.31     
High M -14.76** 5.30     
Public Services Indicator  11.324*** 3.223 .282 -.019 .014 -.099 
Low M  -9.59 5.02     
High M 13.06* 5.09     
Moderator = Voice and Accountability       
HDI -9.85** 3.66 -0.20 .013 .016 .062 
Low M  14.41** 5.06     
High M -5.29 5.87     
GDP per capita (ln) -9.29** 3.92 -0.18 .020 .017 .090 
Low M  16.85** 5.57     
High M -1.05 5.59     
Government Effectiveness -7.01* 3.25 -0.16 .034* .014 .169 
Low M  7.18 5.92  -.111*** .025  
High M -6.83 4.93  -.043* .021  
Public Services Indicator 10.00** 3.61 0.22 -.015 .015 -.071 
Low M  -9.69 5.15     
High M 10.31 5.81     
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Highlighting indicates simple slope effects where there is a significant 








CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction 
Of the statistically significant simple correlations undertaken for this study, some two-
thirds were in respect of correlations with the “proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention” 
serving as the dependent variable, suggesting that the “proportion” outcome measure is more 
responsive to broader national-level economic, political, and social developments. 
The independent variables which had a moderate to strong correlation with the proportion 
of prisoners in pretrial detention dependent variable cover three broad themes: crime and 
insecurity, development, and good governance. This suggests that countries with low levels of 
crime, insecurity and disorder are less likely to detain defendants awaiting trial. Moreover, that 
countries with developed and functioning public services process pretrial detainees relatively 
quickly through the pretrial stage of the criminal justice process and ensure the conviction and 
incarceration of serious offenders. The independent variables which correlated most strongly 
with the rate of pretrial detention dependent variable were either measuring crime / insecurity or 
inequality. 
Three categories of variables – covering public perceptions of safety and experiences 
with police, prison crowding, and public health expenditure – best predicted the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention dependent variable, accounting for 23.2% of the variance in the 
outcome measure. “Development” is a common characteristic of these variables. Developed 
states have more resources for, inter alia, police and interventions which prevent crime and 
improve public safety, building prisons to ameliorate prison crowding levels, and paying for 





predicted the pretrial detention rate dependent variable, accounting for 30.8% of the variance in 
the outcome measure. Namely, homicide rate, HDI, prison occupancy rate, public health 
expenditure, and police per capita. “Development” also appears to be a common characteristic of 
this grouping of variables. States at a relatively high level of development have the resources and 
capacity to identify, apprehend, and remand a relatively large proportion of suspected offenders 
into pretrial detention. 
Relationships with individual independent variables 
This study set out to better understand the relationships between economic, political, and 
social factors on the one hand, and national pretrial detention practices on the other. Moreover, 
whether – and to what extent – there is a relationship between certain specified independent 
variables and two pretrial detention-related dependent variables. The variables were selected to 
test a number of hypotheses around 15 themes which are discussed next. 
Unemployment 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with 
unemployment was not supported. While earlier cross-national studies (Killias, 1986; Chiricos & 
DeLone, 1992) found a statistical relationship between unemployment and incarceration rates, 
more recent analyses reveal a more ambiguous picture. Thus, no association between 
unemployment and incarceration rates were found in a cross-national study of 148 countries 
(Neapolitan, 2001), a review of 15 free-market democracies (Sutton, 2004), and an analysis of 
the 100 most affluent countries (Ruddell, 2005). The studies showing no association focused on 
richer countries which are disproportionately likely to have relatively developed social welfare 
systems which may moderate the impacts of social stress, including crime, and hence, 





In this study, a larger sample of countries, including most developing counties, was used 
to assess Rusche and Kirchheimer’s (1939/2003) theory that punishment, especially mass 
imprisonment, is driven primarily by economic considerations, including the relative value of 
labor, whereby during times of labor surplus or high unemployment, incarceration rates tend to 
be high. Rusche and Kirchheimer’s labor surplus theory is not supported when tested in respect 
of pretrial detention populations only. Moreover, Wacquant’s (2009a; 2009b) materialist 
explanation for trends in penalization and incarceration which focused on developed countries, 
especially those with neo-liberal economic policies, does not hold when exploring a larger group 
of countries at various stages of development when explicitly focusing on pretrial detention rates. 
The hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would not correlate 
with unemployment was supported. While a very modest negative correlation between the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention and unemployment was found, this failed to reach 
statistical significance. 
Both of the unemployment-related hypotheses had not been tested in such a large-scale 
cross-national study before using pretrial detention as the dependent variable. The findings 
suggest there is no meaningful association between unemployment and either the pretrial 
detention rate or the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. It would appear that Rusche 
and Kirchheimer’s (1939/2003) and Wacquant’s (2009a; 2009b) theories do not apply when 
tested against pretrial detention populations only. 
Inequality 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with economic 
inequality was supported. This finding contrasts with a number of cross-national studies which 





(Greenberg, 1999; Neapolitan, 2001; Ruddell, 2005). Others, however, found inconsistent results 
(Wilkins & Pease, 1987; Jacobs & Kleban, 2003), while Krus and Hoehl (1994), found a strong 
correlation between incarceration rates and an index of unequal distribution of wealth in a study 
covering 30 countries. 
The inconclusive empirical findings are counterbalanced by the theoretical literature’s 
contention that imprisonment serves as a mechanism for controlling offenders and maintaining 
the legitimacy of the capitalist state during periods of rising and sustained economic inequality 
Wacquant (2000). Moreover, that the poor and unemployed, who are at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy, have a greater propensity to engage in criminal conduct and be subject to arrest and 
imprisonment compared to better-off members of society; a phenomenon which is exacerbated 
by inequality (Merton, 1938; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Hirschi, 1969; Agnew, 2006; Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 2006). This study supports the theoretical literature in respect of pretrial detention as 
a subset of the general incarcerated population, which stands to reason as pretrial detention is a 
consequence of both crime control policies and criminal conduct. 
The hypothesis that inequality would not correlate with the proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention was not supported. Rather, a modest positive association was found, suggesting 
that the higher the level of economic inequality in a country, the higher the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. This may be because states’ criminal justice apparatus is more 
adept at arresting and detaining persons than processing them through the criminal justice 
process and imposing custodial sentences on convicted offenders. That is, in highly unequal 
settings states place a larger number of persons in pretrial detention than impose custodial 
sentences on convicted offenders, thus increasing the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 





state legitimacy in the context of economic inequality (Wacquant, 2000), or because the poor are 
more likely to engage in “survival” type crime (e.g., theft of food and movable property, petty 
muggings) during periods of acute inequality, a relatively high proportion of persons arrested and 
detained are petty offenders of whom many are not prosecuted or, if prosecuted and convicted, 
do not receive a custodial sentence. 
Social welfare 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would negatively correlate with social 
welfare was not supported. The three independent variables used to test for social welfare (social 
assistance expenditure, education expenditure, and public health expenditure) all correlated 
negatively with the pretrial detention rate, but none reached statistical significance. 
Past cross-national studies, focusing on developing countries using small sample sizes, 
found inconsistent relationships between welfare spending and general imprisonment. Some 
found a negative correlation between welfare spending and imprisonment rates (Jacobs & 
Kleban, 2003; Downes & Hansen, 2006; Lappi-Seppälä, 2007). Others found that welfare 
expenditure does not affect incarceration rates (Cavadino & Dignan, 2006; De Koster, van der 
Waal, Achterberg, & Houtman, 2008). On a theoretical level, Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2007) felt that the 
relationship between state welfare payments and penal policy is attributable to greater feelings of 
social solidarity more widespread in welfare-oriented states. This is partly based on Durkheimian 
tradition that feelings of social solidarity found in “modern” and “industrial” societies are based 
on the dependence individuals have on each other in such societies. Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2007) also 
surmised that established welfare states may be less punitive because of policy interventions 
such as promoting safeguards against social marginalization, thereby reducing the risk that 





Consistent with some of the empirical studies dealing with general incarceration, but in 
contradiction to the theoretical literature, this study’s findings do not support the contention that 
greater welfare expenditure predicts lower rates of pretrial detention. There are at least two 
possible explanations for the finding. First, the number of modern welfare states in the world is 
small. While some form of free universal education is common in most countries, state-
sponsored public healthcare and social assistance is rare, especially in the developing world. It 
may be no coincidence that the social assistance expenditure variable, which was based on data 
from only 59 mainly developed countries, showed a stronger negative correlation with pretrial 
detention rates, compared to education expenditure (N=137) and public health expenditure 
(N=179). Second, in some countries, police operate in terms of “arrest quotas” whereby they are 
expected to arrest a certain number of people over a specified time period. Some of these arrests 
lead to remand hearings and judicial rulings of pretrial detention, so that irrespective of the level 
of state welfare expenditure, arrests and pretrial detentions remain relatively constant. 
The hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would not correlate 
with social welfare was unsupported. All three of the aforementioned social welfare variables 
utilized indicated a statistically significant negative correlation. This is consistent with the above 
finding that inequality correlates with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention as welfare 
spending in respect of all three of the measures used can be expected to reduce levels of 
inequality. Moreover, as welfare spending – especially social assistance expenditure – is likely to 
reduce the incidence of relatively minor “survival” type crimes, it may be the case that, contrary 
to expectations, social welfare has a greater impact on reducing the number of pretrial detainees 







The hypothesis that modernization, as measured by the Human Development Index 
(HDI) and urbanization levels, would positively correlate with the pretrial detention rate was 
generally supported. The finding supports Durkheim’s (1947) analysis of the transition from 
traditional agrarian to modern societies and the modernization perspective on crime (Clinard & 
Abbott, 1973). A number of cross-national studies have been broadly supportive of 
modernization theory in the context of general imprisonment. Killias (1996) and Jacobs and 
Kleban (2003) found that more affluent nations with the resources to maintain extensive prison 
systems have higher incarceration rates. An exploration of cross-national patterns of punishment 
in 140 countries by Ruddell and Urbina (2004) found that high HDI scores were consistently 
associated with the use of imprisonment. This study’s finding thus complements the literature in 
respect of a pretrial detention-specific analysis covering a large number of countries (N=176 for 
HDI, and N=198 for urbanization). 
The premise of Durkheim’s proposition appears to apply to pretrial detention as it does to 
incarceration generally. Countries’ formal criminal justice institutions develop and grow as they 
modernize. This, in turn, brings about a higher number of arrests and the processing of arrestees 
through the pretrial justice system. That is, as countries modernize and become more developed, 
fewer criminal disputes are resolved informally. In a developing and largely non-urbanized 
country, a common assault or similar relatively minor crime is likely to be dealt with by the 
parties themselves or through a traditional justice mechanism. Even if the assault victim sought 
to report the matter to the police, the nearest police station may be far away (which the 
complainant may have to reach on foot or through the use of relatively expensive and erratic 





lead to an arrest and remand hearing. By contrast, modern states have the resources to effectively 
respond to crimes reported to its law enforcement agencies. In a developed country an assault is 
likely to involve the police who, for the complainant, would only be a phone call away. The 
police would have the resources to respond relatively quickly to the matter, likely leading to an 
expeditious arrest. Once arrested, the state should have the technical capacity to ascertain 
whether the suspect has prior convictions or arrest records which, in turn, would strengthen the 
prosecution’s ability to request pretrial detention. 
There was mixed support for the hypothesis that modernization is negatively correlated 
with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. While the Human Development Index is 
negatively correlated with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention, there was no 
statistically significant correlation in respect of urbanization. Because modernization increases 
the prominence of formal criminal justice institutions it is reasonable to assume that 
modernization will exert upwards pressure on both the use of pretrial detention and general 
imprisonment. However, the impact of modernization may be more significant on sentenced 
prisoner numbers as formal justice systems require greater human and technical capacities to 
convict offenders compared to remanding suspected offenders to pretrial detention. That is, the 
ability and capacity to arrest and remand a suspect to pretrial detention will not differ as much 
between developing and developed countries compared to the capacity to hold trials and secure 
convictions. The level of incriminating evidence required to arrest and remand a suspect to 
pretrial detention is modest compared to the evidence needed to secure a conviction in court. 
Effective trials require trained judicial officers, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and police 







The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would negatively correlate with stable 
democracy and civil liberties was not supported. Ruddell and Urbina’s (2007) cross-national 
study of the 100 richest countries found that autocratic regimes tend to have higher incarceration 
rates compared to liberal democracies. This stands to reason as governments which perceive 
themselves to be vulnerable or lacking popular legitimacy are more likely to resort to punitive 
policies to maintain their positions of authority and power (Garland, 2001). Moreover, a 
disregard for civil liberties and due process – both hallmarks of liberal democracy – would 
suggest a greater propensity of autocratic states to arrest and detain a relatively large number of 
people, both to maintain political control and for more mundane law enforcement purposes. This 
study’s hypothesis was based on the contention that if one assumes that autocratic states 
generally employ the “crime control model” as compared to the “due process model” (Packer, 
1968), then autocratic regimes with relatively high incarceration rates should have high pretrial 
detention rates too.  
It may, however, also be possible that autocratic regimes which employ the “crime 
control model” have, on average, relatively short durations of pretrial detention. In jurisdictions 
where due process is largely ignored or more honored in the breach than in the observance, it is 
likely that criminal investigations are perfunctory and short as the amount and quality of 
incriminating evidence required for a conviction is relatively modest. For similar reasons, trials 
in autocratic states will, on balance, be of relatively short duration as the often time-consuming 
trial processes typical in the “due process model” are rarer in jurisdictions focused on the swift 
processing of cases and meeting out punishment rather than avoiding the conviction of the 





numbers of arrests and pretrial detentions, the relatively short duration of the pretrial detention 
period may counterbalance the volume of detention-related cases when pretrial detention is 
measured as a rate of the general population. Moreover, in democracies public opinion and a free 
media shapes and informs policy priorities and outcomes. If the public seeks more penal severity 
and crime control policies, democracy may foster punitiveness and correlate with higher 
incarceration rates (Pratt, 2007) in respect of both pretrial detention and general imprisonment. A 
number of criminologists suggest that over the last few decades developed Western liberal 
democracies have shifted towards a more punitive and crime control paradigm to address and 
respond to growing public insecurity (Young, 1999; Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007). 
The line of argument that more authoritarian regimes focus on expeditious case 
processing, conviction and punishment, suggests that such jurisdictions also have relatively small 
proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention. That is, in autocracies a relatively large proportion 
of pretrial detainees can be expected to be convicted and given custodial sentences. In an 
analysis of 111 countries Sung (2006) found a strong relationship between democracy and 
increased criminal case attrition, suggesting that in liberal democracies relatively few arrests lead 
to convictions and custodial sentences compared to more authoritarian regimes. Yet, this study’s 
hypothesis, that stable democracy and civil liberties are negatively correlated with the proportion 
of prisoners in pretrial detention, found empirical support. That is, on balance, liberal 
democracies are likely to have a lower proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention (and, 
conversely, a higher proportion of prisoners as sentenced offenders) compared to authoritarian 
regimes. One plausible explanation may be that liberal democracies are more respectful of norms 
and standards which provide that pretrial detention be used as an exceptional measure only. That 





relatively high that they will be convicted and given a custodial sentence compared to more 
authoritarian regimes where pretrial detention may be used more arbitrarily and as a form of 
punishment with a relatively high proportion of remandees not ultimately convicted and given a 
custodial sentence. 
Development 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with 
development received mixed support. There are modest but positive correlations for some of the 
measures of development used in this study and the pretrial detention rate. Namely, GDP per 
capita, prison occupancy rate, and police per capita. However, there is no significant correlation 
between either government effectiveness or the Public Services Indicator and the pretrial 
detention rate. 
As this study found a positive correlation between another indicator of development, the 
Human Development Index, it is not surprising that a similar effect was found in respect of GDP 
per capita. In poorer and less developed countries, where state capacity is weak and criminal 
justice infrastructure limited, the rate of pretrial detention can be expected to be low. Unless 
caught in the act, relatively few persons suspected of having committed a crime are arrested in 
jurisdictions where the police lack the technical capacity to investigate crime and the resources to 
pursue and locate suspects. Moreover, in poorer countries where police pay may be low and 
erratic, and both internal and external police oversight mechanisms non-existent, police 
corruption may be relatively prevalent. Consequently, once arrested, corrupt officials often let 
arrestees and pretrial detainees go before they stand trial. Both these tendencies have a 
suppressing effect on the number and rate of pretrial detainees. As Schönteich (2014) points out, 





relatively high as such states have the capacity to arrest and detain a large proportion of persons 
suspected of having committed crimes. 
The hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would negatively 
correlate with development was partially supported by this study. There is a negative correlation 
between the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention and GDP per capita, government 
effectiveness, and state fragility. However, positive correlations were found for the prison 
occupancy rate and the Public Services Indicator. In respect of police per capita no significant 
correlation was found. 
In less developed countries the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention can be 
expected to be high as relatively few offenders are convicted because of the dearth of state 
capacity (i.e., too few courts, judges, prosecutors and investigators, and limited forensic capacity 
to undertake complex investigations) and official corruption. Moreover, because of a lethargic 
state apparatus, periods of pretrial detention tend to be long. Schönteich (2014) contends that in 
middle-income countries the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention are likely to be more 
modest than in low-income countries as more cases go to trial because of states’ greater 
investigative and prosecutorial capacity. In high-income developed countries the proportion of  
prisoners in pretrial detention can be expected to be low as there are sufficient court rooms, 
judges, prosecutors, and police investigators to ensure that trials are finalized relatively 
expeditiously. The average duration of pretrial detention therefore also tends to be short. 
A lack of development and state resources can subtly influence the operations of criminal 
justice systems’ pretrial practices in a number of ways. For example, many resource-poor 
jurisdiction do not have systems of personal or physical identification, rendering efforts to track 





option for risk-adverse law enforcement officials and judicial officers. A scarcity of police 
vehicles to transport arrestees from police stations to courts for bail hearings can increase the 
average duration of detention and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. Moreover, the 
unavailability of adequately resourced and effective alternatives to pretrial detention in resource-
poor settings increases the likelihood that courts will remand defendants into pretrial detention. 
Corruption 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would negatively correlate with corruption 
was not supported – neither by the Corruption Perceptions Index nor by the measure of the 
control of corruption. Both correlations were small in size and not of statistical significance. This 
study’s hypothesis was based on the presumption that periods of pretrial detention in corrupt 
settings are of relatively short duration as detainees bribe themselves “out” of custody which, in 
turn, reduces the overall number of pretrial detainees at any point in time (i.e., the pretrial 
detention rate). It is possible, and the finding may suggest this, that many detainees in corrupt 
settings lack the resources to come up with sufficient funds to offer a successful bribe, or that it 
takes detainees some time to contact and persuade relatives and friends to garner sufficient funds 
on their behalf. It is also possible that corruption drives particularly aggressive arrest practices as 
corrupt police can convert arrests into an income-generating activity. Such corruption-driven 
arrest dynamics are likely to result in a large volume of arrests and, down the line, pretrial 
detainees, which compensates for any corruption-related releases of detainees. 
The hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would positively 
correlate with corruption was supported by the Corruption Perceptions Index and the control of 
corruption measure. The hypothesis was based on the assumption that in corrupt systems 





imprisonment. That is, while corrupt systems may generate a large number of arrests and, as it 
would appear, a relatively high number of pretrial detainees, many such detainees will not stand 
trial as they successfully pay a bribe and are released prior to trial. Moreover, in a corrupt 
environment, where police arrest practices are driven by corruption, it is likely that the 
proportion of innocent persons, or persons who have committed petty crimes, being arrested is 
high. This is because corrupt police will tend to arrest opportunistically, focusing on persons who 
make easy targets and who have some money available to them (e.g., informal traders or sex 
workers) with less concern about arresting those who pose a risk to public safety. Many such 
arrestees, even if they do stand trial, are likely to be acquitted or, if convicted, receive a non-
custodial sentence. This implies that corrupt systems will have a relatively modest number of 
convicted prisoners, suggesting a high proportion of prisoners who are in pretrial detention. 
Political legitimacy 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would negatively correlate with levels of 
political legitimacy found mixed results. While the judicial independence measure had a negative 
correlation with the pretrial detention rate, this was not the case with the rule of law measure.  
In respect of overall incarceration rates (i.e., counting pretrial detainees and sentenced 
prisoners together), the literature suggests a negative correlation between political legitimacy and 
the pretrial detention rate. In a cross-national study of developed countries, Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2007) 
found a strong inverse relationship between levels of imprisonment and political legitimacy, with 
low levels of political legitimacy suggesting tougher penal policies as states seek to demonstrate 
their control over public security. According to Garland (2001), governments which perceive 
themselves to be vulnerable or lacking popular legitimacy will tend to resort to expressive 





compliance so that justice systems maintain order with relatively mild penal sanctions. 
Because of the desire to use a large sample of countries, this study’s measures of political 
legitimacy – judicial independence and rule of law – are somewhat imperfect. For example, in 
deeply divided and politically fractured societies, both these measures may be high, but for a 
significant proportion of the population the ruling party / political executive may enjoy low 
levels of political legitimacy. Conversely, it is possible that regimes with low levels of judicial 
independence and the rule of law may enjoy high popular levels of political legitimacy. The use 
of imperfect measures for the construct in question may have undermined the veracity of the 
finding. Another possibility is that pretrial detention is employed differently than (post-sentence) 
incarceration by regimes lacking political legitimacy. Governments enjoying low levels of 
political legitimacy may focus their efforts on ensuring the conviction and punishment of 
offenders (which explains the findings reported in the literature) rather than tough pretrial 
detention practices. 
The hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would not correlate 
with political legitimacy found mixed results. The correlation between the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention and judicial independence, while negative, was not statistically 
significant. There was a highly significant medium, negative correlation between rule of law and 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. This study’s hypothesis was based on the 
assumption that the relative proportion of pretrial detainees to sentenced prisoners is not 
significantly affected by varying levels of political legitimacy. Namely, that regimes with low 
political legitimacy have punitive policies and practices in respect of both pretrial detention and 
sentencing. A plausible explanation for the finding may be that countries scoring poorly on a rule 





discussion on “regime type”, regimes disrespectful of the rule of law and judicial independence 
may be adroit at expeditiously processing cases through the criminal justice process to relatively 
quickly reach the conviction and sentencing stage. This would exert downward pressure on the 
number of pretrial detainees in relation to sentenced prisoners. Moreover, in countries scoring 
low on rule of law and judicial independence, a relatively large proportion of pretrial detainees 
are likely to be convicted and given custodial sentences. 
Political trust 
Neither of the hypotheses – that the pretrial detention rate and the proportion of prisoners 
in pretrial detention would negatively correlate with political trust – found statistically significant 
support. The hypotheses were based on the assumption that in jurisdictions with high levels of 
political trust, judicial officers would feel more comfortable releasing defendants awaiting trial 
as “wrong” decisions (i.e., where released defendants abscond or interfere with the criminal 
investigation) would not undermine the public’s trust in the political regime generally and the 
judiciary in particular. Lappi-Seppӓlӓ (2007) posits that political trust and legitimacy are related. 
Namely, that declining trust and legitimacy can bring about tougher penal policies as 
governments seek to demonstrate their control over public security. This study’s findings are all 
the more intriguing as the measure for political trust was simple yet robust. It is based on data 
produced by a Gallup World Poll (GWP) survey where respondents are asked, “In this country, 
do you have confidence in the national government?” The GWP is a cross-country household 
survey designed to be nationally representative. It is possible that judicial practice is, on balance, 
unaffected by the political trust enjoyed (or not) by the political executive. Or, that judicial 
practice is affected differently in different settings. As with political legitimacy, trust could have 





whereby some relatively low-trust regimes are adroit at expeditiously processing defendants 
through the pretrial phase of the criminal justice process. 
Crime 
Both the hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with crime, 
and that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would positively correlate with crime, 
found support. The association between crime and general incarceration rates has been 
extensively explored with mixed and inconclusive results. A number of cross-national studies 
found no relationship between reported crime and imprisonment rates. For example, in a study of 
20 developed countries, Greenberg (1999) found no significant relationship between crime rates 
and incarceration levels. Unlike most comparative studies on crime and imprisonment, 
Greenberg did not confine his analysis to homicide only. Other studies found an ambiguous 
relationship between crime and incarceration (Lappi-Seppӓlӓ, 2007), while one large cross-
national study found that homicide rates – the measure of crime used in this study – were 
strongly associated with incarceration rates calculated as the sum of the sentenced prisoner and 
pretrial detainee rates (Ruddell, 2005). This study supports Ruddell’s (2005) findings and 
strengthens the contention that recorded homicides in particular correlate positively with both 
pretrial detention and general imprisonment rates. 
This study speculated that the relationship between crime and the number of pretrial 
detainees is less elastic than the relationship between crime and sentenced prisoner numbers. 
There are intervening bureaucratic and procedural factors in the criminal justice process – 
between the pretrial detention stage and the point at which defendants are convicted and given a 
custodial sentence – which disrupt the “pipeline” between arrest, pretrial detention, and the 





relatively large number of people stopped and questioned by the police, or charged with a crime 
and remanded to pretrial detention. However, many of those arrested or remanded are not 
prosecuted because, inter alia, the incriminating evidence is not compelling enough, state 
witnesses disappear or lose interest, or as a result of prosecutorial inefficiencies. Of those 
prosecuted, some will not be convicted. And, of those convicted, many will not receive a 
custodial sentence. This study’s crime-related hypotheses were based on the assumption that 
high levels of crime will affect pretrial detention numbers more than the number of sentenced 
prisoners, at least in jurisdictions where case attrition rates are high. Intriguingly, this is not what 
was found, with crime correlating somewhat more strongly with the pretrial detention rate 
compared to the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Perceptions of crime / safety 
The hypotheses that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with perceptions 
of crime / safety, and that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would positively 
correlate with perceptions of crime / safety, were broadly supported. Actual levels of crime, or of 
recorded crime, are often not the same as subjective perceptions of crime or safety. People’s 
perceptions of crime can be influenced by, inter alia, a variety of demographic factors (LaGrange 
& Ferraro, 1989) or the news they consume (Busselle, 2003). Popular perceptions of high crime 
and insecurity levels may, through public pressure, result in tougher and more punitive criminal 
justice policies and practices (Garland, 2000). 
As with the above crime variables, the findings suggest that the relationship between 
perceptions of crime / safety and pretrial detention is less elastic compared to the relationship 
between perceptions of crime / safety and sentenced prisoner numbers. That is, high levels of 





sentenced prisoners. As discussed above, this tendency may be especially pronounced in 
jurisdictions where case attrition rates are high. Indeed, this study found that perceptions of 
crime / safety correlated more strongly with the “proportion” of prisoners in pretrial detention 
dependent variable, compared to the pretrial detention “rate” dependent variable. Thus, higher 
proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention correspond with lower scores (higher perceptions of 
crime / safety) on the Law and Order Index, r(131) = -.52, p < .001, and the Safety and Security 
Index, r(146) = -.44, p < .001. Higher rates of pretrial detention correspond with lower scores 
(higher perceptions of crime / safety) on the Law and Order Index, r(130) = -.34, p < .001, and 
the percentage of the population feeling safe, r(137) = -.38, p < .001. 
Ethnic heterogeneity 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with ethnic 
diversity was not supported, while the hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention would positively correlate with ethnic diversity was supported. Group and minority 
threat theories provide a theoretical framework for understanding cross-national patterns of 
punishment (Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967). National-level studies of Western democracies have 
found relationships between the size of minority populations and the use of formal social control 
or punishment (e.g., Wacquant, 1999; Beckett & Western, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001). 
Cross-national studies have shown a relationship between population heterogeneity and 
punishment, with religious diversity positively associated with imprisonment rates (Ruddell & 
Urbina, 2004). 
This study’s ethnic heterogeneity hypotheses were based on the assumption that the 
group threat / ethnic heterogeneity dynamic would apply to pretrial detention practices as well. 





for this may be that the ethnic diversity data used in this study came from 2003 (Alesina et al., 
2003) and are consequently dated compared to the pretrial detention data which are primarily 
from 2015-2016. The 2003 data were the mostly recently available ethnic diversity data for a 
large dataset of countries. Given the significant cross-national population movements over the 
last 15 years (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014) it is possible that more recent ethnic diversity 
data would produce a different outcome to the analysis. 
The data used by this study may also not be the ideal measure for testing minority group 
threat theory. Group threat theory postulates that prejudice and inter-group hostility are largely 
reactions to real or perceived threats by subordinate groups. Dominant groups seek to preserve 
their advantaged social position (through, inter alia, repressive penal policies targeted at 
minorities) and view encroachments on their privileges by minority groups as disrupting to the 
existing social order (Blumer, 1958). Moreover, that intergroup competition and hostility emerge 
from historically and collectively developed judgments about the positions in the social order 
that in-group members believe they should rightfully occupy relative to members of an out-group 
(Blalock, 1967). The data used in this study represent an index to reflect the probability that a 
randomly selected pair of individuals belong to different ethnic groups in a country (Alesina et 
al., 2003). Such data do not adequately reflect the complexity of inter-ethnic relations and the 
determination of an “in-group” to maintain its dominant position. While it is generally assumed 
that aggregate measures of group size tap into group power and associated levels of individual 
perceived threat, numbers alone may not reflect degrees of relative power or the amount of threat 
that may be perceived by a dominant group (Tittle & Curran, 1988). Possibly, because of this 





size of minority group(s) – research findings on minority threat have not been consistent (e.g., 
Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988; Johnson et al., 2011). 
The tendency of criminal justice systems to discard cases during the course of the 
criminal justice process (see “case attrition” discussion above), discriminatory practices against 
minority groups, or the targeting of minority groups by police for the purposes of arrest, may all 
disproportionately affect pretrial detention numbers in relation to the number of sentenced 
prisoners. Empirical studies have shown that compared to majority groups, members of minority 
groups are, on average, subject to greater police scrutiny such as stop-and-search (Sharad, Rao, 
& Shroff, 2010; Ferrandino, 2015) and arrest (Kane, 2003; Kane, Gustafson, & Bruell, 2010). 
Such tendencies and patterns help explain confirmation of the hypothesis that the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention positively correlate with ethnic diversity. 
Foreign nationals 
The hypotheses that the pretrial detention rate and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention would both positively correlate with the proportion of foreign nationals in a country 
were not supported. The hypotheses were derived from imprisonment patterns found in European 
Union (EU) countries, where disaggregated data on prison inmates distinguishing between 
citizens and foreign nationals are generally available. In the majority of EU countries, foreign 
nationals are significantly overrepresented in national prison systems in comparison to their 
prevalence in the general national population (Aebi, Tiago, & Burkhardt, 2016).  
Foreign nationals might reasonably be expected to be overrepresented among pretrial 
detention populations. On balance, non-nationals accused of crimes pose a greater flight risk 
being in possession of a foreign passport and having fewer local community ties compared to 





greater tendency to come into conflict with the law and be arrested and remanded to pretrial 
detention (Albrecht, 1997). Finally, and related to the group threat theories discussed above, 
there is the possibility of disparate and discriminatory treatment against foreign nationals by law 
enforcement agencies (Wacquant, 1999). These factors suggest that the proportion of foreign 
nationals in a population would correlate positively with the pretrial detention rate and 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. The data analyzed in this study do, however, not 
bear this out. This may be because a significant proportion of foreign nationals are concentrated 
in a relatively small number of countries. For example, foreign national populations are likely to 
be relatively large within the EU, given freedom of movement rights within the EU, and large 
“guest worker” and migrant / refugee populations in some EU states. Moreover, in weak or 
dysfunctional states, where few people have access to proper or official identification, the ability 
of judicial officers to distinguish between citizens and foreign nationals may be limited. In 
countries where many do not have a formal address or salaried employment, the risk of someone 
who is released awaiting trial absconding or not being traceable by the police may not differ 
much between citizens and foreign nationals.  
Public punitiveness 
The hypothesis that the pretrial detention rate would positively correlate with public 
punitiveness was not supported by either of the measures used: the Voice and Accountability 
Index, and the Press Freedom Index. The hypothesis was based on the assumption that public 
punitiveness exerts some influence on penal policies and their application, in particular in 
situations where, as measured by the Voice and Accountability Index, the public can participate 
in selecting their government, there is a high degree of freedom of expression, and a free media. 





strategic incentives to reflect changes in punitive attitudes of citizens in their policy decisions 
(Jennings et al., 2015). Studies have shown feedback processes between public preferences and 
policy consistent with the ideas behind penal populism (Soroka & Wlezien, 2010). One 
explanation for the finding is that countries which score high on the two indices are also places 
where levels of public punitiveness are not particularly pronounced. That is, in places where the 
political environment affords the public a relatively high degree of input on policy development, 
public demands for punitive criminal justice policies may be weak. This could be because in 
such places states tend to be strong and developed, so that a high proportion of offenders are 
caught and punished, while victims of crime benefit from widespread property and medical 
insurance thereby mitigating their losses. 
The hypothesis that the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention would positively 
correlate with public punitiveness received only very modest support. There was a small but 
significant correlation between the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention and the Voice and 
Accountability Index, but no correlation between the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention 
and the Press Freedom Index. Policy makers willing to accommodate public demands for greater 
punitiveness may find it relatively easy to change pretrial detention polices (e.g., through the 
promulgation of mandatory pretrial detention laws). Policy makers have limited influence over 
sentencing practices as judicial independence and judicial sentencing discretion act as barriers to 
executive or political interference in sentencing practices. On the other hand, arrest and charging 
practices, and prosecutorial requests for pretrial detention, are typically within the authority of 
the political executive and criminal justice policy makers. Pretrial detention practices may 







The hypothesis that, compared to civil law countries, common law countries have lower 
pretrial detention rates was not supported by the analysis. Rather, the analysis found that 
common law countries have significantly higher pretrial detention rates than civil and mixed law 
countries, the latter two of which were not significantly different from each other. The 
hypothesis was based on the fact that in civil law regimes appeals may be taken both on the facts 
of a case and the law, and the appeal courts can open the record to receive new evidence 
(Messitte, 1999). During such appeal processes defendants continue to be classified as 
remandees or pretrial detainees, often described as prisoners without a final sentence 
(Morgenstern, 2009). The excessive duration of pretrial detention in civil law countries has also 
been commented on by van Caenegem (1999). By contrast, in common law countries appeals are 
relatively rare and prisoners are no longer classified as pretrial detainees once a guilty verdict has 
been made. 
It would appear that the common – civil law distinction in respect of the pretrial detention 
rate follows a similar pattern to the general incarceration rate. According to the cross-national 
empirical literature, countries with common law systems have higher overall incarceration rates 
compared to countries with civil law systems (e.g., DeMichele, 2013; DeMichele, 2014; 
D’Amico & Williamson, 2015). In a cross-national analysis of 100 countries, Ruddell (2005) 
found that countries with civil legal origins had lower imprisonment rates compared to countries 
with common law origins. D’Amico and Williamson (2015) speculated that in civil law countries 
bureaucratic infrastructures allow for relatively affordable alternatives to incarceration such as 





plausible that similar cost-effective alternatives to pretrial detention are relatively prevalent in 
civil law jurisdictions. 
The hypothesis that, compared to civil law countries, common law countries have lower 
proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention was supported by this study. In particular, that 
mixed legal systems had marginally higher proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention than 
civil law systems, and significantly higher proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention than 
common law countries. This may be because common law trials are typically of relatively short 
duration, with emphasis on the oral testimony of witnesses. By contrast, in civil law systems, a 
series of court hearings may be held over an extended period with documents and documentary 
evidence playing a more important role than witness testimony (Daly, 1999). The relatively long 
duration of trials – during which time defendants are classified as pretrial detainees in both 
common and civil law systems – would explain the higher average proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention in civil law systems. 
General findings 
Of the simple correlations undertaken for this study, 29 were statistically significant (p < 
.05). Of these, some two-thirds, or 20, were in respect of correlations with the “proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention” serving as the dependent variable, and nine in respect of 
correlations with the “rate of pretrial detention” as the dependent variable (Table 18). It would 
appear, therefore, that the independent variables chosen for this study correlated more in respect 
of the “proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention” dependent variable. This suggests that the 
“proportion” measure is more responsive or sensitive to broader economic, political, and social 
developments in a country. Moreover, four of the nine independent variables that correlated 





correlation with the “proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention” dependent variable, while the 
other five had very different correlation coefficients (r) compared to the “proportion of prisoners 
in pretrial detention” (Table 15). As discussed in chapter 1, this suggests the study’s dependent 
variables reflect two distinct phenomena. The only independent variables which correlated at a 
similar rate and direction in respect of both dependent variables had to do with crime and 
insecurity: homicide rate, percent feeling safe, and the Law and Order Index. Given this, it 
makes sense to review the study’s findings separately for the two dependent variables. 
 
Table 15: Independent variables with statistically significant correlations for the “rate of pretrial 
detention” variable and matching “proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention” variable 
Variable Proportion prisoners in 
PTD 
PTD rate 
Homicide Rate (ln) .309*** .416*** 
Gini Index .261** .401*** 
Prison Occupancy Rate --- .387*** 
Percent Feeling Safe -.338*** -.384*** 
Law and Order Index -.518*** -.344*** 
Judicial Independence --- -.286*** 
Police per Capita --- .222* 
Democracy Index --- -.204* 
GDP per Capita -.314*** .178* 
Correlations between the outcome measures and independent variables: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
Proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention 
The independent variables which correlated most strongly (r > .40) with the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention dependent variable were either measuring an aspect of personal 
safety such as victimization and popular perception of safety (Law and Order Index; Safety and 
Security Index), or an aspect of development, in particular the presence of basic state functions 
including the state’s ability to protect its citizens through perceived effective policing (Public 
Services Indicator) (Table 18). There are 14 independent variables which had a moderate to 





variable. These can be broadly divided into three themes or categories: crime and insecurity, 
development, and good governance (Table 16). 
 
Table 16: Independent variables with moderate to strong correlations (r > .30) with the 
“proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention” dependent variable, by theme 
Crime and Insecurity Development Good Governance 
Law and Order Index Fragile States Index Public Services Indicator 
Safety and Security Index Human Development Index Rule of Law 
Percent Feeling Safe Public Health Expenditure Corruption Perceptions Index 
Global Peace Index GDP per Capita Government Effectiveness 
Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence 
  
Homicide Rate   
 
Generally, the higher the level of crime and fear of crime (as measured by the Law and 
Order Index, the Safety and Security Index, the “percent feeling safe” measure, and the homicide 
rate), the higher the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. Moreover, the higher the level 
of conflict, disharmony, and political instability in a country, the higher the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. Somewhat relatedly, the more fragile a state (which is, inter alia, 
measured by domestic security threats and crime; within-country divisions along ethnic, 
religious, and class lines; and economic decline and uneven economic development), the higher 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. Other broad indicators of development – HDI, 
public health expenditure, and GDP per capita – similarly correlate with pretrial detention. 
Namely, lower levels of HDI, public health expenditure, and per capita GDP tend to predict 
higher proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention. Three of the four good governance 
indicators complement these findings, with lower measures of rule of law and government 
effectiveness, and higher perceptions of corruption, predicting higher proportions of prisoners in 
pretrial detention. Only the Public Services Indicator appears to contradict this pattern. Namely, 
a higher availability of basic state functions, including the provision of essential services and the 





higher proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention. This appears to contradict the findings of the 
“government effectiveness” indicator which, inter alia, measures perceptions of the quality of 
public services. 
Overall, it appears that the nexus of security, development, and good governance predict 
lower proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention. This stands to reason. Countries with low 
levels of crime, insecurity, and disorder have less need to detain defendants awaiting trial out of 
a concern they will abscond or commit crimes upon their release. Countries with developed 
public services, including effective criminal justice institutions, are, on balance, able to process 
pretrial detainees quickly through the pretrial stage of the criminal justice process and generally 
ensure the conviction and incarceration of serious offenders. The duration of pretrial duration is 
therefore relatively short, while low levels of corruption and fidelity to the rule of law should 
ensure that pretrial detention is used as an exceptional measure of last resort after a range of 
alternatives have been carefully considered. 
Pretrial detention rate 
The independent variables which correlated most strongly with the pretrial detention rate 
dependent variable (r > .40) were either measuring crime (the homicide rate) or inequality (Gini 
index) (Table 18). There are five independent variables which had a moderate to strong 
correlation (r > .30) with the pretrial detention rate. These can be broadly divided into two 
themes or categories: crime and insecurity, and inequality (Table 17). 
 
Table 17: Independent variables with moderate to strong correlations (r > .30) with the pretrial 
detention rate, by theme 
Crime and Insecurity Inequality 
Homicide Rate Gini Index 
Prison Occupancy Rate  
Percent Feeling Safe  






The crime and insecurity category is not surprising. It stands to reason that the higher the 
level of crime and/or public feelings of insecurity, the more the police is likely to arrest 
suspected offenders, some of whom will be remanded to pretrial detention. This also explains the 
high correlation between the prison occupancy rate and the rate of pretrial detention. Both 
measures are influenced by the number of arrests and remands into pretrial detention. 
 
Table 18: Variables with Pearson Correlation (r) of ±.52 to ±.15 (highest to lowest) for p < .05 
r Variable Proportion prisoners 
in PTD 
PTD rate 
> .50 Law and Order Index -.518*** (•)  
> .40 ≤ .50 Public Services Indicator .443***  
Safety and Security Index -.442*** (•)  
Homicide Rate  .416*** 
Gini Index  .401*** 
> .35 ≤ .40 Prison Occupancy Rate  .387*** 
Percent Feeling Safe  -.384*** (•) 
Fragile States Index .372*** (•)  
Human Development Index -.360***  
> .30 ≤ .35 Rule of Law -.349***  
Law and Order Index  -.344*** 
Public Health Expenditure -.342***  
Percent Feeling Safe -.338***  
Global Peace Index .336***  
Corruption Perceptions Index -.333*** (•)  
Political Stability & Absence of Violence -.328***  
GDP per Capita -.314***  
Government Effectiveness -.313***  
Homicide Rate .309***  
> .25 ≤ .30 Control of Corruption -.295*** (•)  
Social Assistance Expenditure -.290*  
Judicial Independence  -.286*** 
Education Expenditure -.265**  
Ethnic Diversity .264***  
Gini Index .261**  
> .20 ≤ .25 Police per Capita  .222* 
Democracy Index  -.204* 
> .15 ≤ .20 GDP per Capita  .178* 
Voice & Accountability Index -.162*  
Correlations between the outcome measures and independent variables: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 







Relationships with combinations of independent variables 
To answer this study’s overall research question, two subsidiary questions were posed. 
The first one, discussed above, focused on the relationship between the individual independent 
variables (taken separately) and each of the dependent variables. The second question asked what 
combination of the independent variables demonstrates the most robust relationship between the 
independent variable(s) and each of the dependent variables. 
Proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention 
A combination of three independent variables best predicted the proportion of prisoners 
in pretrial detention dependent variable. The Law and Order Index is the strongest predictor, 
followed by the prison occupancy rate, and public health expenditure. Collectively these three 
variables account for 23.2% of the variance in the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
The Law and Order Index measures public perceptions of safety and public experiences 
with crime and police in 135 countries (i.e., a substantial number of less-developed countries are 
not included in the survey). It is a composite index created from a combination of questions 
focused on respondents’ opinions on confidence in the police, perceptions of safety, and 
victimization in respect of property and violent crime. The prison occupancy rate is calculated as 
the number of inmates in custody as a percentage of a country’s official prison capacity. The 
definition of overcrowding is not globally consistent and depends on a mix of national-level 
normative, factual, and cultural factors. Public health expenditure reflects current and capital 
spending on health from central and local government budgets, external borrowing, grants, and 
health insurance funds expressed as a proportion of GDP. 
“Development” is a common characteristic of all three variables. On balance, more 





prevent crime and make people feel safer (e.g., adequate street lighting, CCTV, well-kept public 
spaces), also have the funds to build additional prison space when prison crowding levels get too 
high, and to pay for relatively generous public health systems. 
Pretrial detention rate 
A combination of five independent variables best predicted the pretrial detention rate 
dependent variable. Namely, homicide rate, HDI, prison occupancy rate, public health 
expenditure, and police per capita. Collectively these five variables account for 30.8% of the 
variance of the pretrial detention rate. “Development” understood in a broad sense again appears 
to be a common characteristic of the variables, with the exception of homicide rate. Two of the 
variables are the same as with the predictive model for the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention (prison occupancy rate and public health expenditure), suggesting that these play an 
important role predicting both dependent variables. Significantly, HDI is the second most 
predictive variable, suggesting that development measured in the context of life expectancy, 
formal education, and gross national income per capita predicts higher rates of pretrial detention. 
That is, once states have the wherewithal to ensure their citizens can lead long lives (good public 
health services), receive adequate formal education, and have a decent standard of living, they 
also, on balance, are likely to have the resources and capacity to identify, apprehend, and remand 
a relatively large proportion of suspected offenders. Less developed countries typically lack such 
a capacity. 
Moderator analyses 
To further interrogate the overall research question on relationships that may exist 





number of moderator analyses were undertaken. In particular, the following moderating effects 
were explored: 
 whether corruption moderates the relationship between state strength and pretrial 
detention; 
 whether democratization and development moderate the relationship between crime 
and pretrial detention; and 
 whether democratization moderates the relationship between development and 
pretrial detention. 
 The moderation effects when the dependent variable is the “rate of pretrial detention” is 
discussed first, followed by the moderation effects with the “proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention” as the dependent variable. 
Corruption, state strength and pretrial detention (rate) 
The first moderator analysis sought to establish whether corruption moderates the 
relationship between state strength and pretrial detention. Three measures of state strength were 
used: Government effectiveness, Fragile States Index, and Public Services Indicator. 
In countries where there is a high perception of corruption, more government 
effectiveness (i.e., stronger states) predicts higher rates of pretrial detention, compared to 
countries with a low perception of corruption, where more government effectiveness predicts 
lower rates of pretrial detention. That is, high perceptions of corruption only correlate with high 
pretrial detention rates if the government is relative effective. This is an interesting finding as the 
presumption could easily be that corruption drives the excessive use of pretrial detention in 
places where governments are weak and ineffective. The government effectiveness measure 





government effectiveness list have state institutions which are so weak and absent outside of 
major urban centers that corrupt officials are too sparse to significantly influence the pretrial 
detention rate in places where the government effectiveness score is very low. The finding that in 
places with low perceptions of corruption, more government effectiveness correlates with lower 
rates of pretrial detention is also, at first glance, confounding. This finding may be because the 
government effectiveness indicator also measures the quality of state services and their degree of 
independence from political pressures. In places where government effectiveness is high, low 
perceptions of corruption may produce criminal justice institutions which use arrest and pretrial 
detention sparingly and in accordance with international standards and norms. 
In countries where there is either a high or low perception of corruption, less state 
fragility (i.e., stronger states) predicts higher rates of pretrial detention. In countries with low 
perceptions of corruption, the lower the level of state fragility the higher the rate of pretrial 
detention. That is, less state fragility generally predicts a higher rate of pretrial detention, likely 
for the reasons given in the above paragraph on government effectiveness. 
In countries where there is a higher perception of corruption, better public services (i.e., 
stronger states) predict lower rates of pretrial detention, while in countries with a low perception 
of corruption, better public services predict higher rates of pretrial detention. This goes counter 
to the findings with the “government effectiveness” variable discussed above. This may be 
because the Public Services Indicator also measures the state’s ability to protect its citizens from 
violence through perceived effective policing. In such settings high perceptions of corruption 
may not imply a particularly corrupt police agency, so that corruption does not affect arrest and 





The findings are similar when the Corruptions Perceptions Index moderator is swapped 
with the “control of corruption” moderator. This is reassuring as both moderators seek to reflect 
or measure similar phenomena, and suggests that the moderating effect of corruption – as 
derived from public and expert perception surveys – is fairly robust and that this study’s 
aforementioned moderator analyses are broadly valid. 
Democratization and development, insecurity and pretrial detention (rate) 
The second moderator analysis sought to establish whether democratization and 
development moderate the relationship between crime / insecurity and pretrial detention. The 
Democracy Index and the Human Development Index were used to assess democratization and 
development, respectively. There is strong evidence that democratization and development 
moderate the relationship between crime and the pretrial detention rate. 
In countries scoring high on the Democracy Index, high levels of recorded homicide 
predict high rates of pretrial detention, while in countries scoring low on the Democracy Index, 
high levels of recorded homicide predict no relationship with the pretrial detention rate. This is 
an interesting finding and suggests that “more” democracy (i.e., free and fair elections, political 
participation, political pluralism) may be more responsive to high levels of serious crime by 
arresting and detaining a larger number of people. Conversely, countries which are not very 
democratic or in authoritarian states, high levels of serious crime may have no impact on arrest 
and detention practices as the executive has no particular (electoral) incentive to engage with 
public demands for a tough and visible response to insecurity. 
In countries scoring high on the Democracy Index, greater feelings of insecurity predict 
higher rates of pretrial detention, while in countries scoring low on the Democracy Index, lower 





rates. These findings are similar to the above which use recorded homicides as the measure of 
insecurity. That is, in “more” democratic countries either high levels of recorded homicide or 
high levels of feelings of insecurity predict relatively high rates of pretrial detention. This again 
suggests that more democratic countries (as measured by the Democracy Index) tend to have 
governments which are more responsive to high levels of serious crime and/or public insecurity 
in respect of arrest and pretrial detention practices when compared to less democratic or 
authoritarian states. Interestingly, when using feelings of insecurity as the measure of crime / 
insecurity, lower feelings of security predict higher rates of pretrial detention even in less 
democratic states. It would appear, therefore, that less democratic or authoritarian countries are 
more responsive to general feelings of insecurity compared to recorded homicide rates. 
In countries scoring high on the HDI, high levels of recorded homicide predict high rates 
of pretrial detention, while in countries scoring low on the HDI, high recorded homicide rates 
also predict high pretrial detention rates. The relationship between high homicide rates and high 
pretrial detention rates is, however, stronger in respect of countries scoring high on the HDI. 
That is, high levels of homicide predict high pretrial detention rates irrespective of whether a 
country scores high on the HDI, although the relationship is stronger for countries scoring high 
on the HDI. It is possible that countries scoring high on the HDI – which have, on balance, long 
life expectancy, high levels of formal education, and high living standards – have a citizenry 
which is more sensitive and responsive to homicides. In places where most people are assured of 
a long, healthy and prosperous life, having that life cut short through a violent act may be 
subjectively more horrific than in places where non-natural fatalities are generally high for a 
variety of reasons. In countries scoring high on the HDI, high levels of feelings of insecurity 





feelings of insecurity also predict high pretrial detention rates. This pattern is the same as when 
the feelings of insecurity measure is swapped with the recorded homicide rate. 
Democratization, development and pretrial detention (rate) 
The third moderator analysis sought to ascertain whether democratization moderates the 
relationship between development and pretrial detention. For the democracy moderator two 
variables were used: Democracy Index, and Voice and Accountability Index. For development, 
four variables were tested: HDI, GDP per capita, government effectiveness, and Public Services 
Indicator. 
In countries scoring low on the Democracy Index, high levels of development (as 
measured by the HDI) predict high rates of pretrial detention, while countries scoring high on the 
Democracy Index, high levels of development predict low rates of pretrial detention. While 
development as measured by the HDI tends to be positively but modestly correlated with the 
pretrial detention rate (see above), this relationship is affected by the level or degree of 
democracy and tends to apply more in respect of countries which are less democratic. This 
suggests that countries which are doing well economically and are fairly developed as reflected 
by the HDI (high life expectancy, widespread formal education, and high standard of living) but 
which are not overly democratic should, on balance, expect to experience high rates of pretrial 
detention. Similarly, economically successful and developed countries with higher levels of 
democratization should expect lower rates of pretrial detention. This may be because democracy 
entails fidelity to the rule of law, due process, and an emphasis on the presumption of innocence, 
which limits the use of pretrial detention. The same pattern applies when GDP per capita or 
government effectiveness are used as the measure of development instead of the HDI. Namely, 





measured by GDP per capita / government effectiveness) predict high rates of pretrial detention, 
while in countries scoring high on the Democracy Index, high levels of development predict 
relatively low rates of pretrial detention. When using the Public Services Indicator as the 
measure of development, the aforementioned pattern reverses. That is, in countries scoring low 
on the Democracy Index, high levels of development (as measured by the Public Services 
Indicator) predict low rates of pretrial detention, while in countries scoring high on the 
Democracy Index, high levels of development predict high rates of pretrial detention. 
Similar patterns emerge when swapping the Democracy Index with the Voice and 
Accountability Index as the moderator. Thus, in countries scoring low on the Voice and 
Accountability Index, high levels of development (as measured by the HDI) predict high rates of 
pretrial detention, while in countries scoring high on the Voice and Accountability Index, high 
levels of development predict low rates of pretrial detention. The pattern also holds when using 
GDP per capita and government effectiveness as measures of development. The Voice and 
Accountability Index measures key aspects of democracy, such as the extent to which a 
country’s citizens can participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression 
and association, and a free media. It is thus not surprising that the moderation effect of the Voice 
and Accountability Index is similar to that of the Democracy Index. Moreover, as with the 
Democracy Index, the pattern reverses for the Voice and Accountability Index when using the 
Public Services Indicator as the measure for development. 
Corruption, state strength and pretrial detention (proportion) 
Unlike the simple correlation analyses, where the majority of statistically significant 
correlations were in respect of the “proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention” serving as the 





the “rate of pretrial detention” as the dependent variable. This subsection discusses the moderator 
analyses findings in respect of the relatively small number of significant moderations when using 
the “proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention” as the dependent variable. 
This first “proportion” moderator analysis sought to establish whether corruption (as 
measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index and “control of corruption”) moderates the 
relationship between state strength and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. Three 
measures of state strength were used: Government effectiveness, Fragile States Index, and Public 
Services Indicator. 
In countries where there is a high perception of corruption, a stronger state (i.e., less state 
fragility) predicts a higher proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. The same holds, albeit at 
less intensity, in respect of countries where perceptions of corruption are low. That is, in 
countries with high perceptions of corruption there is a more positive association between state 
fragility and the proportion of prisoners who are pretrial detainees compared to states with low 
perceptions of corruption. In weaker states, corruption may result in a relatively large number of 
people being arrested and remanded to pretrial detention as arresting officers, prosecutors, and 
judges seek to extract bribes from arrestees and detainees. In such a scenario many people are 
likely to be arrested and detained arbitrarily or on flimsy grounds as the purpose of the arrest or 
detention is not primarily to ensure a fair trial where the guilty are convicted and punished, but to 
generate bribes. In such jurisdictions trials would be relatively rare, which bolsters the relative 
number of pretrial detainees compared to convicted offenders, increasing the proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. 
In countries where there is little control of corruption (i.e., where corruption is high), 





while in countries with more control of corruption (where corruption is relatively low), more 
government effectiveness does not predict any effect on the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention. This suggests that government effectiveness reduces the proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention where corruption is relatively high. While corrupt systems may generate a lot 
of arrests and detentions to extract bribes from arrestees and defendants, effective government 
institutions may ensure that the average duration of pretrial detention is short or that pretrial 
detainees who are unable to pay a bribe are identified and released relatively expeditiously. By 
contrast, in low-corruption settings, where arrests and pretrial detention is presumably used more 
rationally and sparingly, the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention does not change 
significantly irrespective of whether there is a high degree of government effectiveness or not. 
In countries with little control of corruption, a weaker state (i.e., a high level of state 
fragility) predicts a higher proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention, while countries which 
control corruption, more state fragility has no discernible impact on the proportion of prisoners 
in pretrial detention. This finding is similar to the one where government effectiveness is used as 
a measure of state strength. As discussed above, this may be because corrupt regimes generate a 
disproportionate number of pretrial detainees as opposed to convicted prisoners, a pattern which 
is exacerbated by weak state institutions which, through bureaucratic weaknesses and 
inefficiencies, prolong the average duration of pretrial detention. 
When using the Public Services Indicator as a measure of state strength, the pattern is 
somewhat reversed. Namely, in countries with little control of corruption, a stronger state (i.e., 
better public services) predicts a higher proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention, while in 
countries which control corruption, a stronger state predicts a slightly higher proportion of 





proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention in contexts where corruption is high, maybe because 
good public services imply a relatively large number of police officers who generate many 
corruption-related arrests and, down the criminal justice chain, pretrial detentions. 
Democratization, development and pretrial detention (proportion) 
This moderator analysis sought to ascertain whether democratization moderates the 
relationship between development and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. For the 
democracy moderator two variables were used: Democracy Index, and Voice and Accountability 
Index. For development, four variables were tested: HDI, GDP per capita, government 
effectiveness, and Public Services Indicator. When using the proportion of prisoners in pretrial 
detention as the dependent variable, only one development variable (government effectiveness) 
was significantly moderated by one of the moderators (Voice and Accountability Index). 
In countries scoring high on the Voice and Accountability Index, more government 
effectiveness predicts a modestly lower proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention, while in 
countries scoring low on the Voice and Accountability Index, more government effectiveness 
predicts a lower proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. It may be that in countries where 
citizen participation is high in respect of selecting a government (through, inter alia, a free media 
and widespread freedom of expression), governments are more responsive to investing in 
functioning and effective criminal justice systems which, on balance, increase the number of 
successful investigations and prosecutions, thereby increasing the number of convicted prisoners 









There is a significant positive relationship between crime and public perceptions of 
crime, and both the pretrial detention rate and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Policy makers who respond to rising levels of crime by investing more resources in the criminal 
justice system, would be well advised to focus on effective alternatives to pretrial detention and 
prison-related investments in infrastructure and personnel catering to pretrial detainees to 
accommodate a likely higher proportion of prisoners who are in pretrial detention.  
Pretrial detainees are often confined in harsher conditions than sentenced prisoners 
(Rodley, 2000; Nowak, 2007). Prison administrators regard their main mandate as the custody 
and rehabilitation of convicted prisoners and see pretrial detainees as a group whose 
imprisonment is temporary and somewhat incidental to their work. As a result, pretrial detainees 
are typically not provided with educational, vocational, and related work opportunities. In some 
jurisdictions there is a reluctance to provide treatment for communicable diseases that requires a 
sustained period of therapy for people in pretrial detention, whose custody is seen as temporary, 
even if “temporary” turns out to be of long duration. Given these tendencies, which are 
particularly lamentable given that pretrial detainees are considered innocent and have not been 
convicted of a crime (and, indeed, many of whom will end up not being prosecuted or acquitted), 
it is important that any anticipated increases in both the absolute number and proportion of 
prisoners in pretrial detention be accommodated through sufficient capital and human resource 
investments by the state. 
A number of indicators of modernization and development correlate positively with the 
pretrial detention rate. As countries modernize and grow economically, they develop the capacity 





accentuated in places where economic development abets growing inequality, with inequality 
being positively correlated with both the rate and proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
These patterns hold important lessons for domestic policy makers and international rule of law 
and development assistance providers. 
Domestically, policy makers should pursue policies which reduce inequality. This is both 
a noble aim in its own right, but should also assist with reducing the number of pretrial detainees 
and the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. For example, strengthening the social safety 
net to assist the unemployed and poor in times of need should reduce certain forms of crime 
which fuels arrest and pretrial detention rates. Increased social welfare spending has been shown 
to correlate negatively with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. That is, countries 
spending a larger proportion of their budgets on social welfare tend to have lower proportions of 
prisoners in pretrial detention. 
There is a danger that modernizing and economically developing states, especially in 
places where crime is high or increasing, disproportionately focus their criminal justice 
investments on policing. Compared to judicial officers and prosecutors (who have to undergo 
lengthy graduate studies in law), new police can be recruited relatively quickly. Police are also 
the most visible component of the criminal justice system and thus allow governments to 
demonstrate their commitment to upholding order and combating crime. However, a 
disproportionate focus on police risks creating a bottleneck in the pretrial justice process. More 
police will generate arrests which the system is unable to process expeditiously if sufficient 
investments are not also made in court rooms, prosecutors’ offices, and judges who can deal with 
pretrial hearings. Given these patterns, policy makers in modernizing states should ensure that 





Development more generally appears to be an issue not easily divorced from pretrial 
detention practices. There is a substantial body of empirical evidence that the excessive use of 
pretrial detention undermines socio-economic development and aggravates individual and 
household poverty (OSJI, 2011b; Muntingh & Redpath, 2018). Moreover, in fragile communities 
the impact of pretrial detention – lost earnings, broken homes, and the incarceration of adult 
breadwinners and caregivers – aggravates some of the underlying causes of crime. The 
development – pretrial detention nexus has received international political recognition with the 
adoption, in 2015, of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by the United Nations 
General Assembly, which seeks to reduce the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. It 
would be prudent of policy makers to include pretrial detention-related issues in their national 
development agendas. In practical terms, states need to devote sufficient resources to feed and 
clothe pretrial detainees under their control and provide detainees with adequate medical care. 
Moreover, particular care should be taken to avoid detaining household breadwinners and 
caregivers. International development funders and technical assistance providers (e.g., World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, US Agency for International Development, the UK’s 
Department for International Development) should not neglect supporting criminal justice 
institutions, especially those that deal with the pretrial justice stage of the criminal justice 
process. 
Corruption is positively correlated with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Pretrial detention and corruption are often mutually reinforcing phenomena. A criminal justice 
system that overuses pretrial detention is susceptible to corruption, and an environment marked 
by corruption will likely lead to the excessive use of pretrial detention. Corruption is 





receives less scrutiny and is subject to more discretion than subsequent stages of the justice 
process, and often involves lower-paid and mostly junior actors in the system (OSJI, 2010). To 
minimize corruption, the amount of discretion afforded to police and prosecutors in particular 
should be limited. Both police and prosecutors’ offices should have clear guidelines and/or 
internal instructions setting out, inter alia, under which conditions defendants are to be given 
police bail, or when prosecutors should seek pretrial detention. Internal and external 
accountability mechanisms (e.g., internal affairs units, police oversight bodies, prosecution 
service inspectorates) should be adequately funded and allocate sufficient personnel and 
resources to investigate corruption-related conduct during the pretrial phase of the criminal 
justice process. Moreover, police, prosecutors, and judicial officers working on pretrial issues 
(bail applications, remand and first-appearance hearings, etc.) should include more senior and 
experienced personnel to avoid pretrial justice-related activities falling disproportionately within 
the purview of junior and lower-paid officials. 
Overall, the nexus of security, development, and good governance predict lower 
proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention. Or, conversely, countries lacking in these areas 
should, on balance, expect relatively high proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention. Weak 
states are particularly susceptible to experiencing higher proportions of prisoners in pretrial 
detention when official corruption is high. In such places, policy makers should, as discussed 
above, focus on combating corruption within the criminal justice system and seek to improve 
their general governance processes. 
Policy makers, as well as international rule of law and development assistance providers, 
should be cognizant of the possible moderating effect of democratization processes on pretrial 





democratization combined with higher levels of homicide or feelings of insecurity predict higher 
rates of pretrial detention, is particularly salient as the process of democratization – the 
transitionary period from authoritarianism to democracy – tends to produce higher levels of 
social disorder, including violent crime (Shaw, 2002; LaFree & Tseloni, 2006). This suggests 
that security sector reform initiatives in transitional societies include elements which seek to 
limit the use of pretrial detention (e.g., through the creation, in law and practice, of alternatives 
to pretrial detention) and create sufficient investments in prisons and remand centers to 
accommodate growing numbers of pretrial detainees. In less democratic states, modernization, 
economic growth, and development predict high rates of pretrial detention. The growth of 
populist authoritarianism in the West, and the popularity of the Chinese “development model” 
which sacrifices democratic practices in the interest of social stability and economic growth 
(Halper, 2010; Li, 2015), may succeed in pushing back and supplanting Western-style liberal 
democracy in various parts of the world. This may boost pretrial detention numbers in 
authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian states which grow their economies, promote domestic 
development, and build stronger state infrastructures. 
Future research 
An important area of future research is to explicitly explore causal relationships between 
this study’s independent and dependent variables. The present study identified numerous 
correlational relationships, but a dearth of time-series data did not permit statistical analyses 
whether any of the independent variables cause or influence one or both of the dependent 
pretrial-detention related variables. Such an analysis would be of considerable utility to policy 
makers. If, for example, it were possible to predict that an increase in a country’s Human 





prisoners in pretrial detention, and an increase in the pretrial detention rate, this would helpfully 
contribute to our understanding of factors which influence (and not only correlate with) pretrial 
detention numbers. 
For example, as a lower-middle income economy, Nigeria may have predictable pretrial 
detention patterns using an economic and human development framework. Nigeria, the most 
populous country in Africa with 180 million inhabitants, had 45,000 pretrial detainees in 2016 or 
25 per 100,000 of the general population. This is a low pretrial detention rate and some 32% 
below the global average. However, 72% of all prisoners in Nigeria were pretrial detainees in 
2016, more than twice the global average. Given Nigeria’s volatile political situation, a relatively 
corrupt police force, and a criminal justice bureaucracy which has traditionally been weak in 
implementing laws and policies designed to reduce the number of pretrial detainees, it is difficult 
to predict how the country’s pretrial detention numbers will change on the basis of “micro” 
interventions alone (e.g., changes in police arrest policies, expanding the provision of legal 
assistance for defendants, or law reforms to increase the statutorily available alternatives to 
pretrial detention). If, however, we knew the general impact that development, economic growth, 
and Nigeria’s transition to an upper-middle income economy may have on the country’s pretrial 
detention numbers, policy makers would have access to a more accurate and long-term predictive 
tool to forecast likely pretrial detention trends in Nigeria. This would be helpful to Nigerian 
policy makers and governmental planners. Namely, to anticipate in an informed manner that with 
a growing economy, the country’s pretrial detention rate (and the absolute number of pretrial 
detainees) will likely grow, but that the number of pretrial detainees as a proportion of the 
overall prison population will likely decline. In practical terms, there would be a need to mitigate 





legislative and institutional provisions for alternatives to pretrial detention, improving the state’s 
ability to identify defendants who can be released awaiting trial without undue risk to public 
safety or the administration of justice and, potentially, plan and budget for more prison 
infrastructure and staff. At the same time, governmental planners can expect a decline in the 
proportion of prison spaces needed for pretrial detainees. 
It would be informative to build on the findings of this study, and explore to what extent 
particular aspects of security, development, and good governance affect pretrial detention 
numbers. All these themes correlated with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention and, to 
a lesser extent, the pretrial detention rate. One way of doing so would be to identify clearer or 
more explicit independent variables. Instead of using complex indices to represent, or serve as a 
proxy for a construct such as modernization, a future study could use more discrete measures 
which are easier to interpret and consequently of greater practical utility to policy makers. For 
example, instead of using the Public Services Indicator (an index which aggregates the presence 
of basic state functions that serve the public) as a general measure of governance, a future study 
could focus on a particular aspect of public service provision. This may entail exploring the 
relationship between prosecutor numbers or the proportion of the national budget allocated to the 
prosecution service, and the two pretrial detention-related dependent variables. Such an explicit 
focus on prosecutors is more likely to answer whether, and what, impact more prosecutors or 
greater state investment in prosecution services has on either or both of the dependent variables. 
This, in turn, would allow policy makers to make more informed decisions about spending on 
prosecution services if their aim is to, inter alia, change either of the two dependent variables. 
Another potentially useful approach future studies could adopt is to shift the focus from 





easier to control and influence by policy makers. For example, at the macro level high levels of 
crime and public insecurity, dysfunctional state institutions, public corruption, and societal 
inequality all correlate with the pretrial detention outcome measures in some way. Such macro-
level factors undoubtedly affect pretrial detention policy and practice in myriad ways. However, 
many of these macro-level factors are hard to control or change even by the most reform-minded 
governments. For example, levels of crime and public insecurity are strongly influenced by 
changing age demographics in a society. Young people, especially young males in their mid-to-
late teens, are typically at significantly greater risk of committing violent street-level crimes than 
their older counterparts (Newburn, 1997). Thus, countries with youthful populations tend to 
experience relatively high levels of violence, including violent crime. Initiatives can be 
undertaken to mitigate this tendency, but, everything else remaining equal, age demographics 
will influence violent crime rates. Moreover, while young people tend to be disproportionately 
responsible for many forms of violent crime, older people are generally more fearful of crime 
(Ferraro & LaGrange, 1987). Thus, age demographics also play a role in the average level of fear 
of crime present in a society. 
In addition to being difficult to control, the relationship between macro-level factors and 
actual pretrial detention policy and practice is not always very clear. There are too many 
intervening variables, such as a country’s political system and the responsiveness of policy 
makers to public concerns, the extent to which the public uses informal or traditional justice 
mechanisms rather than formal state-centric ones, and the role the media plays in instilling and 
aggravating public fear of crime, which can affect the strength of the relationship between 





broad a lens through which to identify practical recommendations for improving pretrial 
detention policy and practice. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, when considering ways to alter the use of pretrial 
detention, are micro-level factors which are either very specific or unique to a particular 
jurisdiction. For example, in the U.S. bail bond agents often act as a surety and pledge money or 
property as bail for the appearance of defendants in court. Bond agents generally charge a fee or 
a certain percentage of the total amount of the bail. If a defendant fails to appear in court, the 
bond agent is allowed by law or contractual arrangement to bring the defendant into police 
custody to recover the money paid out under the bond, often through the use of a bounty hunter. 
Virtually no country in the world has a formal private bail bonding industry and the practice of 
bounty hunting is illegal in most jurisdictions (Devine, 1991). Exploring the impact of the bail 
bonding industry on pretrial detention numbers consequently serves no cross-national 
comparative purpose. 
Future research should consequently focus on intermediate-level factors which are not so 
general or complex as to be overly daunting to reformers, but also not so detailed and particular 
as to be relevant to a few jurisdictions only. Rather, such intermediate-level factors should allow 
for the development (and eventual testing) of interventions which address identifiable problems 
with pretrial detention practices as they occur in many jurisdictions worldwide. These may 
include, explicit laws and policies which seek to reduce the excessive use or duration of pretrial 
detention (e.g., laws which provide for a range of alternatives to pretrial detention, or set an 
upper time limit on the maximum legally permitted duration of pretrial detention); coordination 
mechanisms to improve the efficiency of pretrial justice processes and reduce bottlenecks 





the criminal justice process; or, decriminalizing certain petty and victimless crimes to prevent 
persons transgressing such laws from being arrested and potentially remanded into pretrial 







CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
Between a quarter and a third of all prisoners around the world are pretrial detainees, 
probably more if detainees confined in police lockups are included in the final tally. Many 
detainees spend months and even years in pretrial detention before their trials are finalized or 
charges dismissed. The widespread use of pretrial detention subverts the universally accepted 
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and can be a humanitarian calamity for 
detainees and their families. 
To better understand global pretrial detention patterns, this study set out to identify 
economic, political, and social factors associated with two key measures of pretrial detention. 
Namely, the number of pretrial detainees as a rate of the general population, and as a proportion 
of the overall prison population. This study further sought to explore what combination of factors 
are most strongly associated with the aforementioned outcome measures. 
There is a substantial body of literature dealing with global imprisonment patterns 
generally. However, no large scale cross-national studies exist which focus explicitly on pretrial 
detention. Comparative pretrial detention studies either explore a particular country (e.g., a 
comparison of the federal states of the U.S.), or a relatively small number of primarily affluent 
and developed countries. This is a significant gap in the research literature given the substantial 
contribution pretrial detention makes to overall imprisonment levels and its multifaceted 
humanitarian consequences. This study addresses this gap by focusing exclusively on pretrial 
detention using a cross-national sample of almost 200 countries, including the majority of the 
world’s developing states. 
The study found that a number of economic, political, and social factors which correlate 





This suggests that general incarceration dynamics often affect and interact with pretrial detention 
differently. Consequently, studies – such as this one – which explicitly explore cross-national 
pretrial detention correlates make an important contribution to the broader field of imprisonment 
and punishment studies, while deepening our understanding of the “macro” environment – 
economic, political, and social developments – and national-level pretrial detention practices. 
This can serve as a useful stepping-stone for those who wish to develop and refine the theoretical 
literature dealing with the drivers and correlates of pretrial detention. 
In particular, this study found that issues centered on crime and insecurity, development, 
and good governance relate fairly strongly with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention 
dependent variable. The good governance – development nexus is a particularly interesting 
finding, suggesting that these two interconnected concepts relate with national-level pretrial 
detention practices, especially the relationship between the number of pretrial detainees and 
sentenced prisoners. This potentially holds important policy considerations for developing 
countries where development intersects with modernization and democratic transitions – both 
factors which relate with pretrial detention practices, albeit differently in respect of the study’s 
two pretrial detention measures. 
The relationship between pretrial detention and development appears to be mutually 
reinforcing. Pretrial detention undermines development by disrupting employment and 
education. Detainees’ families suffer from lost income and a variety of expenses to support their 
detained relatives. In fragile communities the impact of pretrial detention such as lost earnings, 
broken homes, and the incarceration of adult caregivers, aggravate some of the underlying causes 





governance and insecurity and crime, predict high levels of pretrial detention, especially in 
respect of the number of pretrial detainees as a proportion of the overall prison population. 
While the inclusion of pretrial detention as an indicator of the rule of law and access to 
justice in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is laudable, two challenges remain. 
First, the risk that pretrial detention as a developmental issue is obscured by the numerous 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their 169 associated targets and 230 indicators. 
Second, the SDG-related indicator on pretrial detention (measuring the proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention) on its own is of limited veracity. The indicator is, for example, influenced by 
changes in the number of sentenced prisoners. If the number of sentenced prisoners increases and 
the number of pretrial detainees remains the same, the indicator will show a decline in the 
proportion of pretrial detainees even though the criminal justice system as a whole may have 
become more punitive, and regardless of the fairness of the procedure leading to conviction. The 
“proportion” indicator also reveals little about the average duration of pretrial detention or 
whether pretrial detention is used excessively. In short, the SDG-related pretrial detention 
indicator is limited in its ability to provide an objective sense of improvement in national pretrial 
detention practices in the context of development and the rule of law. This study demonstrates 
that pretrial detention is an important development issue which deserves ongoing attention by 
states and international organizations tasked with implementing the 2030 Sustainable 
Development Agenda, and that the “proportion” indicator on its own provides an incomplete 
picture of the relationship between development issues and pretrial detention. 
Interventions to reduce the use and extent of pretrial detention have been successfully 
tested and institutionalized worldwide. Even in settings where governance is poor and insecurity 





pretrial detention. The challenge is to sustain such interventions in settings where governance 
and state institutions are weak and dysfunctional. National reformers and, where appropriate, 
their international partners, need to build legitimate institutions that can provide an acceptable 
level of citizen security, justice, and economic wellbeing. Transforming institutions is a 
challenging endeavor, especially where these are beset by corruption and in the context of fragile 
states and in post-conflict settings. 
The rule of law, government effectiveness, low corruption, and strong protection of 
human rights correlate with a lower risk of conflict and criminal violence and, hence, more stable 
and effective institutions (World Development Report, 2011). In its 2011 World Development 
Report, the World Bank suggests that an important starting point to fix broken institutions is to 
restore public confidence in government processes more generally, and individual state 
institutions in particular. Nevertheless, the process of reform itself may entail security hazards. 
Research (Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2008) suggests that a shift from authoritarian rule 
toward democracy is associated with a greater likelihood of instability and criminal violence, as 
witnessed in places such as Mexico, the Russian Federation, and South Africa over the last 
decades. Taking on too many reforms too quickly can risk backlash and undermine institutional 
credibility. As the 2011 World Development Report points out: 
Rapid reforms make it difficult for actors in the post-conflict society to make 
credible commitments with each other, since they do not know how the reforms 
will affect the “balance of power.” Elections, often seen as “winner takes all” 
events in fragile states, can evoke powerful reactions from those who lose. And 
if disadvantaged groups or regions are empowered by reform, existing power-





balance of economic access and opportunity. Anti-corruption efforts attack 
entrenched interests, sometimes very powerful ones. (p. 101) 
Reforming state institutions in the development context is thus typically not a short, 
linear process. Countries often go through multiple transitions over a period of decades before 
achieving an acceptable level of institutional resilience. In the criminal justice sphere, 
coordination across justice agencies is critical. Collaboration between police, prosecutions, court 
administrators, the judiciary, and prisons is important if inefficiencies and bottlenecks in the 
pretrial phase of the justice process are to be identified and addressed. 
The engagement of international donors and agencies in security and justice service 
provision is relatively new. It was only in the late 1990s that a number of significant bilateral 
donors began integrating security into development programming (Ball, 1998; Harborne, 
Dorotinsky, & Bisca, 2017). Nevertheless, external financing of the security sector by 
development actors remains modest. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD, 2015), aid to the security sector comprises a small amount of all 
sector-allocated aid (some 1.4% for security and 3.1% for related justice). While international 
development actors are beginning to appreciate the importance of criminal justice reform in the 
development context, more research is needed to better understand the interdependent 
relationships between development and pretrial detention dynamics to provide guidance to the 
development sector and criminal justice policy makers seeking to ameliorate the harmful effect 
the one has on the other. 
A dearth of historical data prevented the investigation of causal relationships between the 
study’s independent and dependent variables. This is a noteworthy gap in our knowledge base on  





detention data become available. Moreover, the inclusion of pretrial detainees kept at police 
stations in future pretrial detention studies would improve the veracity of cross-national patterns 
and correlates of pretrial detention, especially in countries where a significant number of 








Appendix 1: Operationalization of hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis Construct Variable Source 
H1a: Unemployment levels are positively correlated with pretrial 
detention rates. 
H1b: Unemployment levels do not correlate significantly with the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Unemployment - Persons unemployed as 





H2a: Economic inequality is positively correlated with pretrial 
detention rates. 
H2b: Economic inequality does not correlate significantly with 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Inequality - Gini index World Bank 
H3a: State welfare expenditure is negatively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
H3b State welfare expenditure does not correlate significantly 
with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Social welfare - Social assistance 
expenditure 
- Education expenditure 





H4a: A country’s level of modernization is positively correlated 
with pretrial detention rates. 
H4b: A country’s level of modernization is negatively correlated 
with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Modernization - Human Development Index 
- Urbanization rate 
UNDP 
World Bank 
H5a: Established political rights and civil liberties are negatively 
correlated with pretrial detention rates. 
H5b: Established political rights and civil liberties are negatively 
correlated with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Regime type - Democracy Index 
- Political Stability & 
Absence of Violence index 
EIU 
World Bank 
H6a: Countries’ levels of development are positively correlated 
with pretrial detention rates. 
H6b: Countries’ levels of development are negatively correlated 
with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Development - Government Effectiveness 
Index 
- Per capita GDP 
- Prison occupancy rate 
- Fragile States Index 
- Public Services Indicator 





Fund for Peace 
Fund for Peace 
Country sources 
H7a: Levels of official corruption are negatively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
H7b: Levels of official corruption are positively correlated with 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Corruption - Corruption Perceptions 
Index 




H8a: Levels of state political legitimacy are negatively correlated 
with pretrial detention rates. 
Political legitimacy - Rule of Law Index 










H8b: Levels of state political legitimacy do not correlate 
significantly with the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
H9a: Levels of political trust are negatively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
H9b: Levels of political trust are negatively correlated with the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Political trust - Proportion respondents 
expressing confidence in 
national government 
Gallup 
H10a: Levels of recorded crime are positively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
H10b: Levels of recorded crime are positively correlated with the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Crime - Homicide rate UNODC 
H11a: Perceptions of crime / safety are positively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
H11b: Perceptions of crime / safety are positively correlated with 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Perceptions of 
crime / safety 
- Global Peace Index 
- Law & Order Index 
- Safety & Security Index 





H12a: Levels of ethnic diversity are positively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
H12b: Levels of ethnic diversity are positively associated with the 
proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Ethnic 
heterogeneity 
- Ethnic fractionalization 
measure 
Alesina et al. 
(2003) 
H13a: The proportion of foreign nationals in national populations 
are positively correlated with pretrial detention rates. 
H13b: The proportion of foreign nationals in national populations 
are positively correlated with the proportion of prisoners in 
pretrial detention. 
Foreign nationals - Percent population 
immigrants 
UNDP 
H14a: Levels of public punitiveness are positively correlated with 
pretrial detention rates. 
H14b: Levels of public punitiveness are positively correlated with 
the proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Public punitiveness - Voice & Accountability 
Index 




H15a: Compared to civil law countries, common law countries 
have lower pretrial detention rates. 
H15b: Compared to civil law countries, common law countries 
have lower proportions of prisoners in pretrial detention. 
Legal system - Civil, Common, & Mixed 
systems 
JuriGlobe 
EIU: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
ICPR: Institute for Criminal Policy Research. 





Appendix 2: Data sources for dependent and independent variables 
 
Variable Source 
PTD rate, Proportion 
prisoners in PTD 
World Prison Brief:  
http://prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/world_prison_populati
on_list_11th_edition_0.pdf. 














Social welfare World Bank: http://datatopics.worldbank.org/aspire/indicator/social-expenditure. 
 








United Nations Development Programme: http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI. 
Urbanization World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS. 
Original source: United Nations Population Division: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/CD-
ROM/. 
Democracy Index Economist Intelligence Unit: 
https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2016. 
Political Stability & 
Absence of Violence 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) / World Bank: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc. 






Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) / World Bank: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc. 
Prison occupancy rate  World Prison Brief (WPB), Institute for Criminal Policy Research: 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/occupancy-
level?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All.  




Fund for Peace (FFP): http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/indicators/p2/. 
Data: http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/excel/. 










Control of corruption Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), World Bank: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. 
Rule of law Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), World Bank: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc. 
Judicial independence Harvard Dataverse: 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/L716E8. 
Trust in national 
government 
UNDP 2016 Human Development Report: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf. 
Homicide rate UNODC: https://data.unodc.org/#state:0.  
Level of peace / 
insecurity 
Global Peace Index, Institute for Economics & Peace: 
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/06/GPI17-Report.pdf. 
Law and Order Index Gallup 2017: Global Law and Order report, Law & Order Index Score: 
http://www.gallup.com/reports/214607/gallup-global-law-order-report-
2017.aspx?ays=n. 
Safety and Security 
Index 
Safety and Security Index, Legatum Prosperity Index: 
http://www.prosperity.com/rankings. 




Macro Data Guide: http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1. 
Stock of immigrant 
population 
UNDP 2016 Human Development Report: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf. 









Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), World Bank: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc. 










Appendix 3: Histograms and distribution curves 
 




Figure 2: Histograms and distribution curves for economic independent variables. 
 


























Figure 3: Histograms and distribution curves for political independent variables. 
 
 
   
 











Figure 4: Histograms and distribution curves for social independent variables. 
 









   
 



























Figure 5: Histograms and distribution curves for pre- and post-log transformed independent variables. 
 
 
                 
 
















Appendix 4: Tables of moderator analyses results 
 
Analysis 3a 
PTD regressed on government effectiveness with moderators 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
b    SE β b      SE β 
Moderator = Corruption Perceptions Index        
Constant  59.092*** 4.541  .326*** .019  
Government Effectiveness -3.988 9.113 -.090 -.120 .038 -.596 
Corruption Perceptions Index 9.572 9.669 .213 .033 .041 .162 
Interaction -10.276** 3.316 -.271 .022 .014 .127 
Moderator = Control of Corruption       
(Constant) 61.522*** 4.523  .296*** .018  
Government Effectiveness 1.679 8.169 .035 -.040 .032 -.196 
Control of Corruption 6.082 8.406 .125 -.042 .034 -.207 
Interaction -10.372** 3.319 -.241 .044*** .013 .242 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
PTD regressed on Fragile States Index with moderators 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
b    SE β b      SE β 
Moderator = Corruption Perceptions Index        
(Constant) 57.397*** 4.595  .329*** .020  
Fragile States Index -11.781 7.665 -.272 .080 .034 .396 
Corruption Perceptions Index -4.933 8.321 -.112 -.012 .037 -.057 
Interaction 9.674** 3.320 .265 -.029* .015 -.171 
Moderator = Control of Corruption       
(Constant) 58.350*** 4.628  .314*** .020  
Fragile States Index -11.658 7.328 -.259 .059 .031 .290 
Control of Corruption -4.725 7.642 -.106 -.034 .033 -.168 
Interaction 10.033** 3.209 .265 -.037 .014 -.213 







PTD regressed on Public Services Indicator with moderators 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
b    SE β b      SE β 
Moderator = Corruption Perceptions Index        
(Constant) 58.426*** 4.727  .329*** .020  
Public Services Indicator -2.234 6.002 -.051 .092*** .025 .459 
Corruption Perceptions Index 3.601 6.740 .082 -.006 .029 -.028 
Interaction 11.511** 3.918 .272 -.031 .016 -.157 
Moderator = Control of Corruption       
(Constant) 59.000*** 4.830  .313*** .020  
Public Services Indicator -2.826 6.028 -.063 .076** .025 .375 
Control of Corruption 2.455 6.476 .055 -.023 .026 -.116 
Interaction 10.819** 3.835 .249 -.043** .016 -.217 






PTD regressed on homicide rate with moderators 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
b    SE β b      SE β 
Moderator = Democracy Index       
(Constant) 52.041*** 2.963  .349*** .016  
Homicide Rate (ln) 13.971*** 3.282 .336 .071*** .018 .344 
Democracy Index 11.864*** 3.048 .288 -.025 .016 -.122 
Interaction 14.300*** 3.583 .317 -.023 .019 -.103 
Moderator = HDI       
(Constant) 56.392*** 3.099  .339*** .016  
Homicide Rate (ln) 24.304*** 3.233 .531 .037** .017 .182 
HDI 21.022*** 3.102 .456 -.058*** .016 -.289 
Interaction 14.289*** 3.456 .268 .001 .018 .002 






PTD regressed on fear of crime with moderators 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
b    SE β b      SE β 
Moderator = Democracy Index       
(Constant) 49.268*** 3.258  .338*** .016  
Percent Feeling Safe -16.918*** 3.275 -.403 -.065*** .016 -.329 
Democracy Index 9.633** 3.549 .222 -.021 .018 -.102 
Interaction -10.256** 3.245 -.255 .022 .016 .115 
Moderator = HDI       
(Constant) 50.638*** 3.563  .338*** .017  
Percent Feeling Safe -20.895*** 3.725 -.484 -.040* .018 -.201 
HDI 14.512*** 3.829 .324 -.061*** .019 -.294 
Interaction -8.399* 3.740 -.174 .017 .018 .076 





PTD regressed on HDI with moderators 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
b    SE β b      SE β 
Moderator = Democracy Index       
(Constant) 54.071*** 3.779  .345*** .018  
HDI 2.450 4.028 .061 -.094*** .019 -.478 
Democracy Index 4.313 4.206 .105 .021 .020 .102 
Interaction -11.276*** 3.377 -.269 .007 .015 .036 
Moderator = Voice and Accountability       
(Constant) 55.33*** 3.87  .336*** .017  
HDI 4.56 4.08 0.10 -.079*** .018 -.385 
Voice & Accountability 3.79 4.07 0.08 .011 .018 .055 
Interaction -9.85** 3.66 -0.20 .013 .016 .062 






PTD regressed on GDP per capita with moderators 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
b    SE β b      SE β 
Moderator = Democracy Index       
(Constant) 55.170*** 3.867  .341*** .019  
GDP per capita (ln) 4.318 4.131 .109 -.080*** .020 -.416 
Democracy Index 4.736 4.474 .112 .019 .021 .093 
Interaction -12.123*** 3.327 -.299 .007 .015 .035 
Moderator = Voice and Accountability       
(Constant) 54.67*** 3.91  .323*** .017  
GDP per capita (ln) 8.37 4.12 0.18 -.064*** .018 -.319 
Voice & Accountability 2.18 4.44 0.04 -.003 .019 -.012 
Interaction -9.29** 3.92 -0.18 .020 .017 .090 




PTD regressed on government effectiveness with moderators 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
b    SE β b      SE β 
Moderator = Democracy Index       
(Constant) 54.066*** 3.972  .327*** .018  
Government Effectiveness -5.095 4.881 -.126 -.132*** .022 -.654 
Democracy Index 8.673 4.875 .211 .057* .022 .279 
Interaction -9.664** 3.186 -.243 .023 .014 .115 
Moderator = Voice and Accountability       
(Constant) 54.19*** 3.85  .311*** .017  
Government Effectiveness 0.17 4.37 0.00 -.077*** .019 -.379 
Voice & Accountability 3.66 4.35 0.08 .013 .019 .062 
Interaction -7.01* 3.25 -0.16 .034* .014 .169 






PTD regressed on Public Services Indicator with moderators 
 PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
 
b    SE β b      SE β 
Moderator = Democracy Index       
(Constant) 54.134*** 3.675  .341*** .017  
Public Services Indicator 1.732 3.894 .043 .104*** .018 .520 
Democracy Index 7.427 4.038 .180 .019 .018 .093 
Interaction 11.324*** 3.223 .282 -.019 .014 -.099 
Moderator = Voice and Accountability       
(Constant) 56.28*** 3.99  .344*** .017  
Public Services Indicator 0.31 4.13 0.01 .102*** .017 .506 
Voice & Accountability 6.76 4.23 0.15 .023 .017 .115 
Interaction 10.00** 3.61 0.22 -.015 .015 -.071 








Appendix 5: Figures of moderator analyses results 
 
Analysis 3a moderator results 
 
PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
Moderator = Corruption Perceptions Index  
 
  






















Moderator = Control of Corruption  






















Note. Asterisks below each graph indicate the level of significance of the interaction between predictor and moderator.  




















Analysis 3b moderator results 
 
PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
Moderator = Democracy Index 
 
  


















Moderator = HDI  











Note. Asterisks below each graph indicate the level of significance of the interaction between predictor and moderator.  












Analysis 3c Moderator results 
 
PTD rate Proportion prisoners in PTD 
































































Note. Asterisks below each graph indicate the level of significance of the interaction between predictor and moderator.  









Appendix 6: Summary of moderator analyses results 
 
Q1: Does corruption moderate the relationship between state strength and pretrial detention? 
M: Corruption Perceptions Index; Control of Corruption. 
IVs: Government effectiveness; Fragile States Index; Public Services Indicator. 
 
Proportion prisoners in pretrial detention 
Moderator IV Interpretation 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index 
Fragile States Index High perception of corruption, more fragile states -> somewhat more PTD. 
Low perception of corruption, more fragile states -> (slightly) more PTD. 
Control of Corruption Government 
effectiveness 
Countries that highly control corruption, government effectiveness -> no effect on PTD. 
Countries that do not control corruption, government effectiveness -> less PTD. 
Fragile States Index Countries that highly control corruption, state fragility -> no effect on PTD. 
Countries that do not control corruption, the more fragile the state -> more PTD. 
Public Services 
Indicator 
Countries that highly control corruption, more basic public services -> (slightly) more PTD. 
Countries that do not control corruption, more basic public services -> more PTD. 
 
Pretrial detention rate per 100,000 general population 





High perception of corruption, more government effectiveness -> more PTD. 
Low perception of corruption, more government effectiveness -> less PTD. 
Fragile States Index High perception of corruption, the more fragile the state -> (significantly) less PTD (or less 
fragile states -> more PTD). 
Low perception of corruption, the more fragile the state -> (slightly) less PTD. 
Public Services 
Indicator 
High perception of corruption, more basic public services -> (significantly) less PTD. 
Low perception of corruption, more basic public services -> (significantly) more PTD. 
Control of Corruption Government 
effectiveness 
Countries that highly control corruption, more government effectiveness -> less PTD. 
Countries that do not control corruption, more government effectiveness -> more PTD. 
Fragile States Index Countries that highly control corruption, state fragility -> very slight less PTD. 
Countries that do not control corruption, the more fragile the state -> (significantly) less PTD. 
Public Services 
Indicator 
Countries that highly control corruption, more basic public services -> more PTD. 










Q2: Does democratization and development level moderate the relationship between crime and pretrial detention? 
M: Democracy Index; HDI; Urbanization. 
IVs: Homicide rate; Fear of crime. 
 
Proportion prisoners in pretrial detention: Nothing with Sig. <0.05. 
 
Pretrial detention rate per 100,000 general population 
Moderator IV Interpretation 
Democracy Index Homicide rate (LN) Countries scoring well on Democracy Index, more homicide -> (significant) more PTD. 
Countries scoring badly on Democracy Index, more homicide -> no effect on PTD. 
Feeling safe Countries more democratic, greater feeling of safety -> (significant) less PTD. 
Countries less democratic, greater feeling of safety -> (slightly) less PTD. 
HDI Homicide rate (LN) For countries with high HDI, more homicide -> (significantly) more PTD. 
For countries with low HDI, more homicide -> (modestly) more PTD. 
Feeling safe For countries with high HDI, greater feeling of safety -> (significantly) less PTD. 


























Q3: Does democratization moderate the relationship between development and pretrial detention? 
M: Democracy Index; Voice and Accountability Index. 
IVs: HDI; GDP per capita; Government effectiveness; Public Services Indicator. 
 
Proportion prisoners in pretrial detention 





Countries with high ‘voice & accountability’, more government effectiveness -> (slightly) less 
PTD. 
Countries with low ‘voice & accountability’, more government effectiveness -> (slightly) less 
PTD. 
 
Pretrial detention rate per 100,000 general population 
Moderator IV Interpretation 
Democracy Index HDI Countries scoring badly on democracy Index, higher HDI -> more PTD. 
Countries scoring well on Democracy Index, higher HDI -> less PTD. 
Democracy Index GDP per capita Countries scoring badly on Democracy Index, higher GDP -> more PTD. 
Countries scoring well on Democracy Index, higher GDP -> less PTD. 
Democracy Index Government 
effectiveness 
Countries scoring badly on Democracy Index, higher government effectiveness -> slightly 
more PTD. 
Countries scoring well on Democracy Index, higher government effectiveness -> less PTD. 
Democracy Index Public Services 
Indicator (PSI) 
Countries scoring badly on Democracy Index, higher PSI -> less PTD. 
Countries scoring well on Democracy Index, higher PSI -> more PTD. 
Voice & 
Accountability Index 
HDI Countries with low ‘voice & accountability’, higher HDI -> more PTD. 
Countries with high ‘voice & accountability’, higher HDI -> less PTD. 
Voice & 
Accountability Index 
GDP per capita Countries with low ‘voice & accountability’, higher GDP -> more PTD. 





Countries with low ‘voice & accountability’, more government effectiveness -> more PTD. 





Countries with low ‘voice & accountability’, more basic public services -> less PTD. 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Afghanistan x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x 
Albania x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Algeria x x x    x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x 
American Samoa x x       x  x x  x     x x          x   
Andorra x x    x x x x  x x  x   x  x x         x  x x 
Angola x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x 
Anguilla x x         x x       x x          x   
Antigua and Barbuda x x     x x x  x x x x x x x  x x   x      x x x  
Argentina x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Armenia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Aruba x x       x  x x  x     x x          x x  
Australia x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x 
Austria x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Azerbaijan x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Bahamas x x x    x x x  x x x x x x x x x x   x      x x x  
Bahrain x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x   x x  x x x x x x x 
Bangladesh x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Barbados x x x   x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x   x      x x x  
Belarus x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Belgium x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Belize x x x   x x x x  x x x x x x x  x x x x x   x x  x x x x 
Benin x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Bermuda x x       x  x x  x   x  x x          x   
Bolivia x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Bosnia and Herzegovina x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Rep. 
Srpska x x            x                   
Botswana x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Brazil x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Brunei x x x   x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x   x      x x x x 
Bulgaria x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Burkina Faso x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x 
Burundi x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x   x x  x  x x x x x 
Cambodia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x 
Cameroon x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Canada x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Cape Verde x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x   x      x x x x 
Cayman Islands x x       x  x x  x   x  x x          x x  
Central African Rep.  x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x  x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x 
Chad x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x 
Chile x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 





Colombia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Comoros x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   x x  x x x x 
Congo (Brazzaville) x x x x  x x x x x x x x  x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Cook Islands x x                            x   
Costa Rica x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Cote d’Ivoire x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x 
Croatia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Curacao x x       x                        
Cyprus x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Czech Republic x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Democratic Republic of Congo x x x x  x x x x x x x x  x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Denmark x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x 
Djibouti x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x  x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x 
Dominica x x     x x x  x x x x   x x x x   x      x x x  
Dominican Republic x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Ecuador x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Egypt x x x    x x x x x x x  x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
El Salvador x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Estonia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Ethiopia x x x x x x  x x x x x x  x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Faeroe Islands x x            x                x   
Fiji x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x   x     x x x x x 
Finland x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
France x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
French Polynesia x x x      x        x             x   
Gabon x x x    x x x x x x x  x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Gambia x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   x x    x x x x x 
Georgia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Germany x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Ghana x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Gibraltar (UK) x x       x     x                x   
Greece x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Greenland x x       x  x x  x     x x          x x  
Grenada x x   x  x x x  x x x x x x x x x x   x      x x x  
Guam x x x      x  x x  x     x x          x   
Guatemala x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Guernsey (UK) x x            x                   
Guinea x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x 
Guyana x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x   x x  x  x x x x x 
Haiti x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x 
Honduras x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Hong Kong x x x   x  x x x x x x x   x x x x x x x  x x x  x x x x 
Hungary x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Iceland x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x 
India x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Indonesia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Iran x x x x  x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x  x x x x x  x x x x x 
Iraq x x x    x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x 
Ireland x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Isle of Man (UK) x x       x     x   x             x   
Israel x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Italy x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Jamaica x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x 
Japan x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Jersey (UK) x x            x                   
Jordan x x x    x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x 
Kazakhstan x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Kenya x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Kiribati x x     x x x  x x x x   x  x x   x      x x x  
Kosovo x x  x x      x x x x    x x x    x x      x x 
Kuwait x x x    x x x x x x  x x x x x x x   x x  x  x x x x x 
Kyrgyzstan x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Laos x x x x  x x x x x x x x  x x  x x x   x x  x x x x x x x 





Lebanon x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Lesotho x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Liberia x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x 
Libya x x x    x x x x x x  x x x  x x x   x x  x  x x x x x 
Liechtenstein x x    x  x x  x x  x   x  x x   x      x x x x 
Lithuania x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Luxembourg x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x  x x x x 
Macau (China) x x x      x  x x x x   x  x x          x x  
Macedonia x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Madagascar x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Malawi x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Malaysia x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x 
Mali x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Malta x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x  x x x x 
Marshall Islands x x     x  x  x x x x   x  x x   x      x x x  
Martinique x x         x x  x     x x          x   
Mauritania x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mauritius x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mayotte (France) x x            x                x   
Mexico x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Micronesia x x  x   x x x  x x x x x x x  x x   x      x x x  
Moldova x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Monaco x x    x x  x  x   x   x            x x x  
Mongolia x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Montenegro x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x 
Morocco x x x  x  x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x 
Mozambique x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x  x  x x x x x 
Myanmar x x x    x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   x x x  x x x x x x 
Namibia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x 
Nauru x x     x  x  x x x x   x  x x   x      x x x  
Nepal x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Netherlands x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
New Caledonia (Fr) x x x      x     x   x             x   
New Zealand x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Nicaragua x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Niger x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x  x x x 
Nigeria x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Norway x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Oman x x x   x x x x x x x x  x x  x x x   x x  x  x x x x x 
Pakistan x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Palau x x     x x x  x x x x   x  x x   x      x x x  
Panama x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Papua New Guinea x x x x   x x x x x x  x x x x x x x   x x    x x x x x 
Paraguay x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Peru x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Philippines x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Poland x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Portugal x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Puerto Rico x x x      x  x x  x     x x          x x  
Qatar x x x   x x x x x x x x  x x  x x x   x x  x x  x x x x 
Romania x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Russian Federation x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Rwanda   x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x   x x x x x x x x x x 
Saint Kitts and Nevis x x     x x x  x x x x   x  x x   x      x x x  
Saint Lucia x x x  x x x x x  x x x x   x x x x   x      x x x  
Saint Vincent and Grenadines x x x   x x x x  x x x x   x x x x   x      x x x  
Samoa x x x x   x x x  x x x x x x x  x x   x      x x x x 
San Marino x x    x x  x  x   x   x            x x x  
Sao Tome and Principe x x x x  x x x x  x x x x x x  x x x   x      x x x  
Saudi Arabia x x x    x x x x x x x  x x  x x x   x x  x  x x  x x 
Senegal x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Serbia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x 
Seychelles x x  x  x x x x  x x x x x x   x x   x      x x x x 





Singapore x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Sint Maarten x x       x     x   x             x   
Slovakia x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Slovenia x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Solomon Islands x x x   x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x         x x x  
South Africa x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
South Korea x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
South Sudan x x  x  x x x x  x x   x x x x x x x x x x x    x  x x 
Spain x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Sri Lanka x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x 
Sudan x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x  x x  x x  x x x x 
Suriname x x x    x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x   x x  x x x x 
Swaziland x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x  x x x x x x x 
Sweden x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Switzerland x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Syria x x x    x x x x x x  x x x  x x x   x x   x x x x x x 
Taiwan x x        x x x  x    x x x    x x   x  x x x 
Tajikistan x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x   x x x x x x x x x x 
Tanzania x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Thailand x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Timor-Leste x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x  x x x   x x     x x x x 
Togo x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Tonga x x x x   x x x  x x x x   x  x x   x      x x x x 
Trinidad and Tobago x x x    x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x 
Tunisia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Turkey x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Turkmenistan x x x   x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x   x x x  x x x x x x 
Tuvalu    x   x  x  x x x    x  x x   x      x x x  
Uganda x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Ukraine x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
United Arab Emirates x x x    x x x x x x x x x x  x x x   x x  x x x x x x x 
United Kingdom   x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
United States x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Uruguay x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Uzbekistan x x x    x x x x x x x x x x  x x x   x x x  x x x x x x 
Vanuatu x x x x  x x x x  x x x x   x  x x   x      x x x  
Venezuela x x x    x  x x x x  x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Vietnam x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Virgin Is. (UK) x x       x     x                x   
Virgin Is. (US) x x x      x  x x  x     x x          x   
Yemen x x x    x x x x x x x  x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Zambia x x x x   x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Zimbabwe x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 






Appendix 8: Description of terms 
 
Accused person: A person who has been formally charged with an offense(s). Also 
known as a “defendant”. 
Alternatives to pretrial detention: Any form of pretrial release in which the defendant is 
required to comply with specific conditions set by the court, which can be financial, non-
financial, or both. Examples include an undertaking by the defendant not to interfere with the 
investigation or not to make contact with witnesses in his or her case; depositing a sum of money 
with the court (also known as “money bail”); regular reporting to the police or prosecutor’s 
office; electronic monitoring; or house arrest. 
Arrestee: A person who has been placed under arrest by police but not yet charged with 
an offense(s). Also known as a “suspect”. 
Bail: The process of releasing a defendant from state custody with the understanding that 
the defendant will return for his / her trial and required court appearances. The release can be 
conditional – see “alternatives to pretrial detention”. While generally a judicial function, some 
jurisdictions provide for “police bail” whereby police officers of a certain rank can release 
arrestees on bail prior to their first court appearance. 
Civil law: A legal system with a highly structured code of rules and codified statutes. In a 
civil law system, the judge’s role is to establish the facts of the case and to apply the provisions 
of the applicable code. Civil law is derived from Roman law, and is generally followed in the 
countries of continental Europe, their former colonies, and in much of Asia (outside of south 
Asia) and Latin America. Civil law often functions as an inquisitorial system where the court is 
actively involved in investigating the facts of the case, with judicial officers taking an active role 





Common law:  A legal system that gives significant precedential weight to judicial 
decisions based on custom and precedent. Common law systems originated during the Middle 
Ages in England, and from there spread to the colonies of the British Empire. Common law 
typically functions as an adversarial system, a contest between two opposing parties before a 
judicial officer who moderates as an impartial referee. 
Convicted prisoner: A person who is in prison as a result of being convicted of an 
offense(s). 
Defendant: A person who has been formally charged with an offense(s). Also known as 
an “accused” or “accused person”. 
Judicial officer: A person with the responsibilities and powers to facilitate, arbitrate, 
preside over, and make decisions and directions in regard to the application of the law. Judicial 
officers are often categorized as judges or magistrates. 
Jurisdiction: The geographical area over which a state institution (e.g., police, 
prosecutor’s office, court) has formal authority. 
Lock-up: A place of confinement where arrestees are held prior to their first court 
hearing. These are characteristically holding cells at police stations or a local jail. 
Pretrial detainee: A defendant who is awaiting trial or the finalization of trial while in 
detention. Also known as “remand prisoner”, “remandee”, “awaiting trial detainee”, “untried 
prisoner”, “unconvicted prisoner”, and “unsentenced prisoner”. 
Pretrial detention: The custody status of a defendant who is awaiting trial or the 
finalization of trial while in detention. The detention can be intentional (i.e., where a judicial 





grants a defendant money bail but the latter is unable to deposit the requisite amount with the 
court).  
Pretrial release / detention decision: A court’s determination whether a defendant will be 
at liberty or held in detention until the disposition of his or her case. 
Remand facility / center: An institution to which defendants are sent while awaiting trial 
or the finalization of their trial, typically by being remanded to pretrial detention by a judicial 
authority. 
Remandee: A defendant who has been formally remanded to pretrial detention by a 
judicial authority. 
Sentenced prisoner: A convicted person who is in prison serving the sentence imposed on 
him or her by a judicial authority. 
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